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STRASBOURG
Road coming from Fort Vauban to Strasbourg
Soussel R.
Bischheim
Schiltigheim
Map
of the Course of
THE RHINE,
in the
Environs of Strasbourg
Shewing the Passage of the Rhine
effected by the Army of the
RHINE & MOSELLE.
& the Operations at the
Siege of Kehl.
Scale of one Décimètre to 2880 Mètres
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MEMOIRS,

&c. &c.

OF

GENERAL MOREAU;

ILLUSTRATED

WITH A FAC SIMILE OF THE GENERAL'S LAST LETTER TO MADAME MOREAU,

AND

AN ENGRAVED PLAN

OF THE

SIEGE OF KEHL,

AND PASSAGE OF THE RHINE IN 1796.

BY JOHN PHILIPPART, ESQ.

AUTHOR OF THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGNS OF 1812 AND 1813;

And several Pamphlets in "THE PAMPHLETEER."

"Soyez tranquilles, Messieurs; c'est mon sort."

Gen. Moreau's Obss. on receiving his last wound.

Philadelphia:

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1816.

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DEDICATION,

BY PERMISSION

TO

MADAME MOREAU.

MADAM,

I am much gratified by the honor you have conferred on me, in permitting the following Memoirs to appear under your auspices. But in addressing the widow of General Moreau, who has shared his confidence, his triumphs, and his persecutions, I must beg to express those sentiments of respect for your virtues, and sympathy in your unparalleled misfortunes, with which every Englishman ought to be penetrated. And

I earnestly hope that the protection of an illustrious and generous Prince, together with the tender and grateful offices of private friendship, may restore to you that tranquillity of which you have been so lately deprived by an event which, at the same time, has robbed Europe of one of its firmest and most noble supporters.

I have the honor to be,
Madam,
Your most obedient,
And faithful Servant,
J. PHILIPPART.

ADVERTISEMENT.

IT has been the object of the Author of the following pages to present the Public with a correct Memoir of General Moreau, in which he flatters himself he has included every circumstance of importance, military and political, that attaches to the career of that most distinguished officer; and for which purpose he has employed every exertion in collecting materials that may be depended upon.

The Author has only consulted such authorities as he could with confidence rely on: he has avoided the insertion of all incidents trivial or doubtful, conceiving that the fame of General Moreau might be sullied, and the splendor of his just renown overshadowed, by any indelicate and heedless adoption of

indiscriminate intelligence, which frequently has no foundation in truth, but owes its rise to the ready invention of ill judging persons.

A faithful account is given of the campaigns in Germany and Italy since 1794, as far as they relate to the operations of General Moreau; also a detailed account of the siege of Kehl, and the movements immediately previous and subsequent to that event, from the celebrated work by General Dedon, published at Paris, and which is illustrated by a most correct map, describing every operation at the siege of Kehl, as well as the passage of the Rhine effected by General Moreau in the environs of Strasbourg.

These, and every other event connected with the public and private life of General Moreau, the author has drawn together, and embodied with the utmost fidelity and circumspection.

Fac Simile

de la Derniere lettre du GEN.t MOREAU à MADAME MOREAU.

Ma chere amie, à la Bataille de Dresde il y a trois
jours, j'ai eu la cuisse emportée d'un boulet de canon
le Coquin de Bonaparte en a toujours menti.
on m'a fait l'amputation aussi bien que possible quoique
j'aie eu un art fait un mouvement retrograde, la nuit a mille
pas. Avec mes pensées & de reproches du S.t Blocus
Et une Mere qui songe je t'aime & t'embrasse de tout mon Coeur
Je charge ayrault de finir

MEMOIRS,

&c. &c.

THE fall of a renowned military leader may not improperly be compared to a political earthquake: it is a circumstance of more permanent although less general calamity, than the loss of a great battle, and calculating its effects on an army in the field, it is, beyond question, a misfortune of the utmost magnitude.

When the efforts of a superior and vigorous mind are employed in the purposes of universal emancipation, the punishment of insatiate ambition, or the amelioration of human suffering, mankind must contemplate its powers with a mingled sentiment of veneration and delight; of

hope, anxiety, and confidence; we participate with its feelings; we exult in its triumphs; we rejoice in its success; or in its adversity, we cling with heavy hearts around, and mourn the fallibility of all human speculations, and human endeavours.

In this most awful and momentous epocha, the thoughts and wishes of every well-disposed individual must necessarily be directed to the issue of a campaign, in which are involved the dearest interests of Europe; in which the flower of almost every nation within its boundaries are serving, and kings themselves lending their examples and their persons to the great and glorious cause of Christendom.

One only circumstance could have heightened the universal interest, or given to the feelings of mankind, more of enthusiasm, expectation, and poignancy—and that was the voluntary and personal services of a man, who had proved himself, when young in years, a veteran in the art of war—one, who had run a race of victory and renown, without forgetting he was a man, and amenable to God and his fellow-beings—one, who had triumphed over malice, persecution, and injury, by meeting them with patience and fortitude—who endured exile, ingratitude, and a circumscribed income, without irritability or despair—and

who was more honored in his transatlantic banishment, than his persecutor, on the most brilliant throne.

In the vigor of his days, in the plenitude of his mental and physical powers, General Moreau again burst upon the world, not as the youthful and ardent genius, who led the armies of republican France, and who, in imbibing the spirit and fashion of his country, big with the chimerical and baseless notions, which have depopulated half the civilized world, appeared like a blazing star in the fulness of his glory, and was suddenly withdrawn from his early sphere: not thus, but as a man mature and temperate, as a man, who from a contemplation of the past, and anticipation of the future, yielded to the sage and unerring dictates of duty, humanity, and honor, and appeared in the field opposed to his successful compeer, Buonaparte.

A great battle was expected—the liberties of Europe hung in the balance—all was suspense, anxiety, and speculation; but the troops were brave, their Princes with them in person, the talents, the counsels, the experience of Moreau was there, and amidst all the contrarieties of opinion and feeling, hope was predominant, and it was justified in the event.

A contest took place, which soon proved successful, and decisive of the fate of Germany; but the main spring of the allied powers was broken, the pillar of their strength was shaken to its foundation, the lock of Sampson was dissevered, and the mighty spirit, which animated the whole, was about to depart for ever.

After the battle of Dresden, the universal sensation of the enemies of France was directed to the fate of General Moreau—a sensation, too recently and deeply experienced to require a commentary; nor can it be otherwise, that Britain, and her Allies, should deplore the fall of one of their bravest champions.

The family of General Moreau, although not noble, was highly respectable. He was born in the year 1761, in the maritime town of Morlaix, and in a condition of life, which placed him in an intermediate state, that gave sufficient scope for the cultivation of his native talents; being so much above dependence as to allow freedom of thought and action, yet so far below affluence as to require the exertion of industry, energy, and self-control.

General Moreau received a liberal education, which was finished in the French University of

Rheims. He was destined to follow the profession of his father, who had practised that of an Advocate, with considerable reputation, in his native town: but a predilection for a military life induced the subject of this memoir at a very early age to enter the army as a private soldier. He was, however, redeemed from the ranks by his parent, and he resumed his studies.

In the year 1788, Moreau was called to the bar, when he immediately commenced that career of celebrity, which has given such universal astonishment. He had not practised the profession long, before his brilliant talents, as an orator and an Advocate, in combination with his literary acquirements, and polished manners, obtained for him the honorable distinction of being elected *Precôt de Droit*, Provost of Law, in the University where he was educated; the professors of which, justly proud of the mind they had perfected, drew him from the legal course, that he was eminently gifted to pursue, to a sphere of action, that called forth all those talents, for which he has since been celebrated.

The powerful genius of Moreau, his patriotic virtues, and his eloquence, were speedily brought into full exercise. The Cardinal de Brienne, then minister to the unfortunate Louis the Sixteenth, a

man inordinately attached to power and prerogative, and in consequence extremely jealous of its assumption in others, had long meditated an attack on the provincial magistracy, who doubtless in some instances had outstepped the restrictive limits of their authority. These were the ostensible motives of the Cardinal minister's intended encroachments on the official independence of those functionaries. But it is with more appearance of truth asserted, that the penetrating and susceptible mind of the Cardinal foresaw the rising of the Hydra, and with a loyal and determined spirit essayed to crush it in its birth.

Moreau, already a scholar, an orator, and a public functionary, was selected to become the legal defender of the magistracy, and was entrusted with the best and dearest privileges of his compatriots. In this novel and responsible situation, the literary and legislative endowments of the departed General were most conspicuous; nor were his foresight and consummate prudence less the object of notice and eulogium.

The first proceeding adopted by Moreau in his arduous undertaking was remunerated with the proud title of General of the Provincial Parliament: nor was the court party, against whom he pleaded the popular cause, less backward in

paying those tributes to his talents and character, which they could not observe without respect and admiration.

The Count de Bissy, at this period military governor of the province of Brittany, had orders from his court, to arrest but not to injure this rising and extraordinary character. In this instance, the genius of Moreau defended him, and by observing a line of conduct marked with the utmost courage and circumspection, he eluded the toils by which he was to be ensnared, and continued his patriotic exertions with all the ardor of his nature.

The Cardinal de Brienne, being succeeded in his ministry by M. Neckar, a more tolerant and liberal system of government was adopted; and Moreau readily perceiving the enlightened bias of the new minister's mind, became a convert to those opinions which marked the character of Neckar, and to which he had before maintained so strong an opposition.

About this period, the royal authority being threatened from almost every department of the Kingdom of France, and the monster faction rearing its snakes in the very bosom of the capital, a convocation of the States General was deter-

mined; and with the view of contributing to the enforcement of this royal decree, Moreau took the command of the Rennes and Nantes militias.

With a mind warmly attached to the interests of his country, and susceptible of all the milder feelings of humanity, General Moreau remained virtuous amongst thousands of his countrymen who promoted the wildness of jacobinism and anarchy: and in his military command he acquired an increase of reputation.

In the year 1792, the French government, thinking it a requisite measure, to raise and embody certain battalions for the exclusive defence and support of the monarchy, General Moreau was elected to the command of one of them, from which period he relinquished his former pursuits, and became a soldier by profession.

Coercion, or its opposite quality, were alike ineffectual in attempting to oppose the revolutionary principles which continued to develope themselves in this turbulent year, and amidst the dreadful excesses and enormities committed, Moreau preserved unimpaired his character and his principles. Nor were the talents and courage of this gallant officer unrewarded. He was promoted in the course of 1792 to the rank of Colonel, and

having with his battalion joined the army of the Moselle, he was advanced to that of General of Brigade.

The first prominent military enterprize undertaken by General Moreau was not crowned with success. The late Duke of Brunswick, a brave and experienced soldier, was in the field with an army highly disciplined and infinitely superior to any loose and ill-compacted force which the French could bring against him at that time. General Moreau ventured to attack the Duke, and he sustained a complete defeat; but such were the abilities he displayed, that the illustrious Duke in his details of the battle, gave the most honorable testimony to the military talents of General Moreau. This distinction, added to his judicious conduct subsequent to the defeat, procured to him the friendship of General Pichegru, who at that period held the chief command of the army of the Rhine.

This was an important era in the life of General Moreau, conducing to establish his military reputation, and advance him still farther on the road to the chief command of a grand army.

To the perception of General Pichegru, an officer possessing penetration equal to any general of

the age, and liberality to encourage one who promised to become a formidable rival of his glory, the details given by General Moreau of his lost battle were such as proved the science and bravery of that officer. And when the French government removed General Pichegru, from his command on the Rhine, to the chief command of the northern army, he accepted the appointment only on condition that General Moreau should accompany him.

The directory readily acceded to the request of Pichegru, and on the fourteenth of April 1794, General Moreau was promoted to the rank of General of Division.

Towards the end of the same month, April, General Moreau was entrusted with the command of a corps of the army, with which General Pichegru invaded Austrian West Flanders, and he bore a distinguished share in all the operations which ensued, particularly on the 26th and 30th, on which days he blockaded and took Menin.

The garrison of Menin consisted of four battalions of Hanoverians, some cavalry and artillery of the same nation, and four or six companies of La Chatré's regiment of Loyal Emigrants. The Austrians had occupied Menin during the winter,

and had engaged to complete the repair of its fortifications, and to supply them with the proper ordnance, but had failed in both. They had, however, commenced some extensive works. General Abercrombie occupied the place early in the season with some British troops, but quitted it to join the Duke of York; and General Hammerstein, who succeeded to the command, had not been in the place a sufficient time to complete the works commenced, when Pichegru invaded West Flanders. Had they, however, been completed, no guns could have been mounted, because none had been supplied.

Every preparation was made by General Hammerstein, of which his means were susceptible. The outworks, and those commenced by the Austrians, were not only untenable, but too extensive for his garrison, and he had only field-pieces for the defence of the body of the place.

Had the French stormed Menin on their arrival, it must have been taken, and the emigrants would have been executed as traitors to their country. Fortunately, the enemy was dilatory in making the attack, and it was not until the 29th, that the assault was made. In the interim, the emigrant engineers (they were in the pay of Great Britain) made great exertions in repairing the defences of the place.

On the 29th, the town was attacked on all sides, and set on fire in several places; and some posts, which the garrison had neglected to demolish, being seized by the French, they were enabled to approach within musket-shot of the works, and therefore a successful defence was deemed impracticable. A capitulation, however, could not be accepted, as the emigrants would be exposed to destruction. In this dilemma, General Hammerstein adopted the daring resolution of forcing his way through the enemy, which he accomplished in the most gallant manner, carrying along with him not only his own cannon and baggage, but also several pieces of cannon taken from the enemy, and some hundreds of prisoners.

The sortie was so unexpected, and the attack so vigorous, that the enemy were surprised and disconcerted. In justice to General Hammerstein, I cannot avoid observing, that the exertions made by him and his garrison, under the circumstances of the case, were highly creditable to both; and the subsequent resolution of making his way through the enemy, was the only one which afforded a chance of saving the garrison, but would not have been attempted or accomplished by a common mind. No officer in the army was more distinguished for zeal, gallantry, and the exact performance of his duty, than General Hammer-

stein, and none understood better the profession of arms; not only upon this, but upon every future occasion, during the campaign, his behaviour and activity, far beyond his years, were held forth as an example to the army, by which he was generally admired and respected.

The emigrants, animated by a just sense of their danger, made uncommon exertions, forcing a passage with their bayonets, and being bravely supported by the rest of the garrison, they penetrated through the suburbs of Bruges, and joined the advanced posts of the allied army at Rousselair.

On the 18th of May, General Moreau was, with a very inferior force, opposed to General Clairfait on the Lys, and although forced to yield, he gained great credit by the ability and firmness which he displayed.

Ypres, an important town in the Austrian Netherlands, was the point to which their views of conquest were next directed, and General Moreau, even then considered one of the bravest and most scientific officers in the French service, was entrusted with the reduction of that fortress. Early in June the siege was commenced, with an army

of [1] sixty thousand men; General Pichegru having previously detached a corps of observation to watch the movements of the Austrian General Clairfait, and a corps under General Bonneau to Courtray, to observe that of the allies near Tournay.

General Clairfait, from the necessity of attempting the relief of Ypres, was directed to attack General Moreau's corps of observation on the 10th, with means at no time adequate to the task assigned to him. He was repulsed, and retired to Thielt.

He renewed the attempt on the 13th, was successful in the early part of the day, but finally obliged to yield to fresh numbers, brought up by the enemy, he retired again to the neighbourhood of Thielt, which offered a favourable position, and there rallied his forces, with an intention to cover and protect that town, and also to preserve a communication with Oudenarde.

[1] Vide Annual Register 1794, p. 24. It has, however, been questioned, whether the French had this force. General Moreau commanded the besieging army, the covering army was under the orders of Souham and Macdonald, and the whole under the general direction of Pichegru.

The French, however, had insinuated themselves between the Austrians and Oudenarde, and the garrison of Ypres, consisting of three Austrian battalions, and six battalions of Hessians, the latter very weak, and a few light companies, the whole under the Austrian Colonel Salis, (who deserved great credit for his defence) and amounting to about six thousand men, at the period when the place was invested, but who had severely suffered during the siege, now considering resistance ineffectual, and despairing of relief from General Clairfait, capitulated to General Moreau, on (the same day) the 17th of June.

The possession of Ypres was of consequence to the French, in reference to that of West Flanders, but it was wholly out of the line of all the communications of the Allies, being nearly the extreme point on their right. Charleroi was, however, in all senses a more important point, and it has frequently been questioned whether it was judicious in General Pichegru to engage in the siege of Ypres, the fall of which must have resulted from a successful attack on the centre of the allied force.

The fall of Charleroi [2] to the arms of General

[2] About this period, some of the most ferocious members of the ruling party in France, exhibited a degree of savage revenge

Jourdan followed, and the allied army became weakened and depressed, whilst the French Revo-

against England, well calculated to render them the objects of general detestation. Not content with solemnly proclaiming the Premier "the enemy of the human race, in the convention, a decree was also obtained, declaring "that henceforth no English or Hanoverians should be made prisoners," and the annexed address was soon after transmitted to the armies of the Republic, in which, after accusing the British government of all the crimes perpetrated against France, they assert that "not one of the slaves of George ought to return to the traitorous country of England."

On the 11th Prairial (31st of May, 1794) Barrere proposed to the convention, that the decree, prohibiting quarter being given to the English or Hanoverians, should be accompanied by the following address to the armies:

"England is capable of every outrage on humanity, and of every crime towards the republic. She attacks the rights of all nations, and threatens to annihilate liberty.

"How long will you suffer on your frontiers, the slaves of George, the soldiers of the most atrocious of tyrants. He formed the congress of Pilnitz, and brought about the scandalous surrender of Toulon. He massacred your brethren at Genoa, and burned our magazines in the maritime towns.—He corrupted our cities, and endeavoured to destroy the national representation—He starved your plains, and purchased treasons on the frontiers.

"When the event of battle shall put in your power either English or Hanoverians, bring to your remembrance the vast tracts of country English slaves have laid waste. Carry your views to La Vendée, Toulon, Lyons, Landrecies, Martinico, and St. Domingo—places still reeking with the blood which

lutionists were resolved to pursue their successes with every power they could bring into action.

the atrocious policy of the English has shed—Do not trust to their artful language, which is an additional crime worthy of their perfidious character and Machiavelian government. Those who boast that they abhor the tyranny of George, say, can they fight for him?

No, no, republican soldiers—You ought therefore when victory shall put in your power either Englishmen or Hanoverians, *to strike: not one of them ought to return to the traitorous territory of England, or to be brought into France—Let the British slaves perish*, and Europe be free.

The conduct of His Royal Highness the Duke of York on this occasion, was at once dignified and humane, and forms a striking contrast to the disgusting and barbarous system of the monsters who had usurped the French government. Instead of issuing orders for immediate retaliation, and thus producing all the horrors of mutual assassination, His Royal Highness, with that nobleness which characterizes his conduct, issued the following address to his army—To the honor of the enemy also, neither Officers nor Soldiers would enforce the mandates of the self-created government, and some of the Generals actually refused obedience to them at the risk of their lives.

June 7, 1794.

"His Royal Highness the Duke of York thinks it incumbent on him to announce to the British and Hanoverian troops under his command, that the National Convention of France, pursuing that gradation, of crimes and horrors which has distinguished the periods of its government as the most calamitous of any that has yet occurred to the History of the World, has just passed a decree, that their soldiers shall give no quarter to

These events, and more particularly the operations on the Sambre, seriously dispirited the

the British or Hanoverian troops. His Royal Highness anticipates the indignation and horror which has naturally arisen in the minds of the brave troops whom he addresses upon receiving this information. His Royal Highness desires, however, to remind them that mercy to the vanquished is the brightest gem in a soldier's character, and exhorts them not to suffer their resentment to lead them to any precipitate act of cruelty on their part, which may sully the reputation they have acquired in the world.

"His Royal Highness believes that it would be difficult for brave men to conceive that any set of men who are themselves exempt from sharing in the dangers of war, should be so base and cowardly as to seek to aggravate the calamities of it upon the unfortunate people who are subject to their orders.

"It was, indeed, reserved for the present times to produce to the world, the proof of the possibility of the existence of such atrocity and infamy—The pretence for issuing this decree, even if founded in truth, would justify it only to minds similar to those of the members of the National Convention. It is in fact too absurd to be noticed, and still less to be refuted. The French must themselves see through the flimsy artifice of an intended assassination, by which Robespierre has succeeded in procuring that military guard, which has at once established him the successor of the unfortunate Louis, by whatever name he may chuse to dignify his future reign. In all the wars which from the earliest times have existed between the English and the French nations, they have been accustomed to consider each other in the light of generous as well as brave enemies, while the Hanoverians, for a century the allies of the former, have shared in this reciprocal esteem. Humanity and kindness have at all

Austrians, and rendered their resistance to the French so undecided as to become almost unavail-

times taken place the instant that opposition ceased; and the same cloak has been frequently seen covering those who were wounded and enemies, whilst indiscriminately conveying to the hospitals of the conquerors.

"The British and Hanoverian armies will not believe that the French nation, even under their present infatuation, can so far forget their characters as soldiers, as to pay any attention to a decree as injurious to themselves as it is disgraceful to the persons who passed it—on this confidence His Royal Highness trusts that the soldiers of both nations will confine their sentiments of resentment and abhorrence to the National Convention alone; persuaded that they will be joined in them by every Frenchman, who possesses one spark of honor, or one principle of a soldier: and His Royal Highness is confident that it will only be on finding, contrary to every expectation, that the French army has relinquished every title to the fair character of soldiers and of men, by submitting to and obeying so atrocious an order, that the brave troops under his command will think themselves justified, and indeed under the necessity of adopting a species of warfare, for which they will then stand acquitted to their own conscience, to their country, and to the world. In such an event, the French army alone will be answerable for the two-fold vengeance which will fall upon themselves. their wives and their children, and their unfortunate country, already groaning under every calamity which the accumulated crimes of unprincipled ambition and avarice can heap upon their devoted victims.

"His Royal Highness desires these orders may be read and explained to the men at their successive roll callings."

ing, and determined the evacuation of West Flanders and the Netherlands in general.

The Austrians beheld an army every where victorious opposed to them; the whole of Austrian Flanders either reduced or threatened, and they yielded from an apparent conviction of the fallacy of resistance. The means of resistance were, however, still ample, if they had been properly applied, and other causes, besides an impression of weakness, led to a retreat to the Rhine. A false policy had more concern with it than any military consideration.

The Flemish towns, situated between Ghent and the coast, had been abandoned by General Clairfait, and the Hanoverian corps under General Walmoden, forming part of General Clairfait's army, having retired to Bruges after the defeat of Clairfait, as to a cantonment, not to a town which could be defended by a garrison, the works of Bruges having been dismantled, finding it impossible to stem the torrent which poured upon them, withdrew from that city, and joined themselves to the forces of General Clairfait. The magistracy of Bruges then readily submitted to the conquerors, and acknowledged the supremacy of the French republic. General Moreau occupied Bruges on the 29th of June, where he was joined by the body

of Pichegru's army on the 30th, and on the same day Ostend appears to have been occupied by the French.

Oudenarde, however, did not fall until His Royal Highness the Duke of York had quitted Tournay, and the general evacuation had been determined by the Austrians. It had been bombarded by the French during some days before it submitted.

The French made a considerable booty in these different garrisons, chiefly in military stores and provisions.

In the mean time, these rapid successes totally disarranged the plans laid down by His Royal Highness the Duke of York, who at that period was stationed with the British troops at Tournay. His Royal Highness on the 24th of June, marched to Renaix, whence he could support Oudenarde, and in order to form a junction with General Clairfait. When, however, His Royal Highness perceived that in consequence of the retrogade movements of the Austrians, he was forced to retire from the line of the Scheldt, he immediately withdrew the garrison of Oudenarde.

Oudenarde, although from its position an admirable point of assembly, must have been regarded as a very secondary object, and it was incapable of protracted defence. In fact, Oudenarde, though in former wars it stood sieges, had been dismantled by the Emperor Joseph with other places, and was now barely secured against a coup de main. The Duke of York, from his inefficient force, was prevented from having any considerable body of troops in Tournay. A small Austrian corps remained there, and also a few Hessians, who afterwards joined the Duke of York, but not with any view to garrison or defend it. Of these circumstances the enemy readily availed themselves: they entered that city in triumph, and in a very short time the whole of Austrian Flanders became a province of the French republic.

The reputation of General Moreau, who continued to act as an executive officer under General Pichegru, was by these signal yet almost bloodless successes, raised to that height of celebrity which few officers, even in advanced life, have the good fortune to attain: and throughout the whole campaign of 1794, this young officer never deviated from the principles and practice of a brave and honorable soldier.

The Dutch, whose supineness was the subject of universal reprobation, although they perceived the Austrian States in their vicinity falling under the French yoke, were not to be roused from their lethargy. Instead of repairing the fortifications of their frontier towns, and increasing the defences of such forts and strong places as might oppose a barrier to the tide of conquest, which was rising upon them, they were lost to all sense of their situation. They were masters of some fortresses on the Flemish coast, opposite to Zealand, and in particular, one situated on the small island of Cadsand, celebrated for scenes of the most obstinate valor, during the great struggle made by that people for their liberties with the Spaniards.

This fortress, General Moreau, found an easy conquest. He entered Cassandria, its principal town, on the 26th of July, 1794. A large supply of cannon and other military stores here fell into his hands.

The town of Sluys, however, on the opposite coast, was not won without difficulty. Its Governor, Vanderduyn, when summoned to surrender, replied, "The honor of defending a place like Sluys, that of commanding a brave garrison, and the confidence reposed in me, are my only answer."

It was early in the month of July, that General Moreau first set down before Sluys, at which period he was assailed by an affliction of a domestic nature, dreadful as unexpected. He was on the point of mounting his horse to hazard his life in the service, and for the glory of his degenerate countrymen, when intelligence was brought to him, that his venerable and respected father had suffered by the summary course of republican justice. His parent had undertaken to manage the property of several emigrants, and this furnished his enemies with an excuse to destroy him. He was accused of being an Aristocrat, or a friend of the Aristocrats, and under this charge was led to the scaffold.

General Moreau felt the barbarous decree, but yielding to the exigency of the time, he stifled the best and warmest feelings of his nature, remounted his charger, and executed the duties of his situation.[3]

[3] So much however was General Moreau exasperated against the inhuman monsters in whose service he was fighting, that he tendered his resignation to General Pichegru. "What do you intend to do" inquired the latter. "To quit the army and France" was the reply. "To quit the army and France!" repeated Pichegru: do you not then see the manner in which the *Emigrés* are treated by the Foreign powers? I do

The brave garrison of Sluys appear to have determined on resisting the rapid advances the French had made in their occupation of the Austrian Flemish provinces and towns, and continued to make a most vigorous defence, until the 25th of August, when the garrison surrendered. The soldier-like resistance which they displayed, induced General Moreau, with Roman greatness of mind and true glory, to grant advantageous conditions to the garrison, and he strongly expressed his pride and satisfaction in having been opposed to soldiers of such determined gallantry.

The city of Coblentz had been for some time the head quarters of the principal French emigrants. It was the seat of their councils, and the grand centre of communication. It was, therefore, particularly obnoxious to the rulers of France, and they determined on its reduction. General Jourdan, the Commander in Chief of the republican troops in that quarter, having received orders to

not accept of your resignation. I beg of you as a friend, to reflect on the step you intend to take: come to me again to-morrow. It is not thus that you should intend to avenge the death of your father; you must think of acquiring a glory and an importance which may one day put you in a situation to avenge it. I shall soon furnish you with an opportunity of distinguishing yourself.

this effect from the convention, detached General Moreau, who was called to his army, (owing to the division which he commanded at Sluys having suffered so much from sickness as to be sent to the rear,) upon this service.

A strong body of Austrians attempted to intercept General Moreau upon his march, and a smart action ensued, wherein the former were defeated with considerable loss. The French General met with no other obstruction until he arrived before Coblentz.

The Allies had employed a considerable time in fortifying[4] that city, and they flattered themselves that the garrison would make a resistance adequate to the expense incurred for that purpose. The unfortunate emigrants could no longer regard Coblentz as a strong hold, and a secure and certain retreat, after the Austrians retired towards the Rhine, and when any attempt at its reduction could not be counteracted by an army in the field. The reputation of General Moreau preceded him, and the celerity with which he effected the reduction of Coblentz, was considered one among the

[4] Ann. Reg. 1794. p. 54.

many remarkable events of the campaign of 1794.

The Austrian garrison retreated across the Rhine, and the whole surrounding country shortly afterwards yielded to a force which they had not power to withstand. The reduction of Coblentz was an event of great importance to the republican arms, as the allies possessed no other places on the left bank of the Rhine, except Wesel and Mentz.

The victorious French army pursued the retreating Austrians across the Rhine, and soon afterwards General Pichegru made preparations for the invasion of Holland with his whole army.

Nimeguen, the capital of ancient Batavia, but a place of no strength at this period, the works being wholly out of repair, and unfurnished with cannon, was, after various operations between the Meuse and the Waal, and the reduction of several places on the former, invested by the principal part of the republican army of the north. General Pichegru, at that juncture, was attacked by a cutaneous disorder which obliging him to abandon his command; he appointed General Moreau to

proceed with the siege and operations against Nimeguen, whilst he retired to Brussels, for the recovery of his health.

Nimeguen was occupied as a tete de pont, or advanced post, on the Waal, at this time the allies' chief line of defence, and the Duke of York's army cantoned in its front for a short time. It had retired across the Waal on the 19th and 20th of October, the French having forced his line of advanced posts on the 19th, and threatening a general attack with very superior forces, on His Royal Highness's positions.

General Walmoden remained in the town with several British, Hanoverian, and Dutch Battalions. The 7th and 15th regiments of British Dragoons had been employed on the advanced posts while the army remained on the left bank, but were afterwards withdrawn.

General Moreau attacked the out posts, and after a smart action forced them. On the 4th of November the French broke ground under the direction of General Souham, and commenced the construction of their works with great vigor. General Count Wolmoden immediately marched out of the garrison with a strong corps of English and Allied troops, consisting of 6 Battalions of British,

3 of Dutch, 4 Squadrons, 7th and 15th Dragoons, and 5 Squadrons of Hanoverian horse, for the purpose of obstructing the approach of the besiegers. The English infantry advanced under a heavy fire, without returning a shot, leaped into the trenches, and charged the French with the bayonet.

This sortie, though gallant and successful, had however very little effect on the general operations of the French; and the loss was severe on the side of the garrison. Among the wounded was General de Burgh, afterwards Lord Clanricarde, who commanded part of the British troops employed in this sortie, and who subsequently remained in the town with the picquets, about 2500 men of the Dutch troops, whilst the remainder of the forces, which had occupied it under General Walmoden, were withdrawn on the night of the 6th November.

General Moreau, clearly perceiving that the town could not be carried, while the Duke of York continued to throw in large supplies, took measures to cut off the communications of His Royal Highness. He erected a strong battery on the right and another on the left of the lines of defence; and these were so admirably served, that on the 6th of November the bridge of communication, consisting of many boats (Dutch schuyts) was

seriously damaged, and it was with difficulty repaired after some days, by Lieutenant, now Sir Home Popham.

The enemies' fire, however, becoming hourly more destructive, His Royal Highness foreseeing the complete destruction of the bridge, determined on the 8th to withdraw the whole of the troops from the garrison.

After General Walmoden had brought away the greater proportion of the troops, General de Burgh, who remained in command of the town, evacuated it with the British troops and a part of the Dutch. About four hundred of the latter, embarked on the flying bridge, of which during the passage, the swing rope was cut but by an accidental shot, when they surrendered, and were taken in the middle of the river, although they might have been towed across. The evacuation commenced and was completed late at night, and the bridge, which had become nearly unpassable, was then burnt by the British, as was the flying bridge subsequently by their fire.

Besides the above four hundred men, a few sick and stragglers remained behind; they fell into the hands of Moreau, who immediately entered the city.

The French next made an unsuccessful attack upon the whole line of posts on the Waal, and General Moreau on the 10th December directed operations against St. André, a fort in the Island of Bommel, on which occasion the late Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke, were wounded in a sally from the fort. Captain, now Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton, was also wounded. The affair terminated without any decisive advantage being gained by either army.

The winter having set in, General Moreau, with the other French Generals serving in the northern army, represented to their government the necessity of repose to the exhausted troops, but the directory was deaf to their representations, being determined to pursue the war against Holland with much acrimony. Neither the climate nor the season, the fatigues, the privations, nor the victories of the troops, could induce that assembly to protract for a moment these measures of hostility; and nature herself seemed to declare in favor of the republican arms.

The difficulties attendant on an invasion of Holland were great. It was at all times practicable to lay a principal part of the surface of the country under water; the rivers afforded strong

lines of defence, but these lines were necessarily much extended, and although consequently weak, might materially have obstructed every military operation during the wintry season, if the elements had not assisted the enemy. It, however, should not be lost sight of, that there are few instances in which the passage of a river has not finally been forced by a superior and determined enemy, when of course all the defences may be turned and taken in rear.

The plans proposed for the conquest of Holland in December, 1794, were facilitated by an intense frost. Suddenly the season set in with great rigor; the waters became capable of bearing armies with their artillery, stores, and ammunition; and it is therefore not unreasonable to observe, that the reduction of Holland would not have been effected in the winter of 1794, had the Waal and the Lech continued open.

General Pichegru, convinced that the moment was at hand to strike a grand blow, forsook his repose at Brussels, and put himself at the head of the army. Although his health was far from being perfectly re-established, he arrived at head-quarters on the 27th December, and resolved to commence vigorous hostilities without delay; which resolution he executed by the capture of

the Fort of St. André, and the Island of Bommel. The mercury in the thermometer was lower than it had been for thirty years; the waters were converted into an impenetrable substance; both the fort and island were reduced on the 27th without bloodshed, and the Dutch troops forced to retire to the lines of Gorcum. A large quantity of cannon and stores fell to the invading army, and sixteen hundred men were made prisoners of war.

The Island of Bommel, it should be remarked, was garrisoned by Dutch troops, who opposed little resistance here or elsewhere. Its defences were too extensive for the number of defenders. It was well provided with cannon, but without artillery men to work them, or a sufficient supply of ammunition.

Bois Le Duc, almost impregnable from inundation, had been previously surrendered without almost firing a shot. Soon after, the lines of Breda, Oudebosche, and Swenbergen, (eight miles W. S. W. of Breda,) were successfully attacked, and the town and fortress of Grave, situated eight miles S. S W. of Nimeguen, which alone sustained a protracted siege, very creditable to its governor, General De Bous, a very old Swiss officer.

The latter place had been left by the Dutch without provisions or ammunition, but these had been supplied by the exertions of His Royal Highness the Duke of York, while his army continued between the Waal and Meuse. It capitulated to the Republican arms on the 29th of December.

Between this period (end of December) and that of the retreat of the British, there were various affairs of posts. On the 30th of December, General D. Dundas attacked and drove the enemy from Tuyl, with considerable loss of men, and four pieces of cannon, and obliged them to re-cross the Waal, every where passable on the ice.

On the 3d and 4th of January, the enemy again crossed the Waal and re-occupied Tuyl, driving in the British advanced posts. They were repulsed by General D. Dundas at Gelder Malsen on the 5th, but General Walmoden thought proper to retire across the Lech on the 6th.

On the 8th of January, Lord Cathcart, with the 14th and 27th, and picquets of other corps, drove the enemy, with considerable loss of men and one cannon, from Bueren. The 14th and 27th British infantry distinguished themselves, and suffered

severely. Lieutenant-Colonel, now Sir A. Hope, was wounded, as was the commanding officer of the 27th, Colonel Buller.

On the 10th, the enemy crossed the Upper Waal at several points, viz. Pamerden, Nimeguen, Thiel, &c. also forcing the Austrians to abandon Heusden. The allied troops which, in consequence of occasional appearance of thaw, had lingered between the Waal and Lech, now withdrew across the latter river. Lieutenant-General Abercrombie occupied the heights near Rhenen.

On the 14th, the enemy attacked the whole line of posts from Ainham to Ameronym, the most serious attempt being directed against Rhenen. They were repulsed on all points, and particularly at Rhenen, by the brigade of guards and Salm infantry, under the orders of Colonel Count Sombreull.

On the same night, (14th January,) Count Walmoden determined to retire from the Lech to the Yssel, which latter river the army crossed on the 17th and 18th, taking with him a part of his hospital, and consigning the remainder to the care of the French, who treated them with great humanity. The number of sick in hospital at this

period was seven thousand, [1] and the severity of the season forbade the removal of a large proportion. Of those intended to have been left in the hospitals, many made an attempt to follow the march of the army, and fell a sacrifice to it.

The two cities of Utrecht and Arnheim, and the fortress of Gertruydenberg were also taken by the French forces at this period; the former was incapable of defence. The direction of the march of the British to Yssel, uncovered Utrecht and the rest of Holland. Gertruydenberg was capable of defence, but made no resistance. Arnheim was a point on the Lech, which fell with the general line of that river. The retreat of the British to the Yssel was very little, if at all, molested by the enemy, but the sufferings of the troops from extreme cold were most severe.

On the 18th of January, a French officer, bearing dispatches from General Pichegru, entered Amsterdam, and on the 20th, two days afterwards, that General was received there as the deliverer of Holland.

[1] The official account states that only three hundred men were left to the mercy of the enemy.

Every town in the States was speedily occupied by French troops, and to complete the catalogue of miracles exhibited in this campaign, a body of horse and light artillery fought a squadron of Dutch men of war frozen in the Zuyder Zee, and obliged them to surrender.

After these astonishing successes, General Pichegru continued in the chief command of the army. General Moreau was posted with his division on the banks of the Rhine, where, in conjunction with the other Generals of the Republic, they continued to protect its conquests, and overawe its enemies.

1796.

AT the opening of the campaign of this year, the Austrians and the French were posted in the following manner.

The Rhine separated them from the frontiers of Switzerland, to the environs of the town of Spires, where it ceased to be their common barrier. Beyond that city, the cantonments which they occu-

pied, at the distance of some leagues from each other, extended across the upper Palatinate, the Duchy of Deux Ponts, and the Hundsruck.

The line of the imperial army passed through the town of Spires, Neustadt, Kayserslautern and Kussell; from thence, crossing the Nahe, terminated at the Rhine, in the neighbourhood of Baceharach. Here the Rhine again became the common separation of both armies, and continued so to beyond Cologne, between the Sieg, and the town of Dusseldorff. The Austrians and French divided between them the space between the Rhine and Dusseldorff, before which the army of the latter had an entrenched camp.

On the Rhine, the Imperialists possessed the strong fortress of Philipsburg,[1] Manheim, Mentz, and Ehrenbreitstein. The French possessed, on the upper Rhine, the fortresses of Alsace, and on the lower Rhine, Dusseldorff.

[1] This fortress is considered as one of the bulwarks of the German Empire. The swamps round it add greatly to its strength. It was taken by the French in 1734, when the Duke of Berwick was killed at the siege; but it was restored the following year, by the treaty of Vienna. In 1799 it was four times blockaded by the French republicans without success. It now belongs to Baden.

The Imperial forces, including Saxons and other contingents of the German Empire, amounted to 150,000 men. The French force exceeded 160,000 men, and was under the direction of Generals Jourdan and Moreau.

On the 21st of May, 1796, the Austrians put an end to the armistice agreed upon towards the conclusion of the preceding year, and on the 31st, General Jourdan, commanding the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, made an advanced movement on the two banks of the Rhine. This operation gave rise to some trifling affairs of posts.

The weakest points of the Austrian strength were on the right of the Rhine, and to which the French directed the greater part of their force. The Prince of Wirtemberg commanded on the right bank: his corps did not exceed 20,000 men; and with that small force he had to defend the Sieg, to cover Ehrenbreitstein, and to line his bank of the Rhine. The General took up a position in front of the Sieg, where he was attacked on the 1st of June by a principal part of General Jourdan's army, under the orders of General Kleber.

The contest continued for some hours, but the Austrians were finally obliged to retire, and take up the position Uckerath. Their loss was very

great. According to the statement of the French General, it amounted to 2400 men, of whom 1000 were made prisoners. Before the Austrians were established in Uckerath, that position was outflanked and turned by the French, and Wirtemberg was obliged to fall back on Altenkirchen.

On the 4th of June, the French again attacked the Imperialists at the latter place; the post was carried, and the Austrians routed with great loss. This discomfiture forced the Imperialists to leave uncovered Ehrenbreitstein, and retire behind the Lahn. The French immediately invested that fortress.

The Archduke, alarmed by these successes, determined on marching to the assistance of his General. On the 6th, he made a rapid movement towards Mentz, and three days afterwards passed the Rhine. Apprehensive that Jourdan would also cross that river, and join General Kleber, the object of the Archduke was to attack the latter without delay. Securing the defence of the lower Lahn, he rapidly advanced against Lefebvre, who commanded the left wing of the French army. On the 15th, his right wing, under General Werneck, passed the Lahn and the Dille at Westlaer.

The Austrians attacked the French in their posi-

tion at the latter place, and for some time without success: towards evening, however, they were reinforced by some Saxon cavalry, and they instantly advanced against the French with the utmost resolution. Some corps of Austrian cuirassiers charged the French in their position on the heights and broke them, whilst a body of grenadiers attacked their centre with equal success. The French retreated, and took up a second position; here they were again defeated.

On the lower Rhine, the Austrians were also successful, and the French were obliged to fall back on the Sieg. The former followed up their good fortune, and General Jourdan, who on the 12th of June had passed the Neuweid, was forced to re-pass it on the 18th with his right wing.

The Archduke having sent forward General Kray with 11,000 men in pursuit of General Kleber, who, with a force of 25,000 men, was retiring towards the Sieg, that officer on the 20th came up with him. But the French General, finding himself superior in numbers, attacked General Kray, and carried almost every point of his position. Notwithstanding this early success, three Austrian battalions, by their gallant conduct, turned the tide of victory; unshaken by the French artillery, they suffered nine battalions to advance to within

a hundred yards, and, charging them with fixed bayonets, put them completely to the rout.

The Saxon and Austrian cavalry now rallied and returned to the charge, and finally put a stop to the progress of the French. The loss on the side of the latter was very great; in killed, wounded, and prisoners it exceeded 2000; that of the Imperialists amounted to 600. General Kleber was forced to rapidly retreat to Dusseldorff.

We now turn to the operations of the army of the Rhine and Moselle, under the command of General Moreau.

At the period that the Archduke quitted the Hundsruck, Field Marshal Wurmser withdrew the Imperial troops from the lines of Spirebach to a position before the fort of the Rhine, opposite to Manheim; his right extended to Frankenthal, and was covered, as well as his front, by inundation and canals, that joined to the little river of Rhebach, which bounded and defended his left.

On the 14th and 20th of June, Moreau made a feint attack on the positions of the Austrians. He continued to keep that army constantly on the alert: and employed them in making dispositions to repulse an attempt on their lines, which from his masterly

manœuvres they were led to expect would be sudden and decisive.[1]

Unexpectedly, and with the utmost celerity, General Moreau made a forced march with nearly the whole of his army, and arrived at Strasburg before his movement was suspected by the Imperialists. This project, conceived by an expansive mind, and executed with such brilliant success, began to develope itself. The islands of the Rhine were all either overflowed, or in the possession of the Austrians, whom it was necessary for General Moreau to dislodge, previously to his grand attempt to cross that river.

On the night of the 20th, General Moreau attacked the Austrian posts, and with such determined courage, that the latter were driven to the necessity of crossing the Rhine with so much rapidity, that the bridges of communication with the

[1] L'attaque de Missenheim et celles de Béclair et de la redoute d'Isaac, qui n'avoient d'autre objet que de détourner l'attention de l'ennemi, ont parfaitement atteint leur but. Ainsi, ayant fait connoitre les emplacemens de ces quatres attaques secondaires, et tracé le tableau des forces qu'on y avoit destinées, nous ne rentrerons plus dans le détail de ce qui s'y est passé ; le récit en seroit d'un intérêt médiocre, et détourneroit l'attention qui doit se fixer principalement sur la véritable attaque, celle de Kehl. Dedon's Précis Historique.

German side remained in possession of the victors. This circumstance greatly accelerated the plans of General Moreau.

Having taken all the cannon found in the positions he had forced, General Moreau was thereby relieved of a difficulty which had arisen from his deficiency in artillery. With the promptitude and vigor of his character, Moreau resolved to pass the bridges immediately, and assault that most important barrier between France and Germany, the fortress of Kehl, by the possession of which, the French would obtain an entrance into Suabia, and become masters of a large portion of that circle.

General Moreau had previously, in order to conceal his design, attempted the passage of the Rhine at various points, but having now a free communication with Kehl by means of the bridge, he immediately crossed with the cannon taken in the forts, and assaulted Kehl in the most determined manner. Success in the fullest extent crowned his enterprise, and the General obtained complete possession of the fortress with very little loss.[1]

[1] For the information of military readers, I shall also give in the Appendix, General Dedon's details of these operations and those immediately subsequent. They will be elucidated by a reference to the accompanying interesting map.

Marshal Wurmser, with 30,000 of the men under his command, had been called to Italy, and General Latour succeeded to the command of the army of the Upper Rhine. This officer, on finding that Moreau had passed the Rhine, made every exertion to arrest his progress. He directed the Prince de Condé with his corps to move towards Offenburg; this officer on the 27th joined at Biehl, before Offenburg, some Austrian detachments, and some troops of the circle, which had been driven from the camp at Wildstedt.

On the following morning, the French, having brought forward several strong columns, the Imperialists were obliged to abandon Offenburg. This movement was made by the French with the view of preventing the Prince de Condé from effecting a junction with several small Austrian corps, which were marching to his assistance, and thus to divide the Imperial army of the Upper Rhine.

General Moreau divided his force, amounting to 71,581 Infantry, and 6,616 Cavalry, into three columns. The right under Ferino, was directed against the corps of Condé and General Frolich. The object of Ferino was to drive back these corps unto the Brisgaw. He experienced some success, and took the town of Bibrach. St. Cyr commanded the centre—he forced the passes

along the vallies of Renchen and Kintzig, and on the 4th of July gained the town of Freydenstadt. Desaix commanded the left column, and was directed to act against Latour, and the Imperialists, who were rapidly approaching from the Lower Rhine. The French General pressed forward to attack Latour, before the arrival of the latter. On the 29th of June he gained considerable advantage over him at Renchen; the Austrians lost 500 men and 10 pieces of cannon. On the following days he again obtained ground, and on the 4th of July, pushed forward as far as the river Murg, and the city of Rastadt. General Latour took up a position in front of this river, and the 5th, Moreau, who had arrived with a reinforcement to Desaix, made an attack along his whole line. The action was well contested, and lasted the whole day—it ended to the disadvantage of the Austrians, who on the following day were obliged to retreat to Etlingen.

The army of the Sambre and Meuse having been defeated by the Archduke Charles, and driven to cross both the Rhine and Sieg, that officer, leaving 30,000 men under Lieutenant-General Wartensleben, advanced by forced marches towards the Upper Rhine, and arrived on the banks of the Murg, at the moment Latour was giving way to the tide of success that attended the arms of Moreau. The fate

of this part of Germany was now to be decided, and the Austrians, resolved, if possible, to repel their victorious enemy, made every preparation to accomplish that object.

In the mean time, however, Jourdan, finding that the Archduke had marched to the Upper Rhine, immediately resumed offensive operations; he advanced to the Sieg, and on the 2nd of July, passed the Rhine, and effected a junction between different divisions of the army of the Sambre and Meuse.

General Jourdan now marched against the Austrian General Wartensleben, whose force, as already observed, did not exceed 30,000 men, whilst that of the French amounted to 65,000. On the 3rd and 4th of July, slight affairs took place in the vicinity of Montebauer, and the Imperialists were obliged to retire behind the Lahn, which river General Jourdan's army passed on the 9th in three columns.

On the same day, an action ensued, but which was attended with partial success.—The next day (the 10th) General Jourdan attacked all the points occupied by the Imperialists between tho Maine and the Lahn, and after much fighting, the Imperialists

were obliged to rapidly retreat to Bergen, in order to cover Frankfort, the depot for their provisions and magazines. The following day, the fort of Koenigstein was invested, and which capitulated three days afterwards; and on the 12th, General Jourdan arrived before Frankfort, into which city the Imperial army had retired.

Having ineffectually summoned the Magistrates of Frankfort to open the gates, the French bombarded the town on the night of the 13th, and set fire to it. In the mean time, General Wartensleben removed his provisions and magazines. On the 14th, he quitted the city, and retreated in the direction of Aschaffenburg and Wurtzburg, with the view of effecting a communication with the Archduke's force.

The latter, who was placed between two victorious armies, perceived that no other alternative was left him than to attack General Moreau with every force he could bring into the field; but as Generals Hotze and Werneck were expected to join him with reinforcements, consisting of seven battalions, and twelve squadrons, he delayed the attack, although his force already equalled that under Moreau, in point of infantry, and exceeded it, by ten thousand in cavalry.

The Archduke conceived that he should be enabled to debouch a considerable force upon the rear of the French by the valley of Murg, Olbach, and Cappel, and from being enabled to oppose to Moreau, in front, his numerous cavalry, that officer would be obliged to repass the Rhine.

The right of the Archduke's army extended to the Rhine near to the village of Durmersheim: his left occupying the valley of the river Alb[1] and the town and mountains of Frauenalb, appuyed upon Rotensolhe.

Moreau was posted in front of, and along the Murg; his left at Rastadt, and his right in front of Guertsbach.

Finding that the Archduke only waited the arrival of further reinforcements to commence the attack, General Moreau, on the morning of the 9th, reinforced his right with almost the whole of the centre column under St. Cyr, and attacked the Archduke at every point from the mountains to the sources of the Alb. The principal efforts of the French were directed against the Austrian left. Four vigorous charges were made in this quarter,

[1] This river takes its source near Rotensolhe.

which the Imperialists firmly withstood and repulsed, but the fifth, which was made with the bayonet, decided the well-contested engagement in favor of General Moreau.[1]

The loss of the Austrians was very great in killed, and the French took twelve hundred prisoners.

This decisive battle gave to the French army a complete command of the Upper Rhine, and reduced the Austrians to the necessity of abandoning the cities of Manheim and Mentz, together with the strong holds of Ehrenbreitstein, and Philipsburgh, to the mercy of the conquerors.

At this epocha, the army of the Sambre and Meuse, which, after acquiring the most brilliant

[1] Après avoir été repoussés vigoureusement á quatre attaques successives, entreprises par la 93 demi brigade, et ramenés chaque fois jusqu' au pied de la montagne, on se détermina à une cinquième charge, pour laquelle on avoit réservé les 106 et 109 demi brigades. On se forma en colonne, et l'on marcha avec autant d'ordre que la nature du terram le permettoit. Cette dernière tentative réussit complêtement: on parvint sur le plateau, et l'ennemi fut enfoncé et mis en déroute. Nous le suivimes la bayonette dans les reins: nous lui tuâmes beaucoup de monde, et nous fimes prisonniers près de douze cens hommes, dont il y avoient douze officiers et un officier supérieur. [Précis Historique.

successes, had continued rapidly to advance, arrived on the banks of the Stein, and the Imperialists, finding that they could not possibly hold any position on the Rhine, while pressed by these two armies determined on retiring towards the Danube, there to recruit and concentrate their forces.

The vast plans conceived by General Moreau promised to be every-where attended with success. His victory at Etlingen was followed by the reduction of Freyburg, the capital of the Brisgau, and a place of much strength, of which he gained possession with little resistance.

Stutgard, the residence of the Princes of Wirtemberg, next fell to his conquering bands, and in a short time his troops traversed unopposed through the rich, populous, and extensive circle of Suabia. The cities of Ulm and Donawert, on the Danube, also became subject to the force of his arms; in both of which he placed French garrisons.

The army under General Jourdan had at this period overrun Franconia, and was advancing towards Ratisbon, whilst General Moreau was at the same time marching from Suabia, of which he had completed the reduction by taking the places above-mentioned, Ulm and Donawert. Master of both sides of the Danube, Moreau next proposed

to pass the Lech, flowing between the two circles of Bavaria and Suabia, but the Austrians, apprised of his intention and anxious to arrest the calamities that had overspread their country, opposed his design with a strong corps which they had collected for that purpose.

The passage of the Lech was undertaken on the 24th of August, and obstinately disputed by the Austrians; Moreau, however, forced it with the utmost resolution, near the city of Augsburg, and compelled the Austrians to retire into the country behind them.

The successes of the French armies created an alarm at the court of Vienna almost equal to that experienced when Maria Theresa fled from the capital. The Emperor regarded himself in the same situation, and formed projects for abandoning Vienna.—The operations of the French menaced an invasion of Bohemia, unless they were by some immediate step, impeded in their career of victory.

The Emperor made appeals to the people of Bohemia and Hungary, exhorting them to take up arms, and setting forth the exactions of the French not only in money, but in every article of necessity or of

use. The latter[1] operated successfully on the minds of many Germans, and they instantly exhibited a spirit alive to their danger.

The Diet, however, of the German empire was assembled at Ratisbon, and all the Deputies of the Princes and States of the Empire, except those from Austria and Bohemia, resolved on opening a negociation for peace with France, and a decree of remonstration to the Emperor Francis was also agreed upon, recommending him to conclude a peace with the French Republic.

Surrounded with difficulties, the Archduke determined on making a rapid movement to the right of Wartensleben. He learnt that an enterprising officer, General Bernadotte, the present Crown Prince of Sweden, had been detached against Ratisbon, and leaving a strong corps of observation under

[1] The Duke of Wirtemberg had been assessed four millions; the circle of Suabia, twelve millions: besides, to furnish eight thousand horses, five thousand oxen, one hundred and fifty thousand quintals of corn, one hundred thousand sacks of oats, a proportionate quantity of hay, and one hundred thousand pair of shoes. Eight millions were demanded from the circle of Franconia, with a very large supply of horses—Great sums were required from the bankers of Frankfort, Wurtsburg, Bamberg, Nuremberg, together with an immense quantity of other articles, for the subsistence and clothing of the French armies. Vide Annual Register. 1796.

General Latour, to watch and report upon the motions of General Moreau, he advanced towards that city.

On the 17th of August, he crossed the Danube at Ingolstadt, with the intent of throwing himself between Ratisbon and General Bernadotte. On the same day, Jourdan attacked Wartensleben in his encampment at Sultzbach—the army of the latter had received some detachments from the Archduke, and was more than equal in number to the French. They defended themselves with the greatest obstinacy: the conflict lasted from early in the morning, until eleven at night, when the French obtained possession of the ground on which the battle had been fought.

Jourdan, during the engagement, had directed a strong division under General Championet to march towards Augsburg, to prevent the Austrians there stationed, from coming to the aid of those at Sultzbach. The French General, on his rout to Augsburg, fell in with the Austrians, and attacked them with so much impetuosity, that they were obliged to fall back on that town. Early on the 28th, the French army moved towards the Austrians, who had strongly posted themselves in front of Amberg. The latter did not wait the attack of their enemy, and forced him from the position he

had taken. After a hard-fought action, the French regained their post, and following up their success, made themselves masters of the heights before Amberg, and the Austrians were obliged to retreat, across the Naab, and wait the arrival of reinforcements.

The Archduke Charles no sooner heard of the defeat of Wartensleben at Amberg, and his subsequent retreat behind the Naab, than he altered the direction of his march, and advanced to Hemman. On the 20th, he reached the latter place, and M. General Nauendorff, commanding his vanguard, immediately proceeded to take possession of the height of Taswang, while Lieutenant-General Hotz marched with a column towards Bellugriess to secure the Archduke's left, and the road from Ratisbon to Nuremberg. On the 22d, Nauendorff attacked the division under the orders of General Bernadotte, at the village of Teining, within a few miles of Ratisbon, and succeeded in dislodging and compelling him to fall back on Neumarkt. The next day, the Austrian General, reinforced by the column under the Archduke, again attacked Bernadotte, drove him from his position, and as far as the neighbourhood of Altdorf.

By these successes, the Archduke was placed

upon the right flank, and even in the rear of General Jourdan's army, who was no longer able to contend with the united armies of the Archduke and Wartensleben. On the 24th, the two latter formed in order of battle with the intention of surrounding Jourdan. The plan proposed was, that Wartensleben should assail him in front, and the Archduke take him in flank and rear.

The inferiority of the French General in point of strength, obliged him to make an immediate retreat, and abandon all the posts which he occupied, and retire to Amberg. His retreat was, however, conducted with equal judgment and spirit. It commenced on the 24th of August, and till his arrival at Wurtsburg on the 2d of the following month, it was a series of encounters and skirmishes; wherein the superiority of his adversaries in numbers, aided by hordes of peasantry, who fell upon and attacked the French from every quarter, rendered all resistance ineffectual.

On the 2d of September, Jourdan made a resolute stand, defeated General Stzaray, and would have totally destroyed the troops under the Austrian General's command, had not the Archduke, with his whole army, arrived in time to relieve him from his perilous situation.

General Jourdan now pursued his retreat, and from the sixth to the sixteenth, a continuation of obstinate engagements took place, and in which the French were frequently successful. The Archduke, however, concentrating his force for a general battle, the French withdrew from their posts on the Lahn, and made good their retreat to the Sieg.

Here terminated an expedition, which at its commencement promised the most successful issue; and General Jourdan becoming seriously indisposed from the fatigue he had undergone, resigned the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuse to General Bournonville, who, during the remainder of this eventful campaign, kept the Austrians opposed to him in continual check.

Flushed with its successes, the army of the Archduke Charles now became anxious to meet the army of the Rhine and Moselle, and compel its General, Moreau, to abandon the conquests he had made in Germany.

I have already observed that the Archduke, on marching to the relief of Wartensleben, left a strong corps under General Latour to watch the movements of General Moreau. Several affairs had taken place between these officers, in which, how-

ever, the good fortune or superior talents of Moreau, gave success to the French arms. The expulsion of General Jourdan's army rendered it impossible for the army of the Rhine and Moselle to maintain its ground in the heart of Germany, and Moreau came to the determination of moving back to the Rhine. Of the subsequent movements of General Moreau during the campaign of 1796, I shall here give the account published at Paris by an officer, General Dedon, chief of his staff.

Commencement of the retreat of the army of the Rhine and Moselle—Operations of the army from the 24th Fructidor (10 *September Old Style*) *to the 27th.*

PREVIOUS to commencing a narrative of this celebrated retreat, it is necessary to point out the respective positions previously occupied by the different armies.

The first division of the right wing of the army of the Rhine and Moselle was divided into two

brigades: one (Paillard,) was posted before Bregentz; the other (Carreau,) at Kempten, opposed to the corps of Generals Wolff and St. Julien, whilst General Frolich's corps was at the foot of the Tyrolese mountains, near the sources of the Iser.

The advanced guard of the second division of the right wing (Abatucci) was at Munich, opposed to the corps under Condé, posted on the opposite side of the Iser: the remainder of the right wing (Ferino) was at Freysingen, and at Mosbourg; the centre (St. Cyr,) the left wing (Dessaix,) and the reserve (Bourcier,) occupied the position of Geisenfeld, which became the *tête de pont* of Ingolstadt.

The command of the centre of the Austrian army was divided between the Generals Latour, Mercantin, and Deway; it was encamped in the neighbourhood of Landshut, a part behind the Iser. The division of Nauendorff at Abensberg.

On the 24th Fructidor, General Dessaix assembled before the *tête de pont* of Ingolstadt, the troops destined to march under his orders, in the direction of Nuremberg, for the purpose of harassing the rear of the Archduke Charles's army. In

the night of the 24th, he marched to Neubourg, where he crossed the Danube, and advanced by the road to Aichstett. The same night the army quitted its position at Geiseufeld to return to Neubourg. As this was a very difficult march, the army halted at Reicherzoffen, behind the Paar; the advanced guard remained during the day in the environs of Neustadt and Neubourg, and at night retired to Reicherzoffen and Bornbach. The corps under Ferino at the same time quitted the banks of the Iser, and retired towards Dachau, and on the following day took up a position behind the Paar, in front of Friedberg, in which it was directed to maintain itself, to cover the bridges of the Lech.

On the 26th, General Dessaix's corps advanced beyond Aichstett, and detached small parties still further in advance. The latter fell in with some detachments of the enemy, which they routed. The operations of this and the following day were directed in such manner that the army should take up a new position behind Unterstadt. A corps was left in front of Neubourg, and the posts were advanced to Pœtmes.

General Latour no sooner had learnt the movements of the French army, and the march of Dessaix, than he recrossed the Danube at Nauen-

dorff, to follow him. He directed the corps of Mercantin and Deway to rapidly advance together against Neubourg, whilst he took up a position at Shrobenhausen and Reicherzoffen. The corps of Prince Condé also moved from in front of Munich to Aicha, and that under General Frolich marched to Landsberg, there to cross the Iser and menace the French in their rear.

Battle of Neubourg — Movements of the Armies from the 28th Fructidor (14th September old style) until the 2nd complémentaire.

UNDER the impression that the principal part of the Austrian army had crossed the Danube, the remainder of the corps of Dessaix and a part of the centre of the French army, marched to the right bank of that river, in order to cover the movement of the General upon Nuremberg; whilst only four battalions of infantry, three squadrons of dragoons, and four of hussars, with four pieces of light artillery, were left to cover Neubourg.

On the 28th Fructidor, the Austrians advanced under the cover of a very thick fog, unexpectedly attacked the French troops at Neubourg, and before they had time to improve their positions. A strong body of cavalry wished to debouch in the little plain of Zell, under the protection of the infantry, covered by a wood; but were twice repulsed by the 10th French dragoons and the 7th Hussars. Notwithstanding the firm resistance made by the French troops, they were in the end obliged to yield to superior numbers. One piece of light artillery and a caisson remained for some time in the power of the Austrians, and they obtained a series of successes until five in the afternoon. At that period, the infantry of Duhesme's division having arrived from the opposite bank of the Danube, boldly advanced against the Austrian cavalry, and the fortune of the day was changed in favor of the French. The Austrians were attacked in the position they had gained by three battalions of fresh troops; they were driven from Zell and the woods, and obliged to rapidly fall back as far as Pruck, where they received reinforcements, and the French, who had advanced to this village, were in their turn under the necessity of retreating. The latter, however, effected their retreat without any loss, covered by the 7th regiment of Hussars and the 20th Chasseurs, which troops kept in check the Austrians, and

frequently charged them with success. The Austrian cavalry, in retiring by the wood of Wechering, which is interspersed with marshes, were successfully attacked and thrown into confusion, with the loss of twenty-four horses, and a like number in prisoners.

A Dense battalion of Light Infantry, and two complete squadrons of the 9th French regiment of Hussars, were stationed as an advanced guard at Pœtmes to observe the operations on the Aicha and Ausbourg roads. They were attacked by the corps of Condé, supported by the regiment of Modène, lately arrived from the interior of Austria, and forced to yield to such superior numbers, the French abandoned Pœtmes, and retired to Pruck.

On the same day, the detached corps of General Dessaix advanced as far as Heydeck, and thence sent forward some parties, who brought in information that the Archduke had adopted measures for preventing his convoys from pursuing the route to Nuremberg, and for drawing them from Bohemia by Egra and Bamberg. These accounts proving that this expedition was too late, and that it could not succeed in intercepting the Archduke's convoys, the Commander in Chief directed General Dessaix

who would otherwise have been cut off, to make a retrograde movement, and rejoin the main army.

On the 29th, the centre and a part of the left wing repassed the Danube, and took up a position between Rornfeld and Neubourg. The French attacked the Austrians in the woods of Zell and Pruck, and repulsed them as far as Wechering; but the corps which had been previously at Pœtmes, and which the day before had retired to Pruck, was again repulsed as far as Singnung. Some parties of the Austrians penetrated on the road from Rain to Neubourg, which the above check had left uncovered: they made prisoners a French Commissary, a courier, and some waggons of provisions.

On the 30th, General Dessaix's corps having repassed the Danube, the whole of the French army was drawn up on the right bank of that river. It became necessary to deploy the troops, who were too much confined in their present position, and to advance them on the roads leading to the bridges of the Lech, in order that they might repass that river without difficulty, or advantageously attack General Latour, in case he should make a movement in the direction of Friedberg. To accomplish this end, the French army was obliged to move on its right. On the 30th the

centre marched to Walden, in order to cover the road from Rain, and drive back the Austrian corps which had penetrated by Pœtmes. At the same time Ferino made a move in front of Friedberg, towards Aicha, which compelled the Prince de Condé's corps to retire. A part of the latter, in retreating by the route from Aicha to Munich, was surprised in the night by a battalion of the 96th *demi-brigade*, (which was there stationed in ambush,) thrown into confusion, and suffered considerably.

On the 1st *Complémentaire*, the Austrians were driven intirely from Pœtmes, and forced to retreat behind some marshes. The French army made a flank movement upon its right, and took up a position having its left at Pœtmes, with a flanking corps to cover Neubourg, and its right near Gemdelsdorff, upon the road from Rain to Munich.

On the 2nd the French army continued to march on its flank, and moved its right to the Paar, behind Groshausen, and its left to Gemdelsdorff. The French advanced guards drove back those of the Austrian army as far as Schrobenhausen, and took one hundred prisoners. The right wing, (Ferino,) made an advanced move on the Munich road, and re-established its communication with the main French army.

Considerable sortie made by the garrisons of Manheim and Philipsburg—Attack of Kehl on the 2nd Complémentaire, 18th of September, Old Style.

IT should be remembered that after the battle of Ettlingen, the French army in advancing upon the Neckar,[1] left a body of troops, under the orders of General Scherb, consisting of the 68th demi-brigade, and two squadrons of the 19th regiment of dragoons, to observe the garrisons of Manheim and Philipsburg. Although this corps was much inferior to the united strength of the garrisons, and consequently far too weak to fulfil its object, and keep open a communication with the French army, at the distance to which the latter had arrived, the Austrians made no attack on it, whilst the French armies were successful. After the first victory of the Archduke, and when the armed peasantry attacked the convoys and harassed the rear of the French armies, some troops from Philipsburg advanced on the Stutgard road to Pfortzheim.

[1] This German river rises in the County of Hohenberg, in Swabia, flows by Rothweil, Tubingen, Esslingen, Heilbron, and Heidelberg, and enters the Rhine at Manheim.

General Scherb, foreseeing that he would be attacked on the 19th *Fructidor* in his position at Bruchsal, by the garrison of Philipsburg, supported by a detachment from that of Manheim, and a column of peasants, determined to be before hand with the Imperialists, and to attack them on the 18th at Obstadt. The advantage of this action was in favor of the French, who vigorously charged their enemy with the bayonet in his different positions, and occasioned him much loss. On the 20th the Austrians again showed themselves in the same positions, and were again repulsed:—the following days they spent in skirmishing with the French advanced posts, in order to mask their intended operations, viz. the turning of their opponent, and thus to cut off his retreat.

On the 27th, at the approach of night, the small corps detached upon the French flank, were vigorously attacked, and forced to retire upon the principal corps. This affair appearing the prelude of one more important, General Scherb determined to retire on Kehl. In this decision he was confirmed by intelligence that a considerable corps of infantry was marching against him, and that some cavalry, detached by the Archduke, under the orders of Colonel Merfeld, was arrived. This cavalry formed the advanced guard of the corps the Archduke had sent to manœuvre upon the rear of the French.

It was to be attached to the garrisons of Manheim and Philipsburg, and under the orders of General Petrasch, Commandant of Manheim, to form a considerable army, the object of which was to defeat General Scherb's division, gain possession of Kehl, march to the valleys of the Renchen and Kintzig, and thus cut off all communication between this division and the French army.

In the night of the 27th *Fructidor*, General Scherb commenced his retreat. At the village of Grumbach he found the Austrians, who had preceded him, and he was under the necessity of forcing his way sword in hand. The Austrians fell back on Weingarten, and there waited for the French; they were, however, again obliged to fall back, after a contest which lasted one hour, and the French continuing their retreat, arrived at Kehl on the 29th, at eleven at night, after having been continually harassed on their flank and rear, and obliged to cut a passage through the Austrian lines. This retreat was admirably conducted. At its commencement the French division was nearly surrounded, and it only escaped from skilful movements, and partly disguising its march.

After the passage of the Rhine, the French had labored to strengthen the fortifications of Kehl, they had also commenced an entrenched camp to

augment its defences (marked 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 in the accompanying map,) but the outline of these new works was hardly completed,[1] and the old ones had not yet received all the repairs which were necessary to prevent them from being carried by main force. The garrison at this time consisted of only one battalion of the 24th *demi-brigade*, and some detachments of the 104th, who had been stationed there on account of the works. In fact, the Commander in chief, General Moreau, who had foreseen that the corps which he had left at Bruchsal, would be obliged to retire, and that Kehl would be threatened, had detached from the army a demi-brigade of infantry, and a regiment of cavalry, with instructions to advance, by forced marches, to the support of this fortress: but this corps, which set out from the army on the 22nd *Fructidor*, was not yet arrived, and General Petrasch, on the intelligence he had received, had detached Lieutenant-Colonel Aspre, with two battalions, to occupy the valley of Renchen, and to strengthen this position by by *Abbatis*, whilst three divisions of cavalry observed that of Kintzig.

[1] Every difficulty was experienced in the management of these works, and which much retarded their construction. The peasants of the Rhine, who were at first employed, seized every opportunity of escaping from their superintendents, so that but a few workmen out of the number appointed were actually engaged in the construction of the works

It must be admitted that the garrison of Kehl, when united to the corps under General Scherb,[1] was weak to defend a post of such importance, and to protect such extensive works, and that all circumstances could not be more favorable to the Austrians for attacking this *tête de pont*, of which the situation was truly alarming. The most prudent step, perhaps, would have been to abandon the new, and concentrate the small forces they had in the old works, which might have speedily been completed, and to have placed in the Isle of the Rhine, the small body of cavalry, consisting of two squadrons of the 19th dragoons, to which they had attached some carabineers, and some of the 15th cavalry. The 30th *Fructidor* and the 1st *Complémentaire* would have been sufficient for accomplishing these dispositions; but instead of which, the corps of General Scherb, with the cavalry, was left in the position it had taken on arriving upon the right bank of the Kintzig, in front of the bridge. It may be observed, that it is only to the obstinate courage of the French soldiers, and their astonishing bravery, that the Republic had to attribute at this period the safety of Kehl, for the preservation of which no defensive or judicious measure had been adopted.[2]

[1] This corps was extremely fatigued by its retreat, and the continual actions it had to sustain in effecting it.

[2] There is no doubt that the French had not expected to have been so soon attacked; and as the troops were much

On the 2nd *Complémentaire*, before the break of day, the Austrians, divided into three columns, warmly attacked Kehl. The principal column, composed of the regiment of Ferdinand, and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ocskay, crossed the Kintzig above the French position, and made a winding movement to reach the dykes of the Rhine above Kehl. Under the protection of these dykes, and conducted by some peasants who had been employed in the works of Kehl, they advanced as far as the horn work on the Upper Rhine, (marked 4[1]) and entered by the gorge, which was still obstructed by houses and gardens. Another co-

fatigued, they delayed till the following day, the adoption of better dispositions. They might perhaps have had reasons, of which I am ignorant, for remaining in so disadvantageous a position for the defence of Kehl, and their own safety. I have no intention of throwing blame on any person, but I have not been able to dissemble, especially as the first success of the Austrians is to be attributed to these dispositions. However, the conduct of every French soldier in this affair was such as to make ample amends.

[1] It has been stated that some Austrian officers, disguised as peasants, engaged themselves as workmen at Kehl, in order to reconnoitre with greater facility, and to direct the attack: it has also been asserted that from eleven o'clock at night the Austrians secretly introduced themselves into a garden contiguous to the right bank of the horn work of the Upper Rhine. These assertions, although not fully authenticated, are not destitute of foundation.

lumn, under the command of Major Busch, also composed of the regiment of Ferdinand, marched by Sundheim, upon the village of Kehl, of which it obtained possession. The third column, consisting of three companies of Servians, and a division of Blankenstein's Hussars, advanced to effect a false attack on the left bank of that river. One corps of reserve under Colonel Pongratz had approached as far as the French works on the banks of the Rhine, to support the columns more advanced, whilst another, consisting of a battalion of Manfrédini, moved by Neumuhl, and the route from that village to Kehl.

These movements of the Austrians experienced at first every success. In a short time they obtained possession of all the works of the town and the village of Kehl, and even of the fort: their tirailleurs advanced on one side as far as the butment of the ancient bridge of piles *(pilotis,)* and on the other, through the islands formed by the branches of the Kintzig and the Rhine, and aided by the fall of the waters, to the front of the bridge where the centinels were stationed.[1] It cannot,

[1] This bridge had been raised the preceding watch a hundred yards, and the butment left in its first position, but as it was not very light, and brandy had been distributed with great prodigality to the Austrian soldiers, they mistook the butment for the bridge itself, and there halted. This mis-

however, be said that the French were surprised, as the troops were under arms before the attack, which commenced a quarter before four o'clock: but the corps under General Scherb was intirely neutralized at this period, the Austrians having got in his rear and preceded him into Kehl.

The French cavalry endeavoured to retire by the bridge of Kintzig and the grand road, but the Austrians had already established themselves there, and the former were received with so warm a fire of musketry, that nearly the whole were destroyed.[1]

The 68th *demi-brigade* moved on the left of Kintzig, where the waters were low, defiled under a murderous fire, and endeavoured to turn the fort

take was very advantageous to the French, as if their enemy had reached the bridge and destroyed it, all their resources of ammunition and men would have been cut off. This first position of the bridge, upon the small arm of the Rhine, may be seen upon the map.

[1] The Citizen Ferry, an officer of the 15th regiment of Cavalry, was one out of the small number of individuals who escaped. After being made a prisoner, he perceived from a cave, where he was guarded by seven Austrians, that the French were regaining the advantage, and persuading his guards to restore him his sword, he made them all his prisoners.

on the side of the Rhine, in order to re-enter Kehl, General Sisé put himself at the head of the 68th, and sustained the action in the town; he was thrice repulsed by superior numbers, and the fire of case shot from four pieces of cannon, which lined the grand road. It was not till seven in the evening, and after extraordinary efforts and prodigies of valor, that fortune began to be favorable to the French arms. Lieutenant-Colonel Ocskay was made prisoner in the Fort, with two hundred men of the regiment of Ferdinand. This success restored confidence to a battalion which had begun to give way, and had thrown itself upon the bridges of the Rhine. General Schawemburg, who had gone to Strasburg, returned to rally and bring them back to the charge. This enabled the French to meet the truly impetuous attack of the Austrians, who had already suffered a great loss in men, and who exhausted themselves by this obstinate action.[1]

The town of Strasburg was without a garrison, but the artificers at the military magazines had been assembled and formed into a battalion; these together with the grenadiers, chasseurs, and cannoniers of the Strasburg national guard, were sent

[1] Major Dallas, who commanded under Ocskay, having been dangerously wounded, and the latter made prisoner, there remained no commanding officer to conduct the principal attack.

to the succour of Kehl. This reinforcement arrived *à propos*, and the aid it afforded was decisive.

The Austrians, who were not supported sufficiently early by their reserves, were thrown into confusion, driven from the town, and afterwards from the village of Kehl, where the action had lasted some time, but was finally evacuated, and the French troops took possession of it. At 10 o'clock the Austrians still held the redoubt *étoilée* 3, and the houses at the extremities of the village. The arrival of the battalion of Manfrédini by the route of Neumuhl, encouraged a fresh attack, but which was vigorously repulsed. At 11 o'clock, the fort, the town, and the village of Kehl, as well as all the French works, were in their own possession.

Such was the result of this bloody and memorable day, which at first threatened the French army with the most direful consequences. If Kehl had been carried, the entire corps of General Petrasch would have fallen upon the rear of the French army: the Austrians might perhaps have had time to re-ascend the Rhine as far as Huninguen, and to carry its *tête de pont*, far inferior in strength to that of Kehl, and in the event of which the embarrassed situation of the French army would have been indescribable.

The bridge and the town of Kehl were twice on the brink of being taken,[1] and it was owing to the cool intrepidity of General Siscé, to the zeal and activity of Generals Meulins and Schawemburg, and above all to the bravery and intrepidity of the 68th *demi-brigade*, that its preservation is to be attributed. In fact, it was only at the expence of a seven hours action of the most obstinate and sanguinary nature, against superior forces, that the French succeeded in repulsing the Austrians, who at one time were completely masters of the greater part of their works. The Austrians lost in this action, according to their own statement, six hundred and fifty men in killed, nearly three hundred

[1] The grand bridge of piles was not entirely re-established. One of the French battalions, which was repulsed, wished to retire by it, but having reached the *coupures*,* and not being able to advance any further, it was forced to return. It has been observed that the Austrians, perceiving this bridge covered with troops, expected they were reinforcements, and that this idea determined them to retrogade. I, however, imagine that if this incident contributed to the preservation of Kehl, it arose from the battalion being obliged to return to the action.

* *Coupures* in fortification, are passages, sometimes cut through the glacis, of about 12 or 15 feet broad, in the re-entering angle of the covert way, to facilitate the sallies of the besieged. They are sometimes made through the lower curtain, to let boats into a haven built in the rentrant angle of the counterscarp of the outworks They are also ditches dug to prevent a besieging army from getting too close to the walls of a fortified town or place.

prisoners, a howitzer, and some caissons. The loss of the French, although very great, when their small force is considered, was much inferior to that of their enemy.[1]

After the ill success of the above attempt, General Petrasch divided his forces, in order to march them at once upon the different defiles by which the French would retire. One column was moved to the valley of Kintzig, another to that of Renchen, and a third upon the Pfortzheim and Stutgard road:—they also sent out detachments to a great distance, which surprised and carried off many stragglers of the French army, as well as equipages and large supplies.

Another part of the garrison of Manheim, under the command of General Hotze, had made a rapid movement upon the left bank of the Rhine. It advanced to Germersheim, to Weissembourg (which it put under contributions) to Lauterbourg, and even opposite to Fort Vauban, and near to Haguenau, but it was repulsed by some weak detachments of posts, supported by the columns of the department of the Lower Rhine, and it retired without having obtained any other advantage than that of destroying the lines of the Queich and the fortifications of Germersheim.

[1] The Citizens Boutrou and Forty of the 68th Brigade were made prisoners.

Continuation of the retreat of the Army of the Rhine and Moselle, to the 10th Vendemaire.

THE situation of the main French army became much more embarrassed. The first division on the right was menaced by the corps of Generals Frolich, Wolff, and St. Julien, which united formed a mass of strength far superior to the forces under Generals Tarreau and Paillard. In fact, the latter was entirely surrounded in his position near Kempten, and some of the enemies' parties had pushed as far as Memmingen. Several skirmishes had taken place at this point, and in the environs of Brégenz, on the 27th *Fructidor*, and the 4th *Complémentaire*. On the first intelligence that these officers received of the danger to which this division was exposed, Ferino moved with General Jordy's brigade upon Memmingen, whilst Abatucci, who had set out from Landsberg, advanced by forced marches to attack the enemy in rear: but the latter was defeated before the arrival of these troops, by General Tarreau, seconded by General Paillard. The latter obtained possession of one piece of cannon.

The main French army was too far distant from the appui, which the lake of Constance would have afforded, to support its right, and the communications were become so bad, that it could not have remained secure so remote from its frontiers. Although the army of the Rhine had not yet given up the hope of seeing that of the Sambre and Meuse re-commence the offensive, but as it had not yet succeeded, General Moreau determined on continuing the retreat, and to take up a more contracted position, by which he would be enabled to detach a corps to cover his rear, and to wait for more fortunate circumstances, which might enable him again to advance. General Moreau put himself in motion to take up the position of Iller, the right to the lake of Constance, and the left to Ulm. With this intention, he detached General Montrichard, with four battalions and two regiments of cavalry, to move on Ulm, to cover that place, as well as the bridges of the Danube, and to repulse the detachments of the enemy from Manheim and Stutgard, who were advanced as far as Goeppingen. This detachment set out from Friedberg the 2nd *Complémentaire*, and although it made forced marches, it only preceded by an hour the division under General Nauendorff, who had moved by the left bank of the Danube, and which, if enabled to pass the Austrians, would have been on the rear of the French.

The preparations of the latter being completed for re-passing the Lech, that operation was effected on the 3rd *Complémentaire*. Every precaution was adopted that no corps should be left behind, and to prevent the advanced guard from being attacked with advantage. General Latour having been duped by the movements of the French in front of the Paar, as well as from the attack upon Schrobenhausen, and conceiving their intention was to attack him, retrograded, and thus afforded the French several marches over him. This gave further promises of success to the retreat.

The right wing and the centre re-passed the Lech, upon the two bridges near Augsburg. The left wing by Rain, and all the advanced guards remained for that day in front of the river.

On the 4th *Complémentaire*, the army retired behind the Schmutter, the left wing behind the Zusam to Wertingen; the advanced guards took up a position behind the Lech. The corps of General Nauendorff, followed the French by the left bank of the Danube; its advanced guard arrived the same day at Nordlingen and Donawert.

On the 5th the French took up a position behind the Mindel, their right at Kemlat, left at Burgau, and the advanced guards on the Zusam.

On the 1st *Vendemaire*, the French took up a position behind the Guntz, their right to Wattenweiller, and their left to Bubisheim, in front of Leipheim, their advanced guards upon the Mindel.

On the 3rd the army arrived upon the Iller; the corps of Ferino halted at Memmingen, that of St. Cyr crossed the bridges of Illerdissen, and Kirchberg; the left wing (Dessaix) arrived at Ulm, there passed the Danube, and took up a position upon the heights in the rear of Blau, the right to the river and the left to Klingenstein.

General Moreau, who had at first designed to remain some time in this position, not receiving any intelligence either from France or from the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, and knowing the Archduke was manœuvring on his rear, and General Nauendorff rapidly advanced to unite himself to the corps under Petrasch, perceived that no time was to be lost in regaining the Rhine, and resolved to continue his retreat.

In three marches the French removed from its position of the Iller, to another behind the Federsée, where it arrived on the 8th. Ferino's corps, which had joined near Kehl the brigades of Paillard and Tarreau, in order that they should in future consti-

tute but one army, moved upon some heights behind the Schussen, between Baindt and Rawensbourg. The centre was posted near Steinhausen, between the lake Federsée and abbey of Schussenried. The left wing (Dessaix) retired by the banks of the Danube, as far as Ettlingen, where it re-crossed the river: it abandoned Ulm, which was hotly cannonaded by General Nauendorff, in the night of the 5th, and the Austrians took possession on the following morning. This wing next took up a position between the lake Federsée and the Danube. The head-quarters were established at Sulgau.

At this period General Latour, who had rapidly followed the French, was posted in their front. General Frolich's corps, consisting of those under Wolff and St. Julien, with that of Condé, threatened the French on their right. General Nauendorff, moving upon the left of the Danube, made every effort to menace and turn the left flank; General Petrasch, with ten thousand men, occupied the debouchés of the black mountains, in the rear of the French, and the Archduke was advancing with a formidable column from the Lower Rhine, to take Kehl and the *tête de pont* of Huninguen. He had arrived beyond Mein, and a part of his cavalry had joined that of General Petrasch.

On the 9th, General Latour pushed his advanced guard by Steinhausen as far as Schussenried, where an obstinate action took place. General St. Cyr supported his advanced guard with all his corps, and the action extended along the whole line, Dessaix having also been attacked on the left, and Ferino on the right near Rawensbourg. The Austrians were repulsed at every point with the loss of three hundred prisoners, including five officers.

Battle of Biberach, the 11th Vendemaire, (2nd October, 1796, old style.)

THE army of the Rhine and Moselle, thus circumscribed in its position by General Latour, could not continue its retreat, nor force the passage of the black mountains, without having first obliged the Austrians sufficiently to fall back, so that they might remain at least some days disembarrassed. In the midst of the numerous dangers which threatened them, the French possessed the singular advantage of having their forces concentrated, and the power of moving in a united mass

against the different corps by which they were surrounded in every direction, and with every promise of successively defeating them. General Moreau knew admirably well in what manner to profit by these circumstances, and to preserve his army from ruin. General Nauendorff's corps, which was moving to cut off the passages of the valleys of Kintzig and Renchen, having already advanced beyond Tubingen, was too far distant to afford any succour to General Latour, and General Moreau therefore determined to make the first attack on the latter. A battle was almost the only resource which remained to the French army. The admirable constancy and firmness of the troops decided this bold step, and the Commander-in-Chief made dispositions for the attack along the whole line.

The right wing (Ferino,) leaving a corps to oppose that of General Frolich, upon the Argeu, was directed to move by Waldsee, upon the village of Essendorff, and vigorously to attack the enemy in every direction it should be encountered.

The centre, (St. Cyr,) with the reserve, was commanded to attack the Austrians in their position near Steinhausen, and to endeavour to push them as far as Biberach, whilst the left wing (Dessaix) made an attack on the opposite side of

the lake by the route from Riedlingen to Biberach, and endeavoured to attain the heights near that town, before the army under General Latour, encamped at Steinhausen, and which General St. Cyr was to have obliged to fall back: but Dessaix was also directed to leave sufficient troops to watch the Danube, and guard its banks.

At half past seven in the morning, the centre began its principal attack by the route from Reichembach to Biberach. One column advanced on the enemy by the right of Schussenried, whilst another attack was engaged at Ogeshausen. The Austrians, after a long resistance, were defeated and closely pursued.

The left wing had been put in motion early in the morning, in order to arrive, at the expected moment of the attack on the centre, between Sechkirch and Ala. At the same instant therefore the right wing of the Austrians was warmly attacked, and obliged to give way, as well as their whole line: and a most complete and brilliant victory crowned the operations of the day. Five thousand prisoners, including sixty-five officers, eighteen pieces of cannon, and two colors, fell into the hands of the French. This success would have cost the Austrians a much greater loss, if the right wing of the French had co-operated and executed the move-

ment prescribed for it, but in which it failed, owing to the orders having been lost, and from not receiving fresh instructions until too late. Had it been otherwise, a principal part of Mercantin's corps, which was opposed to the right of the French, must have been cut off, and made prisoners.

Continuation of the retreat of the Army—Affairs of Rotweil and Villingen, 18th Vendemaire, (9th October, old style,) Passage of the Valley of Hell.

THE victory of Biberach, although complete, was not sufficient to extricate the French army, and render its retreat secure. General Nauendorff, who had marched by Tubingen and Hechengen, was arrived at Rotweil, where he had rejoined General Petrasch: their united divisions amounted to 25,000 men, occupying Rotweil, Villingen,[1] Doneschingen, and Neustadt. The forest

[1] Pronounced Fillingen, the V in German having the pronunciation of F.

towns were occupied by Austrian troops and armed peasants.[1] Therefore, (although the corps of General Latour, weakened by its defeat, was driven to some distance,) as all communications with the Rhine were intercepted, it was necessary that more than one action should be fought to open for the French army a passage by the forest towns, and to force the *gorges* of the black forest: and little time was to be lost, as the Archduke had already[2] arrived upon the Renchen with the principal part of the forces, which he was marching from the Lower Rhine, and some detachments, which he had pushed forward, had reached the environs of Fribourg and Old Brisach.[3]

[1] General Joba, who had been sent to reconnoitre a camp, near Friedingen, was taken on the 14th *Vendemaire* by a party of Lobkowitz Light Horse.

[2] He remained a long time upon this river. If he had powerfully marched to the *débouché* of the *gorges* of Hell, he could have got there before the French army. He is accused of having amused himself at Fêtes, which were given him at Frankfort and Manheim: but I imagine he had more plausible motives for not advancing beyond the Renchen; he was fearful that the French could *débouché* on his rear by forcing the passage of the valley of Kintzig, less impenetrable than the valley of Hell, which he moreover conceived sufficiently defended by two battalions, and this consideration in all probability detained him on the Renchen.

[3] The French had left at Fribourg General Tholmé, with some hundred men, to cover their communications and escort convoys. On the night of the 16th *Frimaire*, they evacuated

After the battle General Moreau had not left opposed to General Latour, but such troops as were indispensably necessary to keep him in check. He had directed a part of his forces to cross the Danube, close to Riedlingen, which he destined to march against General Nauendorff's division, near Rotweil, and Villingen, and to proceed by Ebingen and Spaiching. On the 14th and 15th *Vendemaire* the advanced guard of this portion of the army encountered upon this route, near Strasberg and Ebingen, the advanced posts of their enemy—the latter were vigorously repulsed, and on the 18th the French arrived at Rothenmunster. Here a warm contest took place, which terminated in favor of the French, who drove the Austrians beyond Rotweil, with the loss of one hundred and forty cuirassiers, who with their horses were made prisoners. During this attack, a corps under General Taponnier entered the valley of the Briege,[1] to turn the post of Villingen, into which the French entered on the 20th, after a second action, wherein they took two pieces of cannon, and a hundred and fifty light horse of the regiment of Karaicksay.

that town upon receiving intelligence of the march of the Archduke's troops, and 70 were made prisoners at Old Brisach. These prisoners were, however, liberated in a few days, and their escort fell into the hands of the French.

[1] The Briege is, properly speaking, a source of the Danube, and one of the most considerable.

The French, not being able to reach Kehl by the valleys of the Renchen and Kintzig, too strongly occupied by the Austrians, and at the *débouché* of which the Archduke was encamped; and having no other way by which to retire than that of the narrow and difficult valleys terminating at Fribourg and the Forest towns' road, had moved, after their victory, by Maskirch and Pfullendorff, to the heights of Stockach and Friedingen, in which position they arrived on the 16th. From thence they detached a *demi-brigade* to open the road of the Forest towns, and to conduct to Huninguen a large convoy of stores and baggage. It marched by Tengen, and Stuhlingen, and executed its object without experiencing any serious obstacles. The remainder of the army continued to retreat by Doneschingen. At the latter place, General Moreau having destined the centre to force the passage of the valley of Hell,[1] detached it from the

[1] To traverse the black mountains, from Neustadt to Fribourg, you have for two hours to travel along a narrow valley between perpendicular rocks. This valley, or rather this crevice, at the end of which runs a torrent, is only a few paces wide, and is named the valley of Hell. By this terrible defile, the greater part of the French army traversed the black mountains with an enemy in its front, its rear, and on its flanks. It was on this valley that Marshal Villars, in 1702, wrote the following sentence to the Elector of Bavaria, who pressed him to cross the black mountains and join him. " Cette vallée de Neustadt, que vous me proposez, c'est ce chemin qu'on

rest of his forces, and united his right and left into one body, which was to make head against the corps under Generals Latour, Petrasch, and Nauendorff.

The corps of the Austrians which occupied the valley of Neustadt, was composed of two battalions, and some light cavalry. The troops under the orders of General Girard, charged with forcing this passage, surmounted every obstacle which the nature of the country presented to them, and on the 20th attacked with extreme vigor the enemy occupying this valley, who were overthrown with the loss of a hundred prisoners, and a piece of cannon. He retired in the greatest disorder upon Emmendingen, and on the following day, 21st *Vendemaire*, the centre of the army (St. Cyr) took up a position in front of Fribourg.

The 22d, 23d, and 24th were occupied with the remainder of the army defiling by that valley. The convoy of stores and baggages had passed by the Forest towns, protected in its march by a part of the right wing, and arrived at Huninguen, without sustaining any loss.

appelle le val D'Enfer. Hé bien, que votre Altesse me pardonne l'expression, je ne suis pas Diable pour y passer."

Lieutenant-Colonel Aspre, who was charged with defending the passage, was mortally wounded in the breast.

Thus this brave army, whose dangerous and interesting situation had attracted the attention of all Europe; and which the Austrians had flattered themselves of intirely capturing, escaped by the able manœuvres of its Chief, General Moreau, and by his skill in taking advantage of the admirable conduct of his troops, and their unshaken firmness. After a march of one hundred leagues, this army had reached its borders, ready to overcome every difficulty, and carrying with it the glorious trophies of brilliant victories, which fix this retreat as the first military operation of which history has preserved the details.[1]

Affair upon the Eltz, the 28th Vendemaire (16th Oct. Old Style.) Retreat of the Army on Huninguen. Operations to the 1st Brumaire.

THE project of General Moreau, in descending the Rhine, was to move near Kehl, and already he

[1] The French army brought with it eighteen cannons taken at the battle of Biberach, two at Villingen, and two colors.

had advanced before the Eltz[1] to Emmendingen: he had posted a division at Waldkirch to cover his right flank: and had begun to make dispositions to gain the valley of Kintzig. With this design, and to possess himself of the heights, he directed the centre to carry Eltzach; but the continual rains which had destroyed the roads, rendered them impassable for artillery, very slippery and bad for an infantry almost intirely without shoes, prevented this attack taking place. The Austrians moreover were already masters of the summits which commanded the French, and which it would have been necessary for the latter to ascend in order to act.

The Archduke, on his part, hastened his march to oppose the progress of the French, and lost no time in uniting all his forces, and collecting all the corps which had been invested. That of General Petrasch joined him on the 24th near Ettenheim after having passed by Hornberg and Haslach; Naundorff moved from Villingen by Hornberg upon Eltzach, where he effected a junction on the same day, with the left wing of the Archduke. General Latour's army débouched in the plain of the Rhine by the valley of Kintzig,

[1] The Eltz takes its source in the black mountains beyond Waldkirch, passes by Kenzingen and Cappel, and disembogues into the Rhine near Witenwihr.

and after forced marches, he joined on the 27th, between Ettenheim and Herbottzheim. The corps of Prince Condé and General Frolich, the only corps that had followed the French by the valley of Hell, arrived at Neustadt on the 24th, and General Wolff, who had followed the retreating army by the Forest towns, was in the invirons of Waldshut.

The 24th, 25th, and 26th, were passed in skirmishes with the advanced guards beyond Eltz, in one of which the French made prisoners four companies of the Regiment of Ollivier Wallis with nine Officers.

On the 27th, the advanced posts of the French left wing were attacked in the valleys of Hell, St. Pierre, and St. Mirgen, and obliged to give way, but the *corps de bataille* of that wing preserved its position, and all the efforts of the enemy to *débouche* by the *gorges* were ineffectual.

On the 28th, the Archduke, who had united all his forces, marched to attack the French at every point. The right of the latter was at Waldkirch, and the left at Riegel, the advanced guards beyond the Eltz. He divided the troops for his principal attack into three columns, that on the right under Latour was directed against the village of Kendrin-

gen, of which it was to obtain possession; that of the centre, under Wartensleben, was to carry the heights of Malterdingen, and that of the left, under Petrasch, was directed to march to Emmendingen. Two flank corps, under the command of the Prince of Orange, and General Meerfeld, were to gain the summits of the mountains, in order to extend the right flank of the French, whilst the corps under General Nauendorff attacked the post of Waldkirch.

The action began on the left of the French by the attack of Kendringen, the advanced guard of the left wing, which occupied that village, received orders to retire as soon as attacked from the opposite side of the Eltz, by the bridges of Tuningen and Amwasser, but General Beaupuy, who there commanded, having been killed by a cannon shot, at the commencement of the action,[1] these orders were not executed, and this advanced guard continued the contest with the greatest bravery in that bad position. They repulsed several times the reiterated attacks of the Austrians, who

[1] This distinguished General, whose death was much regretted by the whole French army, and the cause of sincere grief to the soldiers of his division, was the victim of excessive bravery. He had received several sabre wounds, on the 8th *Messidor*, and had rejoined the army before his cure was perfected. His death at this moment occasioned dismal consequences, and he is justly accused of having rashly exposed himself.

confessed that the Archduke was obliged to march in person at the head of his best corps of Grenadiers, to force them to abandon this village.

A similar resistance was opposed to the attacks of Wartensleben and Petrasch, near Emmendingen,[1] until the Prince of Orange's division arrived from across the mountains to debouche upon the right flank of the French, when the advanced guards of the latter retired behind the Eltz and destroyed the bridges.

The French troops even attacked the corps under General Nauendorff, at the moment that Officer was preparing to march against the advanced guard of their centre: but the advanced guard, which ought also to have retired behind the Eltz, having sent out detachments by the valleys of Simonswald against the troops that had repulsed the piquets in the valley of St. Pierre, was obliged to maintain its position to protect the retreat of these detachments. The French made continual exertions to repulse their enemy, but they were finally forced to abandon Waldkirch, and to retreat near to Langen-Dentzlingen. The detachments which had marched to Simonswald, and which consisted of

[1] Wartensleben, one of the principal Austrian Generals, had his arm broken by a case shot, whilst attacking the heights behind Malterdingen.

three light infantry companies, were cut off, but they afterwards escaped by the mountains with only the loss of a small number in prisoners. Nevertheless the right wing succeeded in retaking the position, which the piquets had lost at St. Pierre.

Although the French army had only lost the ground of its advanced guards, and had kept its position,[1] yet as its enemy had gained possession of Waldkirch and the commanding heights, General Moreau found it would have been imprudent to remain in his position. He therefore retired a short distance behind the Langen-Dentzlingen, and took up another at Nymbourg, masking the *débouchés* of Waldkirch.

On the 29th the Austrians again attacked the French in their new position; and notwithstanding the superiority of their forces, and the greatest efforts, from ten in the morning until very late in the evening, they could not succeed in making any impression, or obliging the French to lose ground. The infantry of their right even suffered severely in this affair by the corps of General Dessaix.

General Moreau, perceiving that all the Aus-

[1] The French lost in this affair six hundred prisoners, and took four hundred.

trian forces were united, and that he would have much difficulty in maintaining himself in the Brisgau with an army weakened and fatigued by its continual marches, and by incessant rains, determined to retire upon Huninguen, and there to repass the Rhine: but to force the Austrians to a diversion, which might re-establish an equilibrium, he directed the left wing to repass the Rhine at Old Brisach, and to move with celerity to Kehl, and threaten the Archduke's rear.

In the night the French quitted the position of Nymbourg, Dessaix repassed the Rhine at Brisach, and the remainder of the army retired upon Huninguen, so closely pressed by the Austrians, that their rear guard, commanded by Generals Abatucci and Laboissiere, was continually engaged.

Defensive Battle of Schliengen, on the 3rd Brumaire, (23rd October, Old Style.)

THE French had but one bridge at Huninguen, by which to recross the Rhine; and the Austrians closely pressing them, this was a difficult

operation; but as their army was diminished by the absence of the left wing, and the Austrians concentrated themselves as much as possible, the former could only remedy these disadvantages by the choice of an excellent position, where they might wait the attack.

On the 1st *Brumaire* they reached Schliengen, the right appuyed on Kandern, and the left on the Rhine near Steinstadt, the line, passing over the heights commanding the villages of Ober and Nider-Eckenheim, Liel, and Schliengen, was covered by a brook running at the foot of these heights, which extend to the Rhine, where they terminate in a perpendicular declivity, and consequently the left flank of the French army, appuyed on this declivity, could not be extended. Their right enjoyed a position equally good upon the height of Kandern, covered by a brook of the same name, and they had a corps of Infantry opposite Schliengen in front of the line of heights, furnished with vineyards. It was in this position, that General Moreau, notwithstanding his inferiority in point of numbers, resolved to sojourn in order to arrest the Archduke: he even entertained some expectation of maintaining himself here, if the latter, acquainted with the march of Dessaix towards Kehl, had weakened himself by detaching a part of his forces to oppose that officer.

But the Austrians, anxious on the contrary, to profit by their actual superiority over the army of the Rhine and Moselle, and to lose no time in causing it to abandon the right bank, marched with all their strength against it. Generals Nauendorff and Latour were directed to attack the French right and to turn the position of Kandern, whilst a division commanded by the Prince of Furstemberg, with the corps of Prince Condé, should keep in check, by false attacks, the left wing, whose position, from Schliengen to Steinstadt, was too advantageous to allow them any expectation of forcing it.

On the 3rd *Brumaire*, at seven o'clock in the morning, the French were attacked, but they offered so firm an opposition, that no part of their line could be forced: and notwithstanding the fatigue of their troops, and the extreme bad weather, they vigorously repulsed every attack. The right wing (Ferino,) against which the Austrians directed their principal strength, displayed prodigies of valor at Kandern, and at Liel, and sustained from the break of day until night their repeated efforts, and prevented their acquiring any success. The only advantage of which the Austrians could boast, was that of having gained on their right, the village of Steinstadt, and on their left, that of Kandern. These posts were in front of the French line, which experienced no discomfiture.

Night, together with a thick fog, and a violent storm, put an end to the battle. If the Austrians had succeeded in defeating the French at Kandern, they would have easily cut off the retreat upon Huninguen, by preceding them to Eimeldingen, and which was their design. It was with the like object, they on the same day attacked the post of Rhinfeld, in order to move a corps upon the rear of the French, but as, in retiring from that town, they had time to destroy the bridge, it could not have any dangerous consequences.

The Austrian army, which since the departure of Dessaix was at least double that of the French, rendering it impossible for the latter to maintain itself beyond the Rhine, it was determined to repass that river. This retreat the army commenced in the night following the battle, and on the 4th arrived in the position of Raltingen, and on the 5th passed the Rhine at Huninguen, without any attempt on the part of the Austrians to overturn its rear guard, (Abatucci and Laboissiere,) which displayed to them the greatest firmness, order, and precision in all its movements.

The Archduke, having succeeded in compelling the French to move beyond the Rhine, ought perhaps to have masked, by two corps sufficiently strong, the two *têtes de pont* of Kehl and Hunin-

guen, which were the only points they had kept upon the right of that river, and to have detached a part of his forces to Italy for the relief of Mantua; but jealous of acquiring the title of Liberator of Germany, he would not conclude the campaign without making some efforts to gain possession of these two posts. His design was easily perceived; and as that of Kehl on account of its position was the most considerable and important, his first efforts it was conceived would be directed against it. He left before Huninguen, under Prince Furstemberg, a corps of three battalions and twelve squadrons, and rapidly moved with the remainder of his forces before Kehl.

General Moreau, on his side, left a sufficient corps near Huninguen under General Ferino, and with the remainder took up a position in the environs of Strasburg.

SIEGE OF KEHL.

Investment of this fortress the 1st Complémentaire. Opening of the trenches, the 1st Frimaire. Considerable sortie, the 2nd Frimaire, (22 *November, Old Style.*) *Evacuation of Kehl by the French, the* 21 *Nivôse* (10 *January,* 1797, *Old Style.*)

ALTHOUGH expedition had been used to protect Kehl from a *coup de main,* the advanced works and the entrenched camp were at this period but outlines: three parts were only palisadoes. Thus it was imagined unworthy the honors of a regular siege, and the French with difficulty could persuade themselves, that their enemy conceived the plan of attacking it methodically at so advanced a period of the season. The lines of contravallation, which the Austrians had commenced since the 5th *Brumaire,* and which consisted of redoubts placed at some distance from each other, and connected by entrenchments, were regarded by the French as works purely defensive. However, towards the end of *Brumaire,*

it was no longer possible to be mistaken, and it was perceived that a siege was resolved upon.

Until this period, the French had not obstructed their enemy's workmen, on account of having themselves no time to lose in forwarding their own works, which would unavoidably have been interrupted by an attack: moreover it would have been extremely imprudent to provoke the besiegers, whilst they, the French, had not a single work in a condition to arrest a vigorous attack. The Austrians having moved their advanced posts too near the redoubt *étoilée* 3, and rejected the propositions made them to retire, in order to avoid the useless skirmishing between centinels, some hussars and light infantry, under the orders of Vandamme, were sent against them. This sortie, which took place on the 14th *Brumaire*, was successful, and eighty Austrians were made prisoners.

From the 10th *Brumaire* the French troops had been employed in the works of Kehl; in furnishing them with heavy artillery, and pallisading them. General Dessaix, after having passed the Rhine at Brisach, had taken the command of this fortress: the garrison was considerably augmented, and the works, on which a want of hands had occasioned a relaxation since the 1st *Complémentaire*, were now pursued with increased activity. The Aus-

trians also lost no time in perfecting their lines of contravallation. When the French works were sufficiently forward to permit an attack without danger, it was determined to attempt the raising of the siege, or at least to impose on the Austrians by a bold attack. On the 21st of November, whilst the latter opened the trenches on the right bank of the Kintzig, the French made dispositions for a considerable sortie. On the 22nd, at break of day, their troops boldly marched to attack the lines of contravallation between the Kintzig and the Rhine. They debouched from the isle of Erlenrhin, and from the left of the entrenched camp. One column forced the two first redoubts, that appuyed these lines to the arm of the Rhine: another penetrated near the centre, and carried Sundheim, and the two redoubts contiguous to that village: but three other intermediate redoubts, between these two, not having been carried, and the remainder of the French troops, intended to support those who made the first attack, not having arrived and deployed sufficiently soon, they were obliged to abandon the Austrian lines, and to retire into their entrenched camp, after an action of four hours. They took seven hundred prisoners, seven pieces cannon, and two howitzers, and spiked fifteen pieces of cannon, which a want of horses prevented them from carrying off.

Sixteen thousand French infantry, and from three to four thousand cavalry, had been destined for this attack; but the principal part of these troops, and especially the cavalry, not having been able to deploy on account of the confined situation of the ground, could not even act.

This sortie occasioned much alarm to the Austrians. All their Generals, Latour and the Archduke in person, moved to the gap the French had made. Six battalions of armed workmen, who had been employed at the opening of the entrenchments beyond Kintzig, marched against the French, and all the Austrian troops were put in motion:—they employed every effort to oblige the French to abandon that part of the line they had forced, and favored by a thick fog, that prevented the latter from reconnoitering, and by the humidity of the ground, that impeded the march of their columns, the Austrians succeeded in again obtaining possession of their works, and the French retired in perfect order to their own.[1] The bad weather, the tardiness in the deployment of the troops, who had but

[1] General Moreau received a wound in his head. His aid-de-camp Lélée was dangerously wounded. General Dessaix had a horse shot under him, and received a contusion in his leg. General Latour had also a horse killed.

one narrow pass by which to defile, prevented this affair from being attended by all the success the French promised themselves: it was very sanguinary, and on both sides the number in wounded was very great.

The issue of this day decided the fate of Kehl: it demonstrated that the Austrians were too well entrenched, and that their works confined the French too much to enable the latter to deploy in sufficient strength to force those works: and it became evident that this fortress would in the end be obliged to yield to a regular attack, unless some very fortunate and unforeseen event should save it.

It is from this period that the commencement of the siege of Kehl should be considered, of which the investment had continued since the 1st *Complémentaire*. In order to comprehend perfectly the operations of this siege, it is necessary to give a perfect statement of the French and Austrian works, which, together with an attentive examination of the accompanying plan, must furnish a correct idea of this memorable military event.

The fortress of Kehl, properly speaking, is a fortified square on the plan of Marshal Vauban. It was demolished agreeably to the treaty of 1736,

when it was given up to the empire. The foundations of the ancient stone revêtements remained, with the exception of the flank angle overlooking the Rhine, which was entirely destroyed. At the period of the passage of the Rhine, on the 6th *Messidor*, it had neither trenches nor relief; the French, had since re-established the parapets, and made a trench, at the foot of the revêtement, from eighteen to twenty feet wide. Since the first *Complémentaire* the progress in the works had been very slack, it not being possible to engage the peasants of the Rhine, and it was not till the 10th *Brumaire*, when a part of the army arrived, and soldiers were employed, that they were pursued with vigor.

1. *Horn work of the Lower Rhine.* Its relief had been re-established by fascines,[1] upon the old

[1] Fascines in fortification are a kind of faggots, made of small branches of trees or brush-wood tied in three, four, five, or six places, and are of various dimensions, according to the purposes intended. Those that are to be pitched over for burning lodgements, galleries, or any other works of the enemy, should be one and a half or two feet long. Those that are for making *épaulements* or Chandeliers, or to raise works, or fill up ditches, are ten feet long, and one or one and a quarter feet in diameter. They are made in the following manner: six small pickets are stuck into the ground, two and two, forming little crosses, well fastened in the middle with willow bindings. On these trestles the branches are laid, and are bound round with withes, at the distance of every two feet.

foundations. There had not been sufficient time to perfect it, and to strengthen the parapets, that were not cannon proof. This work possessed an old covert way, of which the relief remained, and had been pallisadoed.

2. *Lunette of the Kintzig.* The French had re-established it upon the old foundation: it was pallisadoed, as well as its covert ways, towards the end of *Brumaire.* The Kintzig was at first crossed at the *gorge* of this Lunette, upon a bridge of piles, but an inundation having carried it away, one of boats was built. The Austrians having a battery commanding this bridge, all the boats were sunk on the first day of the siege, when a coppered pontoon was substituted, which was equally unsuccessful. Finally they succeeded in keeping up a communication by means of a kind of ferry, composed of three pontoons lashed together.

3. *Redoubt étoilée.* This was constructed by the Austrians before the passage of the Rhine, and taken by the French at that period. The overflowing of the Kintzig, in *Brumaire,* forced the

Six men are employed in making a fascine; two cut the boughs, two gather them, and the remaining two bind them. These six men can make twelve fascines every hour. Each fascine requires five pickets to fasten it.

latter to evacuate it, and the Austrians took possession and demolished it.

4. *Horn work of the Upper Rhine.* A part of the foundations of this work existed: the rest were formed by fascines. A trench was made behind the entrance battery. A small ditch was dug at the foot of the revêtement, which the French had begun to strengthen with fraises; they sketched a covert way; they fixed pallisadoes, but had not time to complete either the body of the work, or its appertenances, and all remained imperfect. It was in these horn works that the houses, forming what was called the town of Kehl, were situated; but they were all either ruined or demolished at the beginning of the siege.

5. *Half Moon before the Horn work.* It was commenced on the 10th *Brumaire*, but never finished.

6. *Redoubt of the Cimetière.* This redoubt had been constructed by the Austrians: it was taken at the passage of the Rhine; one of its faces was demolished, and a communication opened with the covert way of the horn work of the Upper Rhine. The Austrians entered it on the 17th *Nivôse*, but could not maintain themselves there; it remained abandoned until the end of the siege.

7. *Left part of the entrenched camp;* covered by a morass, and united by a branch of communication to the redoubt of *trous de loups.* When, on the 17th *Nivôse*, the Austrians obtained possession of this part of the entrenched camp, they turned the relief against the French.

8. *Redoubt of trous de loups.* This had been constructed by the Austrians; it was covered at its *gorge*, and constituted a part of the entrenched camp. The French lost it on the 12th *Nivôse.*

9. *Right part of the entrenched camp.* It was constructed along an old dyke, of the relief of which in some places the French took advantage. The Austrians obtained possession of it on the 12th *Nivôse*, opposed the reliefs to the French, and established several batteries.

10 *Têtes de Pont of Erlenrhin.* A redoubt fraised and pallisadoed, that covered the bridge of boats constructed upon this arm of the Rhine, from the day of the passage, and by which the French communicated with the flying bridge. It remained in the power of the French until the 17th *Nivôse:* they evacuated it at the same time as the Isle of Erlenrhin.

11 *Redoubt bonnet de prêtre* (priest's cap[1]). It was so little perfected, that it was not considered prudent to place any cannon there, and it had only a guard of twenty men when the Austrians took it on the evening of the 16th *Frimaire*. Its reliefs were also turned against the French.

12. *Horn work of Erlenrhin.* It was only commenced on the 10th *Brumaire*—They had scarce time to form the outline of the trenches and parapets, which were never sufficiently perfected to be susceptible of a good defence. It was evacuated on the 17th *Nivôse*.

13. *Reduct* for covering the flying bridge. It was commenced during the siege, and never intirely pallisadoed.

14. *Ile des Escargots*, and its entrenchments, which were begun on the 15th *Brumaire*, were maintained by the French until the end of the siege.

15. *Ile de l'Estacade*, with a trench to cover the troops who guarded it. This island, as well as the

[1] An outwork, having three salient, and two inward angles, and differs from the double tenaille only in having its sides inclined inwards towards the *gorge*, and those of a double tenaille are parallel to each other.

preceding one, remained in the possession of the French, until the last day, and even after the evacuation of Erlenrhin.

16. *Ile Touffue,* of which the Austrians gained possession in the evening of the 16th *Frimaire.*

17. *Estacade,* intended to stop the fire ships and other craft, the Austrians had built at Offemburg to destroy the bridges.

18. *Entrenchments of the Islands of the Kintzig,* began the 10th *Frimaire.*

19. *Batteries of the left bank.* Independent of the artillery with which the French had furnished the works of Kehl, all the batteries[1] of the left bank, existing before the passage of the Rhine, for the defence of this river, were strongly supplied. This numerous artillery cost the French much ammunition; but it exceedingly annoyed the Austrians, whose works it took *à revers:* it obliged them to traverse, retarded their progress, and destroyed a considerable number. The first of these batteries was an ancient redoubt: during the siege it had been strengthened by a barbet battery on its right. Their fire seriously distressed the Austrians in the *Ile Touffue,* and destroyed several times a

[1] These batteries are all pointed out on the accompanying map.

small bridge of communication between this Island and that of Ehrlenrhin, next was the battery in the *Ile des Epis*, lower that of fascines, still lower and in front of the small island, that called the grand bivouac, with three batteries at the end of the bridges, fifteen hundred metres, (about 750 fathoms) below the bridge, upon a *gravier avancé*, armed with six mortars, and four pieces of cannon, very much distressed the right flank of the besiegers, and their troops in the isles of the Kintzig. Behind, near the mouth of the arm of the Mabile, is the redoubt of the Upper Carpe, and three hundred metres, (150 fathoms) lower, the battery of Rubrechtslau. At a very advantageous point of a woody Island, opposite to the mouth of the Kintzig, a battery had been commenced, but which was not finished; its object was to destroy the bridge upon the Kintzig, near Auenheim.

20. *Manor of the Anabaptists*, in the island of the Rhine, where Generals Dessaix, and St. Cyr resided, and who alternately commanded at Kehl.

21. *Camp* of the two *demi-brigades* of the reserve, in the Island of the Rhine.

22. *Ancient bridge of piles.* This bridge had been re-established in the situation, where the

old stakes remained. The French had repaired three gaps in the piles, where they had been burnt by the Austrians. On the 8th *Frimaire*, when the latter began firing from their batteries, the boats were destroyed. The bridge was entirely broken, repaired some days after, and again broken. It was so directly in the fire of the Austrians, that it was impossible for the French to maintain it three days together, or to derive from it any advantage, and was even dangerous to the bridge of boats, below it, and which it threatened to carry away with its wreck.

23. *Ruins* of the Church of Kehl, and the post house. The village of Kehl had been intirely razed by the French, since the 5th *Brumaire:* there only remained some walls of these two buildings, which were vigorously disputed, and which were the cause of several actions.

24. *Austrian Battery* of four pieces of heavy calibre, established upon a branch of the French intrenched camp. On the 19th, it commenced firing on the bridge of boats; and the following day, at nine in the morning, the bridge was destroyed in such manner, as to render it irreparable.

25. *Austrian Redans*, of from ten to twelve pieces, directed against the bridge. They were for-

tified on the 20th, in the morning, and were to have commenced firing in the evening, if the evacuation had not been agreed upon.

26. *Lines of contravallation.* They were formed of several redoubts, joined by entrenchments; they appuyed, on a dyke near Aunheim, traversed the route of Rastadt, that of Offenbourg, the Kintzig, and the Schutter, environed the village of Sundheim, and finished at the arm of the Rhine before the *Ile touffue*, near the redoubt of the *Bonnet de prêtre*. The Austrian troops in that Island, who were there on the 16th *Frimaire*, contributed to assure the left flank, and the besiegers were covered by considerable entrenchments in the Islands of the Kintzig, where their right appuyed; they had also behind these lines, several redoubts or fleches, intended to serve as appuys to their camps.

27. *Austrian camps.*[1]

THE Austrians had in the night of the 1st *Frimaire*, opened the trenches on the right of the Kint-

[1] A statement of the French troops employed in the defence of Kehl, and of the besieging army is given in the appendix marked *B*.

zig: this was, however, intended as a diversion, and to protect the real attack that was to have been made on the left, from the Schutter to the Rhine. They had formed two trenches, one from the village of Neumuhl, and the other from the Rastadt road, and connected them together by parallel lines. Other trenches were formed, and batteries erected.

On the part of the French, their works were sufficiently forward to prevent any fear of a *coup de main*. On the 4th, their cannon began to play upon the works of the besiegers, and it was not till seven in the morning of the 8th, that the batteries of the latter were opened. The firing of this day was extraordinarily brisk—it destroyed some boats of the military bridge, and entirely swamped one of those which were substituted for the piles deficient in the grand bridge; and which from this time became impassible, one of the Austrian batteries, so entirely commanding the bridge, as to prevent it being repaired.

The same evening, the Austrians attempted a lodgement at the entrance of the village of Kehl, where the French had their advanced posts; the former were several times repulsed, but they finally succeeded in their object.

The firing continued with much spirit, but without any remarkable event occurring until the 16th *Frimaire.* In the interval the French had made several night sorties on the works of the besiegers, but without any other success than dislodging them from the head of their works; the reserves of the Austrians always obliged the French to retreat, before they could carry off any cannon, or destroy the lines.

This time the Austrians had employed in forwarding their works, and erecting new batteries. Towards the 8th, they had commenced trenches on the left of the Schutter, at the entrance of the ancient village of Kehl, and by the 16th they had erected a grand parallel, which connected their lodgements in these ruins, to the left flank of the contravallation, at the arm of the Ehrlenrhin, and in this trench had formed six new batteries. They had also armed three others on the borders of the Kintzig, and connected the lines of both banks of this river by several branches, traversing it almost to where it enters the Kintzig and Schutter.

In the morning of the 16th *Frimaire,* the besiegers opened at the same time all their batteries; and kept up a warm fire during the whole day. About four in the afternoon, they attacked the *Ile*

touffue (16) which was only defended by 300 men: they succeeded in carrying it, but the French retook it, and made some prisoners. At the same time the Austrians had attacked the work (11) called the *Bonnet de prêtre*, where only 20 men were posted: they succeeded in taking it, and afterwards connected it to their other works.

In the night of the 19th, the Austrians attacked the French advanced posts entrenched in the ruins (23) of the post house, and church of old Kehl. This post was obstinately contested on both sides: the besiegers were three times repulsed, but they finally succeeded in carrying it: they were, however, driven from the place on the following morning. In this attack, at which the Archduke was present, the Austrians lost three hundred men, and an officer of note. They returned to the attack on the 20th and 21st, and were equally unsuccessful.

The arm of the Ehrlenrhin being dried up, the Austrians endeavoured to obtain possession of that island. In the nights of the 20th and 21st they attacked it, but were repulsed, and with much loss, by the 76th *demi-brigade*.

It was at this period, and without doubt to support their attacks, the Austrians launched two fire ships to burn the French bridge of boats (92)

but the *estacade*, and the vigilance of the French pontoniers, frustrated this and every other attempt of a similar nature, afterwards made to destroy or break their bridges.

Although the French works were not nearly perfected, the besiegers despairing of success by main force, marched to the sap on the Ruins of Old Kehl, the redoubt of *trous de loups*, and the Isle of Ehrlenrhin; and these posts which were scarcely tenable they surrounded with an immense number of batteries.

On the 28th *Frimaire*, at bread of day, the Austrians opened all their new batteries, obliged the French to evacuate the ruins of the church and post house, effected a lodgement and joined their trenches in front of the entrenched camp with those of the village of Kehl. They had at this time advanced their principal attack near to the redoubt of *trous de loups* by a second parallel.

This redoubt became no longer tenable—it was nearly destroyed by the fire of the cannon: the heavy artillery was therefore removed, and pieces of small calibre, sufficient to annoy the workmen of the besiegers, substituted.

In the first decade of *Nivôse*, all the Austrian batteries were completed, and a general attack was expected on the 12th. The reports of deserters prepared the French for an event of importance on that day. The Archduke had for some time prepared his troops by harangues and presents. About four in the afternoon twelve battalions attacked the redoubt of *trous de loups*, and the right part of the entrenched camp (9), succeeded in repulsing the French from those works, in the trenches of which the Austrians immediately made a lodgement, and took six pieces. If their reserves had been able to pass the Rhine in sufficient time, the French would have retaken these works; but two boats of the bridge having been stove, (*coulés*,) by the fire of the cannon at the commencement of the attack, the passage was prevented until the bridge was repaired, and when reinforcements might have arrived, the Austrians were too strongly established, to afford any hopes of dislodging them. Fougasses had been prepared before the horn works of the Upper and Lower Rhine, the *Lunette* of the Kintzig, and the redoubts of *trous de loups;* but the miners retired without having blown up those of this redoubt, the explosion of which might have facilitated its recapture.

The same evening the Austrians attacked the Isle of Ehrlenrhin. They got possession of

the *Boyaux*, in front of the horn work, and which the fire of their artillery forced the French to abandon: the latter were repulsed as far as the *reduit* (13) of the flying bridge, and the former succeeded in entering the bastion on the right of the horn work. This isle was on the point of being irreparably lost to the French, when General Lecourbe removed the flying bridge to the left bank in order to cut off all hope of retreat: he seized a standard, rallied a battalion, and advanced against the Austrians whom he repulsed as far as their trenches; and it is therefore to the presence of mind this officer possessed at this crisis, that the preservation of the Isle is to be attributed, the loss of which would have accelerated by some days that of Kehl. The French remained masters of the horn work, but they could not defend the *Boyaux* and the small redoubts which were at the extremity of the Isle, as they were taken in reverse by the batteries of the Austrians.

Thus the besiegers obtained a footing in this Isle, and against which they had brought an immense artillery, although the frost and dryness had rendered it accessible on all sides, so that it could no longer be considered an ilse; but nevertheless the horn work, imperfect as it was, still preserved it several days, and although the troops intrusted with its defence had no other passage than that of

the flying bridge, and the communication with the fortress was cut off by the loss of a part of the entrenched camp, the Austrians, continually prudent, advanced to the sap against a work which had never been complete, and of which the thaw, together with the effect of their artillery, had almost destroyed the relief.

At this period the front of the Austrian saps and works were only some metres distant from the works which the French maintained, and the former increased their artillery, directing it principally upon the fire of the communications of the latter, which were every where, and even in the Isle of the Rhine, extremely dangerous.

On the 15th the Austrians carried another branch of the entrenched camp, and they employed themselves in making a lodgement in the part of that work which they had made themselves masters of, in connecting it with their trenches at Old Kehl, in constructing new batteries, and amongst others the battery 24.

It was understood that the Austrians were preparing for a fresh attack to celebrate the *jour des Rois*, the 17th *Nivôse*. The horn work of Ehrlenrhin being nearly destroyed, it was not considered prudent by the French to maintain that

place, and General St. Cyr therefore directed that it, as well as the *tête de pont*, (10,) should be evacuated in the night of the 16th, and that only two hundred grenadiers with one piece of small calibre should remain in the reduit,[1] (13,) to retard the establishment of the Austrians in the horn work, and facilitate the return of the flying bridge: they had left on the right bank the boats necessary for the retreat of their grenadiers: and had also determined to abandon in the horn work, two pieces of cannon, the fire of which, admirably kept up during the night, prevented the Austrians from discovering the evacution. It happily succeeded, and as it had been directed, excepting that the grenadiers destined to remain in the *reduit* threw themselves upon the flying bridge, when it was moved to the left bank, and that this work, the preservation of

[1] *Reduit* literally means a nook or bye place; in a military sense, it signifies a sort of citadel, which is extremely inconvenient to the inhabitants of the town, because it takes up more ground than those that are regularly built, and is, at the same time, uncomfortable to the troops, because they must be very much crowded. This word is explained by an English Lexicographer in the following manner: reduct or *reduit*, an advantageous piece of ground, entrenched and separated from the rest of the place, camp, &c. for an army garrison, &c. to retire to in case of surprise. Reducts are sometimes made for the purpose of securing different posts in a town independent of its citadel. These have been proposed by the celebrated Vauban.

which might have retarded for a day the establishment of the enemy, was abandoned contrary to the intentions of the French General. They endeavoured to re-embark the same squadrons, and to make them retake the *reduit;* but since the break of day, the Austrians had arrived in great strength in the isle, and notwithstanding the fire of the French from the left bank, were employed in forming lodgements in the ditches of the *reduit;* and it was impossible to pass the Rhine when exposed to them.

The French still remained masters of *l'Ile de l'Estacade,* and of that of *Escargots,* to which they communicated by boats, and these two isles were their only remaining points on the right of their defensive line.

On the 17th, towards six in the evening, the besiegers had advanced their works very near to that of the horn work of the Upper Rhine, and the left part of the entrenched camp, which the French still maintained. After a warm fire from all their batteries, the usual prelude of a *coup de main,* the Austrians vigorously attacked the left part of the entrenched camp, the redoubt of the *Cimetière;* and the horn work of the Upper Rhine, from which the French had moved all the heavy artil-

lery, and substituted small calibre. They succeeded in obtaining possession of the entrenched camp, the *Cimetière* redoubt, and had penetrated into the *place d' armes,* and as far as the barrier of the horn work, but were afterwards repulsed by the 10th and 62nd *demi-brigades,* which drove them from the *place d' armes,* and the *Cimetière* redoubt. They acquired no other advantage from this attack, for which they had deployed considerable forces, and in which they lost seven hundred men, than that of a lodgement in the left part of the entrenched camp, which the progress of their works must otherwise have soon forced the French to evacuate.

On the 18th and 19th, the Austrians continued to advance their works and laboured to perfect the battery, (24,) already commenced, and to construct that marked, (25,) both intended to destroy the bridge of boats. The first was opened on the 19th after mid-day: two boats were sunk in the evening, several were damaged, but these accidents were repaired at night fall. At the break of day, the Austrians recommenced so brisk and well directed a fire upon the bridge of boats, that before nine o'clock, five of the boats were sunk, and almost all the others damaged. It became impossible to repair it in one part before the fire

from the cannons destroyed it in another, and from that period this communication must be regarded as impracticable.

It was wished to establish a flying bridge below the bridge of boats: but this new communication would have been insufficient; placed too near the extremity of the French left, it would still have been exposed to the fire, and would have required an extensive circuit to reach Kehl. Moreover, this fortress was not in a condition to withstand a vigorous attack; almost all the palisadoes were thrown down, the trenches partly filled up by the fall of the palisadoes, and the arrival of reinforcements was become extremely difficult. To maintain it any longer would have been to expose the troops and artillery employed in its defence to a certain capture. The evacuation was therefore determined upon. At ten in the morning, whilst the establishment of the inferior flying bridge was attempted, General Dessaix proposed the evacuation to General Latour, and it was agreed upon between them that the Austrian troops should enter Kehl on the 21st *Nivôse*, at four in the evening. The French instantly essayed to re-establish the bridge, which was rendered passable at 2 o'clock. There then remained only 24 hours to raze every thing, nevertheless so much activity was employed, that

not a single palisadoe was left for the Austrians: all was brought to the right bank, even the carriages of the bombs and howitzers, &c. At four o'clock, when the Austrians took possession, in the sight of a crowd of spectators of both nations, whom the spectacle had attracted to the banks of the Rhine, there absolutely did not remain in Kehl aught but the earth and ruins.

Thus finished, after fifty days of open trenches, and a hundred and fifteen of investment, one of the most celebrated and memorable sieges history can record.

In it is to be seen on one side an army, proud of having obliged its enemy to retreat, commanded by a Prince whose high birth afforded a magic power over soldiers under a discipline approaching to servitude; all the solemnity of a grand siege exercised against imperfect entrenchments, but the conquest of which was of great importance, rendered circumspect by the ill success of its attack on the 2d *Complémentaire*, it adopted a kind of warfare which must have been attended with success, although tardy; the magnitude of its works supplied the place of the enterprize which was wanting; it besieged detached works, deployed a formidable artillery against ruins occupied

by tirailleurs. Nevertheless, by the constant obstinacy of its adversary, who disputed the ground foot by foot, it was forced to an assault on each part of the works, when it desired to effect a lodgement, and by which it lost in detail, by a multitude of trifling actions, more soldiers than a general attack would have occasioned. At last, after fifty days of fatigue and hard labour, it succeeded in its object, but after having lost six thousand men, and consumed artillery and ammunition sufficient for the siege of a place of the first strength and magnitude.

On the other side, one must admire the prolonged resistance of a fortress constructed in haste, of which only some parts were fortified, without defences, without magazines, without shelter; attached to an entrenched camp of a large *développment*, but of which the principal defences, consisting of swamps and marshes, were reduced to nothing by the frost; of which the only advantage is not to be entirely invested and to readily communicate with Strasbourg: one must be astonished, that such a place sufficiently imposed on the Austrians as to prevent them from attempting any thing at hazard, and not to act but with the most timid prudence. Although defended by troops harassed from a long retreat, to whom it was impossible to

afford, as expeditiously as their situation demanded, the requisite and indispensable comforts, the term of its defence far exceeded that which had been prescribed; and if it finally underwent the fate of besieged places, which it is impossible to succour, it carries with its fall the glory of having operated as a powerful diversion, and contributed by its long resistance to the conquest of one of the most celebrated fortresses in Europe.[1]

THE French, with a view of preventing their opponent from uniting all his forces against the fortress of Kehl, had maintained themselves in the *tête de pont* at Huninguen, which was flanked by a horn work, raised on Shuster Insel, an island of the Rhine; it was also protected by the fortress of Huninguen, and flanked by several batteries, erected on the left bank of the Rhine, above and below that place.

After the retreat of the French army, the command was entrusted to General Abatucci, but under the direction of General Ferino, and the 3rd *demi-*

[1] It cannot be denied that Kehl, by its long resistance, powerfully aided the taking of Mantua.

brigade of light infantry, 56th and 86th of the line were destined for its defence.

Early in November, Prince Furstemberg, commanding the Austrian army, had invested this place. He erected works, and mounted some batteries commanding the head of the bridge.

After ineffectually summoning the French to evacuate the *tête de pont*, the Imperialists began to cannonade and bombard it, as well as the Shuster Insel and Huninguen, and their commanding situation in a short time enabled them to break the bridge, which connects the two banks. By this success the *tête de pont* was insulated, but the French, notwithstanding the continual fire of their enemy, repaired it, and re-established the communication between the *tête de pont* and the town of Huninguen.

The breaking of the bridge had flattered the Imperialists with the hope that the reduction of the place would instantly follow. Disappointed, however, they directed on the 10th a general assault on the entrenchments of the French. The Imperialists obtained possession of the half moon of the horn work, but which the French retook after a bloody engagement. The loss on both sides was very severe. General Abatucci fell on the part of the French.

This unsuccessful attempt induced Prince Furstemberg, who judged that the fate of the *tête de pont* rested on the issue of the siege of Kehl, to content himself with commanding and bombarding it. When, however, the reduction of Kehl took place, the Archduke sent the heavy artillery to the assistance of Prince Furstemberg, and which enabled the latter vigorously to attack the *tête de pont* and the works defending it.

Unable to make any long resistance, the French determined to abandon the right bank of the Rhine, on which, after the fall of Kehl, it was of little importance for them to remain. On the 2nd of February, they agreed to a capitulation, and on the 5th recrossed the Rhine with their arms and baggage; and on the same day, the 5th, the Imperialists took possession of the *tête de pont* and the Shuster Insel.

This reduction terminated the campaign in Germany, the result of which found the French in the same situation as at its commencement: but they had acquired from the campaign invaluable advantages: such as having favored the numerous victories of the army of Italy, the taking of Mantua, and exhausted the resources of their enemy, while they preserved their own, by supporting themselves at the expense of the Imperialists.

1797.

About the middle of April 1797, the French Directory, acquainted with the critical situation in which the present Ruler of France was placed, then entangled amidst the Styrian mountains, and hearing of the approach of two numerous armies, the one from Suabia under Laudohn, and the other from Hungary, commanded by Alvinzi, with an intention to act on his rear, was desirous of a prompt and powerful diversion, and therefore gave directions for the immediate march of General Moreau.

The safety of the army of Italy, the interest of his country and his glory, all imperiously demanded that the opening of the campaign by the army of the Rhine and Moselle should not be delayed, and the passage of the Rhine promptly effected.

On the 19th of April, all the army under General Moreau quitted its cantonments, which extended from Huninguen to Langau, and marched towards the Rhine, which the General designed passing on the following night.

This distinguished officer, whose masterly retreat had acquired him a greater proportion of the confidence of the French people, than could have been

obtained from a succession of victories, had no bridge over the Rhine, and but one set of pontoons. To establish promptly and with safety a bridge, it was necessary to obtain a footing on the opposite bank. General Moreau, therefore, in order to embarrass his enemy by harassing him on several points at the same time, and prevent him from directing his force to that, which was actually in danger, prepared several false attacks, calculated to conceal the real one, which was to take place a little below Strasbourg. He intended to effect the passage of the river before break of day, but the difficulty of assembling sufficient boats retarded the embarkation of the troops till six o'clock, and for more than two hours before, a heavy fire had taken place all the way from Brisach to Fort Louis, either from the opposite bank of the river, or from the little islands possessed by the hostile parties. The advanced posts of the Imperialists being put on their guard by these attacks, it became necessary for General Moreau to attempt his passage by open force.

The attacking force, consisting of 15,000 men, he divided into three bodies, under the command of Generals Jordis, Davoust, and Duhesme. The latter with five battalions first set out from where the little river Ill joins the Rhine, and advanced towards the opposite bank. The Austrians per-

ceiving their approach, fired briskly upon the boats, but the French, partly covered by the islands, did not suffer much, and made good their landing on the island nearest the right bank, from which they forded a narrow branch of the river, and established themselves on the German side. It was defended by the ordinary advanced picquets, who, seeing so superior a force coming against them, fell back to their reserve; and before sufficient force could be assembled to attack the French, their boats had time to return to the left bank, and to bring over fresh troops.

To shelter themselves from the fire of artillery and a great superiority of force, it became necessary that this body of troops should make themselves masters of Diersheim, and which they readily effected. The Imperialists several times attempted to retake it, but in vain. The French received continual reinforcements, either by their boats or a flying bridge, which they had established: and by means of the latter, some pieces of cannon and some hundred horse joined them from Strasbourg. Whilst this enabled the French to make a more orderly arrangement of their force, the Austrians perceived that every hour diminished the possibility of obliging them to repass the river; and therefore attacked, with the greatest intrepidity, Diersheim, into which village they

penetrated. The French, however, knowing that every thing rested on their keeping possession of the village, brought up all their force, and a most sanguinary engagement took place.

During the contest, the reinforcements sent to the French by means of the boats followed each other so rapidly, that they became, in a short time, greatly superior to their enemies, who were therefore obliged to give up the attack of the village; they lost also that of Honau, where the French lodged themselves. On the left the Austrians made another attack, which was also frustrated by a superior force: and during the night the French established a bridge of boats across the river, and brought over such an abundance of ammunition, artillery, and fresh troops, that on the following morning they were in sufficient force to defy all the efforts of the Imperialists.

General Moreau, being now enabled to act on the offensive, immediately formed his army into several columns. One gained possession of the villages of Lientz and Habine; another, with the greatest facility, took possession of the Fort of Kehl, whose protracted and gallant defence, during the preceding year, has been described: its fortifications had been imperfectly repaired, and the commanding officer, dreading the consequence

of the assault with which he was threatened, delivered it up to the French. A third column marched towards the banks of the Kintzig, and before night the Imperialists, attacked on all sides, had dispersed in different directions.

The French pursued the Imperialists during eight whole days, and at length the army of the Rhine and Moselle, with its victorious General, found itself in the mountains of the Brisgau. The left wing, commanded by General St. Cyr, took possession of Helmhingen and Lichtenau; the centre, under General Vandamme, penetrated into the adjoining valley, and the right approached Fribourg.

At the moment that General Moreau was actively preparing to achieve new triumphs, he received a courier from Buonaparte announcing the intelligence of the peace,[1] signed at Leoben, and

[1] It was immediately previous to this peace, that Buonaparte addressed to the Archduke Charles the letter dated 31st March 1797, which has been so much panegyrised by his friends and supporters; but which in fact was a mask of policy to disguise the ambitious projects that occupied his expansive mind. Brave soldiers, he observed, made war but desired peace. The war had now lasted six years. Men enough had been slaughtered, and evils enough committed against suffering humanity. Such, he noticed, were the exclamations on all sides. Europe, which had taken up arms against the French republic, had laid them down, and Austria alone continued its enemy.

a suspension of hostilities having been agreed upon by Generals Moreau and Latour, it was announced to both armies. The first intelligence of the peace to the Directory was transmitted by General Moreau, and the following message, from that body to the Council of Five Hundred, was made on

Blood was still to flow, a sixth campaign was announced, and, whatever might be the result, thousands of gallant soldiers must fall a sacrifice. At some period, nevertheless, he observed, both parties must come to an understanding, since time brought all things to a conclusion, and extinguished the most inveterate resentments.

The French Directory had expressed a desire to terminate this ruinous contest, but their pacific overtures were defeated by the intervention of the British ministry. Was there then, he said, no hope of accommodation? Must blood still be shed to promote the interests, or to gratify the passions, of a people far remote from the theatre of war. Are not you, addressing himself to the Archduke, who are so nearly allied to the Throne, and above the mean passions that usually influence ministers, desirous to merit the appellations of benefactor of the human race, and saviour of the German Empire? I do not mean, added he, that your Country cannot be preserved by your sword, but that, however the chance of war may alter in your favor, Germany must still be a sufferer. He concluded by assuring the Archduke, that as to himself, were his present application to him, to be the means of saving the life of a single man, he should be prouder of the civic crown, to which he would thereby become intitled, than of the melancholy glory resulting from the most brilliant exploits of war.

the 25th of April, respecting the victories in Italy and on the Rhine.

"Citizens Representatives,

"The armies of the Rhine and Moselle, after having favoured the brilliant operations of the army of Italy, by driving before them the Imperial troops on a former occasion, were no longer to remain in a state of inaction; they have just opened the campaign, and the first movements have been attended with signal success. The army of the Sambre and Meuse, more formidable still by the remembrance of some checks they have already revenged, rendered the 29th *Germinal* illustrious by a pitched battle and three actions, which immediately established their positions upon the right bank of the Rhine. Among the glorious trophies of this victory are seven thousand prisoners of war, twenty seven pieces of artillery, seven standards, sixty ammunition waggons, &c.

"The passage of the Upper Rhine, by the army of the Rhine and Moselle, was accomplished on the 1st *Floreal*. It seems even to surpass the brilliant operation which took place at the commencement of the last campaign. This brave army, more proud perhaps of its retreat from Ba-

varia, than of the victories that conducted it into that country, which obliged the Archduke to consume his forces before Kehl, while Mantua called in vain to him for succour, has again taken possession of that very fort by a *coup de main*, which it had before defended for three months.

"This passage was accomplished in broad day, and by main force, while the enemy were ranged in order of battle on the opposite bank. They have lost several standards, more than 20 pieces of cannon, their military chest, the bureau of the Etat Major, and from three to four thousand prisoners of war, one of whom is a General, the number of killed and wounded is enormous.

"Thus the enemy, disappointed in all their schemes, and every where vanquished, have no safety but in that peace, which we have always offered them upon equitable terms.

"The despatch, in which General Moreau informs us of the passage of the Rhine by the army of the Rhine and Moselle, is terminated by the following postscript: 'A courier, which I received this moment from General Buonaparte, announces to me the signing of the preliminaries of peace with the Emperor.'

Signed REWBELL,
President."

1799.

EARLY in 1799, the Republican forces in Italy amounted to 90,000 Frenchmen, and upwards of 50,000 Poles, Swiss, Piedmontese, Genoese, Romans or Neapolitans, dispersed from the frontiers of Piedmont. They constituted two armies; the army of Italy, and the army of Naples. The former 90,000, under General Scherer, the successor of General Joubert,[1] occupied the Modenese, the state of Genoa, Piedmont, the Milanese, the Valtelein, and the countries of Brescia, Bergamo, and Mantua. The general hatred of the French had rendered the above dispersion indispensably necessary, although it reduced the number, who could be employed in active operation, to 50,000. They were in cantonments on the banks of the lake of Garda, of the Mincio, and of the Po, from the Tyrolese frontier to the mouth of the last mentioned river.

[1] This distinguished officer, together with General Championnet, who in the course of a month had obliged the Neapolitans to evacuate Rome, seized on Capua and Naples and forced the King of the two Sicilies to take refuge in Palermo, were at this period, sacrificed to party principles, notwithstanding they had hitherto conducted the French troops to victory. The former was afterwards killed at the battle of Novi, as will be seen in the sequel.

The army of Naples, under the command of General Macdonald, the successor of General Championnet, amounted to about 40,000: it occupied the capital and the conquered part of his Sicilian Majesty's dominions, as also Rome and the different provinces of the Church.

The Austrian army, at a short distance from the French army of Italy, occupied the parallel line of the Adige, from the Italian Tyrol to beyond Rovigo. Along this line, about 90,000 men were distributed, while the army of reserve, amounting nearly to the same number, were cantoned in the Trevisano, Carniola, and Friuli. All were under the command of General Kray, until Lieutenant-General Melas should come to take the chief command.

On the 28th of March, General Scherer put his army in motion. He formed it into six divisions, which were directed against the three principal positions of their opponents.

General Moreau commanded the left composed of three divisions. He had been sent to Italy by the Directory to act as Inspector General, and to assist General Scherer with his advice. Moreau was directed to move with the left against the right of the Imperialists. One of his divisions, supported

by an armed flotilla upon the lake of Garda, drove the Imperialists from all the detached posts they possessed on the heights between the Lake and the Adige; the two other divisions attacked with fixed bayonets and carried the entrenched camp of Pastrengo, where the force of the Imperialists amounted to 5,000 men, one half of whom were either put to the sword or made prisoners. General Moreau pursued the flying enemy so quickly, as not to give him time to destroy two bridges he had at Polo. Moreau passed the river, and spreading his divisions upon the left bank towards Verona and towards the Tyrol, he cut the line, by which the Imperialists held their communications from the Upper to the Lower Adige.

General Scherer commanded the centre in person: it consisted of two divisions and a body of reserve. He attacked the chain of posts which covered Verona, and an obstinate battle ensued. The Austrians succeeded in maintaining the posts, which constituted the principal strength of their position, but with the loss of 2,800 men. The French also suffered severely.

Although the centre was successful, as well as the left under General Moreau, it was very different with the right, which had been directed to take and burn Legnago. It was twice repuled by the

Austrian advanced posts, completely routed and obliged to fly towards Mantua, having above 2000 men killed and wounded, with 600 prisoners, and 11 pieces of cannon. The Polish legion of Dombrousky, composed almost entirely of Austrian deserters, having been at this affair, the Austrian soldiers, notwithstanding the interference of their officers, would give no quarter, but put to death every man of that legion, who fell into their hands.

The engagement in this quarter seemed so decisive in favor of the Austrians, that General Kray was on the point of pushing on to Mantua, when a courier brought him intelligence of the defeat of his right by General Moreau. Leaving therefore a corps of observation between Mantua and Legnago, notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, he instantly marched them to the support of his right and centre.

On the 27th a part of these reinforcements arrived at Verona, and the remainder on the 28th, during which two days General Scherer, disconcerted by the defeat of his right wing, attempted nothing decisive against Verona. The two armies were so near to each other, that on the following day they were obliged to agree to a suspension of arms, to bury their dead, who lay on the field

since the 26th, and began already to infect the air.

On the 30th, at the expiration of the armistice, General Moreau directed General Serrurier with half his corps, about 10,000 men, to pass the Adige, by the bridge of Polo. The latter successfully executed his orders, and attacked the posts of the Imperialists, which guarded the left bank, overcame them, and advanced till within half a league of Verona, while another column endeavoured to gain the heights flanking the right of the Austrians and the road of Vicenza, upon which General Kray had posted the main body of the army. Three Austrian columns came up with them on their march, and attacked them with such spirit, that they could not resist, but were obliged to retire towards their bridge, full three leagues distant.

The retreat of the French was nothing but a continual engagement. They continued it for a long time in good order; but, when the left Austrian column saw that they approached the bridge, two battalions of grenadiers, detached from it with the greatest rapidity, along the bridge, without firing, and using only the bayonet, overcame all resistance, seized the bridge, and thus all, who had not already passed, were cut off. The French column, which had been sent by the mountains, and which,

in order to arrive at the bridge, had more ground to traverse, met with a like fate. A party of it immediately laid down their arms, and the rest, in endeavouring to escape across the mountains, were likewise almost all taken. Two thousand men fell into the hands of the Austrians on this day, and the French lost all the advantages they had gained on the 26th.

General Scherer, on the 1st April, abandoned all the posts which he occupied between the Adige and the lake of Garda, and placing a strong garrison in Peschiera, took a position with his left and centre beyond the Tartaro, at Magnan, between Villa Franca and Ysola-della-Scala, where he placed his head quarters, his right wing being before Legnago.

The advanced guard of the Austrians, on the same day, occupied the posts abandoned by the enemy on the other side of the Adige, and pushed on to Castelnuovo.

On the following day, the Austrian army encamped on the right bank of the Adige, before Verona, and on the road to Villa Franca. These first days of the campaign cost the French 10,000 men in killed, wounded, taken, or deserted. The

loss of the Austrians amounted to about half that number.

General Scherer, finding that the Austrians already acted partially on the offensive, and perceiving that they would attack him with an irresistible superiority when they should be joined by large reinforcements, which were rapidly advancing, judged that but little time remained to give the campaign a favorite turn. He resolved therefore to make a new effort to drive the Austrians over the Adige, and to establish himself on the other side of that river.

General Kray at the same time had formed the project of driving the French from their grand camp at Magnan, and driving them beyond the Tartaro, or, if possible, behind the Mincio.

It was on the same day that the two armies resolved to attack each other. The French army already reduced to 30,000 men, moved from their camp at Magnan, in three columns, exclusive of the advanced guard. The right, consisting of the divisions of Generals Victor and Grenier, marched to the attack of St. Giacomo along the Adige: the centre, consisting of the divisions of Generals Montrichard and Hatry, was commanded by General Moreau, who was charged with dislodging the

Imperialists posted between Villa Franca and Verona. The left, under General Serrurier, formed of his own division, was directed to gain possession of Villa Franca, and to push on to the Adige: the advanced guard, under General Delmas, directed its march to Dossobono, half way between Villa Franca and Verona, with a view to assist the operations of the centre.

Similar reasons influencing General Kray, his plan corresponded with that of the French. His army, amounting to 45,000 men, advanced in order to attack the latter. The two armies were too near each other, as they were marching forward, to be long in meeting. The engagement was soon begun, and by ten o'clock was general along all the front of the line.

For the first two hours, fortune was favorable to the French, who gained ground on all sides. General Serrurier got possession of Villa Franca, and maintained himself there. The centre under General Moreau, and the right, pushed on to Verona. The Austrian General Latterman at this critical moment advanced with nine battalions, and marched rapidly against the French, to the sound of Turkish music: and the French, hitherto victorious, attacked both in flank and rear, were at once stopped, broken and put to flight.

The presence of mind of General Moreau was, however, with him. To prevent the Austrians from following up this success, he directed his column, the centre, reinforced by some troops that had remained in reserve, vigorously to charge and force the centre of the Austrians, where General Kaim commanded. This order was executed in the most admirable manner. The Austrian centre was compelled to give way, and, notwithstanding the greatest exertion on the part of its General, was repulsed to within half a league of Verona. General Lusignan, having then come up to his assistance, with three battalions of grenadiers, still kept in reserve, the battle was renewed with redoubled fury, and long maintained with equal success.

The obstinacy of the Austrians at last prevailed; and the French on this point likewise were broken, routed, and pursued with the bayonet at their backs. Defeated on the right and in the centre, the French could not think of drawing any advantage from the success they had on their left. General Serrurier followed the retrograde movement of the rest of the army, which it executed with great confusion, leaving behind their cannon, ammunition waggons, and wounded.

The trophies of this victory were seventeen pieces of cannon, and near three thousand prisoners.

It cost the victors in killed and wounded, two thousand five hundred men. The loss of the French in killed and wounded was at least three thousand five hundred.

General Scherer abandoned Villa Franca and Ysola-della-Scala on the day after the battle of Magnan, and concentrated his army between Mantua and Goito. On the 7th, continuing his retreat, he passed the Mincio near Goito, at the same time throwing a reinforcement of men and provisions into Peschiera.

The Austrian van-guard occupied the extent of country abandoned by the French, and pushed on to Valeggio, where it seized the bridge over the Mincio. In the mean time, a flying corps, under General Klenau, either sunk or took the armed and provision boats of the French on the Po, and on the 7th gained possession of the countries of Ostiglia and Governovolo; thus cutting off the communication between the lower Po and Mantua.

These successes on the part of the Imperialists encouraged the long suppressed detestations of the Italians for the French to break forth. The inhabitants of the two banks of the Po, took up arms for themselves, cut down the trees of liberty, ab-

jured all revolutionary insignia, and compelled the French troops to disperse about the country, and to shut themselves up in Ferrara and Bologna. Affairs were equally prosperous in the other extremity of the line formed by the Imperial army. General Wuckassowich on the 8th took possession of the defile of Rocca d'Anso, which opened the entrance of the Brescian, and placed him in the rear of the French army. The latter circumstance determined General Scherer to quit the Mincio intirely, and to retire behind the Chiesa, thus leaving Peschiera and Mantua to their fate.

General Melas, who had arrived on the 8th to take the command of the Austrian army, sent his van-guard, on the 10th, beyond the Mincio, to occupy the approaches to Peschiera; while on the left General Klenau pushed on to the vicinity of Mantua.

On the 13th, the first columns of the Russian Auxiliary army, which were immediately followed by the others, arrived at Verona, and the day after General Melas, having no longer any thing to fear for his rear, passed the Mincio with all his army, which on that day he encamped near to Campagnola, his head quarters being at Valeggio. In this position he was joined by the Russian army, about 20,000 fighting men, and by

Marshal Suwarroff,[1] who took the chief command of the troops of the two emperors.

The first measures of Suwarroff were directed for the double blockade of Mantua and Peschiera, to

[1] Field Marshal Suwarroff, who had risen from the ranks, through all the intermediate gradations, to that of General in Chief, brought with him a reputation established by more than fifty campaigns. He first distinguished himself as a partizan at the head of a body of light troops, during the seven years, war: and afterwards acquired considerable fame by his exploits against the Poles, the Tartars, and the Turks. But what chiefly fixed the attention of his contemporaries, was his victory at Ryminick, which, in addition to the title of Count, conferred by two Emperors, had obtained for him the sir-name of Riminiski, while his sanguinary exploits at Ismailoff and Praga, although demonstrative of the most consummate bravery, attracted the execration, rather than the applause, of mankind. Living among his troops, like an Arab chief with his tribe, he obtained their affections by participating in their fortunes, and sharing all their hardships. He had also discovered the secret, that the Greek Cross, as well as the Crescent of the Mussulmans, was capable of inspiring its followers with fanaticism; and he omitted no opportunity to exalt the valor of his soldiers, by recurring to the popular superstitions of their country. Unacquainted with war as a science, he was yet passionately enamored of its stratagems and dangers; and it still remained to be proved, whether he was to be considered as a fortunate free-booter, delighting in slaughter, and actuated by no fixed principles, or a great captain, worthy of the enlightened age in which he happened to live.

Vide Stevens' Wars of the French Revolution.

which service he allotted between 18 and 20,000 men, under the command of General Kray.

General Scherer, with his army reduced to less than 20,000, pursued his retrograde movements on the 14th, 15th, and 16th, and on the 17th his right passed the Adda. His rear-guard remained on the left bank of the Rhine; his left in front of the Oglio, behind Brescia; his head quarters at Lodi, which two days afterwards were transferred to Calao upon the Oglio, and, by an oblique movement, the right of his army approached the left of that river, and of Brescia.

General Scherer was already followed by the Allied army: the latter reduced the town and citadel of Brescia, and forced the French to abandon the Oglio. General Scherer next determined on securing the fortified places of Piedmont, and there to wait for reinforcements, which were on their way from France and Switzerland. It was at this critical period, that the Directory were compelled by the universal voice of the army to take the command of the army of Italy from General Scherer, who was generally disliked by the troops, and to confer it on General Moreau, whose well-earned military reputation had not been diminished by the late disastrous events, which the French army had experienced.

General Moreau was invested with the command on the banks of the Adda, where the French army was reinforced by some troops from Piedmont, from Genoa, and from the interior of France; which, in part made up for the sacrifices of men it had been obliged to make in forming the garrisons of Mantua, Peschiera, Brescia, and Pizzighetone.

The French positions were as follow: the left wing, commanded by Serrurier, defended the Upper Adda from Lecco; on the lake of Como, to Trezzo, where it joined to the centre, composed of the divisions of Generals Victor and Grenier, and where the Commander in Chief, General Moreau, took his station. All the territory comprised between Trezzo and Cassano was occupied by these two divisions. At their right and behind Cassano, was placed the main body of their cavalry. The bridge-head of Cassano was strongly entrenched and protected by the artillery of the castle. It was protected likewise by the canal between the Adda and Milan, lined with riflemen, and defended by a great number of batteries raised along the banks of the river. The right of the French army, guarded by General Delmas, had its principal force at Lodi and Pizzighetone.

The Allies on the 23rd encamped on the banks of the Adda, taking their positions along that river,

and leaving those occupied by the French. Their head quarters were at Treviglio. General Kaim's division held in check Pizzighetone, observed the Lower Adda, and advanced parties beyond the Po, to Placentia and Parma.

One of these parties was sent into Parma to carry off the Pope, whom the French were conducting into France. But the Austrians, who were not informed of this circumstance, before it was too late, did not arrive at their destination till twenty-four hours after Pius had been removed from Parma.

This aged and infirm father of the Catholic Church, as he passed by Valence through Daupheny, was every where received by multitudes of people, with sentiments and expressions of sympathy, respect and veneration. They fell on their knees and demanded his blessing, which he bestowed with great goodness and grace, in a very affecting manner. After an indisposition of several days, he expired at Valance on the 19th August, in his eighty-second year. He was elected Pope, February 15, 1775. Unslacked lime was thrown into the grave to consume his body.[1]

On the 27th, Suwarroff, unable to turn the

[1] Vide Annual Register.

French line, resolved to force it, and to attack at the same time its centre and left points, on which it was best defended. General Wuckassowich, in the night of the 26th, had made himself master of a flying-bridge, which the French had but imperfectly destroyed; and having quickly repaired it, he marched four battalions and two squadrons across the river, and took up a position at Brivio, an important point, situated at the end of a road leading to Milan, from the lake of Como, on the centre of the Allied army: to reach the opposite bank of the Adda was not so easy. Some hundreds of troops were employed almost all night in carrying pontoons and planks, necessary for the construction of a bridge, to the edge of the water opposite Trezzo, and at half-after-five the next morning, the bridge was completed.

The Austrian light troops of the centre passed the bridge, attacked the division which had occupied Trezzo, and repulsed it to Pozzo. Between the latter place and Brivio, a battle ensued; but the French were driven out of the village with some loss. General Melas threw a flying bridge over the Adda, and, with his two divisions, joined the Commander in Chief at Gorgonzello.

The French retired towards Milan; and on the following day, the Allies arrived at that city, and

took possession of it without difficulty. General Serrurier, with the left of the French, having been cut off from the centre by General Wuckassowich surprising the passage of the Adda at Brivio, and his force being reduced to 3000 men, was obliged to capitulate to the allies, and himself and troops surrendered as prisoners of war.[1]

General Moreau, after the battle of the Adda, compelled to yield the Milanese to the Allies, found himself in a very embarrassing situation. The force with him was scarcely fifteen thousand; and what remained on his right and left, hardly amounted to 10,000 more. With these he had to preserve the communication with Switzerland, to defend the approaches of Turin, to cover the fortified places of Eastern Piedmont, to secure the passes of the Appenines, to leave to the army of

[1] The conditions were, that the whole troops should lay down their arms, and be made prisoners of war. The Generals and Officers, however, were permitted to return to France, not to serve again until exchanged. This last condition was a mark of respect shown to the bravery of the old General Serrurier, and to the probity of his conduct. General Serrurier, preserving, under the republican standard, that sense of honor which raised him to the rank of Lieutenant under the old government, kept himself so pure in the midst of the extortions committed by the other generals, that he was styled the *Virgin of the Army*. Vide Annual Register.

Naples the means of effecting its retreat, and to suppress the insurrections which were breaking out against him on all sides.

To combat against so many dangers, required all the consummate skill of General Moreau: he directed his right to fall back from the Adda to the Po; his centre from Milan to Pavia; and his left to Novary. He quitted the latter town, where he had his head quarters, and repaired to Turin, to put its citadel[1] in a state of defence, and having effected this object, he rejoined his army.

Unable to protect Turin, Tortona, and Alexandria, equally well, he wisely determined to leave Piedmont to its fate, to dispute the rest of Italy inch by inch, and by gaining time to save the campaign. General Moreau, on the 7th of May, chose a position, by which his right rested on Alexandria, and the Tanaro; and his left on Valentia and the Po. By this position, on one side he supported Tortona, and on the other, by the course of the Po, gave some direction to Turin. At the same time, he preserved his most important

[1] The whole army of General Moreau would hardly have sufficed to form a garrison for the city, but the citadel required a much smaller one, and which only he therefore put into a state of defence.

communications with France, and the Genoese territory: and he hoped to fix the attention of the Allies in the centre of Italy, to oblige them to waste the campaign in a war of posts and sieges, and thus to retard, or even to prevent, any project of invasion they might form against France, and to give the republic time to collect new armies.

On the 1st of May, Suwarroff put his army in motion, and on the 4th, established his head quarters at Pavia. On the 5th, General Kray, who was besieging Peschiera and Mantua, made himself master of the latter. On the same day, he invested the castle of Pizzighetone, and General Latterman that of Milan. The first surrendered on the 9th.

The injudicious conduct of Suwarroff, who, at this period, divided his army, and determined to embrace a variety of objects at the same time, afforded to General Moreau an opportunity of retrieving his loss, and of which that able chieftain readily availed himself. The multiplied operations, which the Allies undertook[1] at the beginning

[1] The siege of Turin, the investment of Milan, Pizzighetone, Alexandria, Tortona, Ferrara, and Bologna; to occupy the passes of Susa, Pignerol, and the Col. d'Assiette. Major General Hohenzollern was also posted at Modena, with a con-

of May, divided their army into a great many corps. They were acting on a line almost circular round the basin, formed by the Alps and Appenines, and intersected by the Po.

On the 14th of May, the allied army passed the Scrivia, and encamped at St. Juliano; thus taking a position on the right flank of General Moreau. Neither this nor another movement, by General Wuckassowich on the other side, shaking the firmness of General Moreau, Suwarroff, hoping to weary him out by a new movement, gave orders that his army, in the night of the 16th, should fall back and pass the Po, near Casa Tisma, and from thence to proceed towards Sesia.

General Moreau, acquainted with the latter order, in the night of the 15th, threw a bridge of boats over the Bormida, and with ten thousand men passed that river on the following morning. He overthrew the advanced posts of the allied army, and drove them by Marengo towards Juliano. An action ensued, in which, after several vicissitudes, General Moreau was forced to retreat with loss.

siderable body of troops, and Lieutenant General Ott detached with ten thousand men, while the main body of the Russians advanced into Piedmont.

In the afternoon of the 25th, three Austrian and one Russian division, more than thirty thousand strong, encamped within a league of Turin, in which General Fiorella was posted with 2500 men, who, refusing at first to surrender the city, retired into the citadel; from whence he threw into the city some balls and shells.

Four battalions, which had been left at Milan with General Latterman, not being sufficient to undertake the siege of the castle, Suwarroff directed General Hohenzollern to go with six battalions and lay siege to the castle of Milan, and which capitulated to him on the 23rd. On the following day, the city of Ferara was also taken by capitulation: and four companies of Austrian infantry, having embarked on the 24th at the mouth of the Po, took possession of Porto Digoro, and on the 26th, of Porto Primero. The capture of Ferara, which followed, completed the establishment of the Austrians on the Lower Po.

General Macdonald, commanding the army of Naples, now received instructions from the Directory to evacuate the kingdom of Naples, and join General Moreau. With his troops in close columns, General Macdonald traversed the Romish state, and hastened towards Tuscany, the capital of which he reached on the 24th of May. He

found there the division of General Gauthier, and established a communication with that of General Montrichard, which was opposed to General K'enau, in the country of Bologna, and in Romagna. The union of all these troops formed an army of about 25,000 men, composed of French, Italians, and Poles.

To effect an union with General Moreau, Macdonald chose the road between the Appenines and the Po, across the Duchies of Modena, Parma, and Placentia. On the 26th, he proceeded on his march, and on the 30th, had his head-quarters at Lucca. Meanwhile, General Moreau advanced half-way to meet him; and leaving only his left wing in the position of Coni, arrived with his right across the maritime Alps at Savona, occupying with his centre the Upper Valley of the Tanaro. Pushing on a division still further, he occupied, with considerable force, the defile of the Bochetta, and other passes of the Appenines. All preparatory measures being taken, General Macdonald put his army in motion on the eighth of June, marching himself with the centre towards Modena, and the other divisions taking the road to Fornovio and Rheggio.

About this period, Suwarroff obtained reinforcements from the Courts of St. Petersburg and

Vienna, which enabled him to march forty-five thousand fighting men to oppose Generals Moreau and Macdonald. After two actions with the Imperialists on the 10th and 12th, Macdonald on the 13th advanced towards Rheggio, entered Parma on the 14th, and on the 15th arrived at Placentia. Suwarroff, leaving Wuckassowich with a corps of observation, in the province of Mondovi, and General Kaim with a brigade to cover, on the side of France, the siege of Turin, set out from the city on the tenth with the principal part of his army, amounting to from twenty-five to thirty thousand men, and on the 12th, had his head quarters at Acqui.

On the 15th, Suwarroff again set out with little more than 20,000. A dreadful battle ensued, which was interrupted only by the night, on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, on both sides of the Trebbia. It terminated to the advantage of Suwarroff; and Macdonald, after losing more than a third of his army, retired to the positions from which he had set out. Suwarroff next hastened back, marching his army towards Alexandria, to meet General Moreau, who had passed the Appenines, raised the blockade of Tortona, and forced General Bellegarde to retreat behind Bormida. Moreau, on the approach of the Russian commander, retired to Genoa.

On the 20th, Turin surrendered to the Imperialists by capitulation. About the end of June, Suwarroff was in a state to oppose 90,000 men to the 60,000 of the French, who were, exclusive of the garrisons of Mantua, Tortona, and Alexandria, garrisons which amounted scarcely to 15,000 men. The advantage that Suwarroff wished to derive from his successes was that of conquering Tuscany, and taking the three strong places above mentioned.

As soon as Macdonald had removed himself from the Appenines, many thousands of the inhabitants of the Province of Arezzo took up arms in favor of their Sovereign, and at the same time a Cisalpine General, Lahooze, commanding for France a corps of Italians, together with his troops, deserted the cause of the Republic.

In these circumstances, Macdonald lost no time in continuing his retreat from Tuscany. The troops could retreat by the Reviera di Levante; but there was no other mode of saving the artillery, the baggage, and the numerous chests filled with the spoil of Italy, than to send them by sea. Macdonald therefore sent all that he could collect to be transported to Leghorn. Only a small part of this could be embarked on board an American vessel, in which many officers of the staff as well as

the civil agents of the republic, took their passage. On the 9th, the vessel set sail, and fell into the hands of the English, almost in going out of the port. On the same day, the garrison of Urbino capitulated to the Imperialists, Leghorn followed, and Macdonald, whose retreat by the Corniche was by this time rendered safe, and in a good measure already effected, on the 17th, gave orders for the evacuation of the whole of Tuscany.

Towards the end of July, General Macdonald's force, reduced to about 13 or 14,000 men, joined General Moreau in the environs of Genoa. By their re-union, General Moreau had a disposable force of 40 or 50,000 men, who were spread from the eastern extremity of the State of Genoa, as far as Coni, and occupied in that line all the defiles of the Appenines.

On the 21st of July, the fortress Alexandria, which was besieged by the Imperialists, had surrendered by capitulation; that of Mantua followed on the 30th, and Tortona some time after, viz. on the 23rd of August.

At the end of July, the mixed party, which had succeeded the old directory of France, relying on the popularity, which commonly attends newly acquired power, created a new army of the Alps, and

another o the Rhine, and a plan of general attack was formed on the enemy's line in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. General Joubert was appointed to succeed to the command of the army of Italy, General Moreau having been appointed to command that of the Rhine, but who, from a singular attachment to General Joubert, remained with him as a volunteer, submitting to act under his orders.

THE first military operation of General Joubert, on taking the command, was the battle of Novi, on the 16th of August.

On the 15th, the French prepared to offer battle, being drawn up in their encampment, upon the heights terminating the extensive plain of Piedmont, and of which the ascent is very difficult. Notwithstanding the strength of this advantageous situation, Suwarroff, (who knew the French always to be the most formidable when the assailants,) by whom difficulties were not regarded as obstacles, when his plan once formed, warsesolved upon

engaging General Joubert in this position at five the next morning.

The Republicans received the attack of the Imperialists with their usual intrepidity and firmness; they drove back their centre and right wing several times. They appeared to be immoveable in their position, and sustained with equal valor repeated charges, so that at noon they considered the day as their own. The loss of the allies exceeded that of the French, until the right wing of the latter began to give way, and the French, failing of support from this side, could not prevent General Melas, who most opportunely came up at the head of sixteen Austrian battalions, from turning their flank, and pursuing his advantage.

General Joubert having received a mortal wound, the command of this army again devolved upon General Moreau, who was under the necessity of giving orders for a retreat, after having three horses shot under him, and received a ball in his clothes. He effected a retreat with his usual masterly ability, and in some sort arrested the victory in the very hands of the allies. The loss on both sides was excessive.

General Moreau took up a position nearly in

the line his army had before occupied at Genoa. Suwarroff pursued a plan for dispossessing him of his situation, and forcing the passages to Genoa, either by the way of the Bochetta or the Levant; towards effecting which, General Klenau had made some progress; Suwarroff's ultimate intention being to surround and form the siege of Coni.

The disputes between the coalesced powers, however, rendering it impolitic to confine their exertions to the same theatre, it was resolved by the respective cabinets, that General Melas should continue the war in Italy, while the Russians under Suwarroff were to enter Switzerland.

The Austrians, left to conclude the campaign in Italy, without the aid of their Russian allies, obtained some partial successes over the French on the 22nd and 24th of September, and the latter were obliged to retire to Coni.

General Championnet, having at this period been appointed commander-in-chief of the two armies of Italy and the Alps, removed his head quarters about the end of November to Final; not, however, leaving entirely the former position on the Appenines, by which he could protect and watch Genoa and Coni: but the successes of the Austrians enabled them on the 26th of November

to open the trenches before the latter place, one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, and which on the 3rd of December surrendered to their arms.

Previously to the latter event, however, the situation of the Austrians had been daily improving in other parts of Italy. They had obtained possession of the important posts in the valley of Stura. Mondovi, Ceva, and Serraville, had been surrendered to the Austrians, and at the close of this important campaign, there remained in all Italy, only Genoa, and its small territory, in the possession of the French.

1800.

IN the year 1800, while Buonaparte was preparing to relieve Genoa, and overrun Italy on one hand, he determined on the other to carry the war into Germany; and in conformity to the genius of the nation over which he now presided, it was resolved that the French should act upon the offensive in both countries.

General Moreau, upon this occasion, was selected to command the army of the Danube, and, by occupying the attention of the Austrians, prevent them from detaching any more forces into Lombardy.

The outline of the present did not differ greatly from that of the two preceding campaigns; but the means were more proportionate to the end; it was intended to act with large masses against inferior numbers, and, by means of a combined movement with the armies of Switzerland, Germany, and Italy, to end the contest with the capture of Vienna.

On the 20th of April, the French army crossed the Rhine in four large divisions, under the respective commands of Generals Moreau, St. Susanne, St. Cyr, and Lecourbe. That under St. Susanne advanced to Offenburg, while St. Cyr, who crossed the Rhine at Old Brisau, advanced to Fribourg.

The manœuvres of the latter seemed to indicate an intention to form a junction with the former: and of course that General Moreau was to penetrate through the black mountains by the valley of Kintzig, towards Donaweschingen. St. Susanne's movement, however, was only a feint; on the 27th he received orders to return to Kehl; and marching up from thence along the Rhine, he arrived by forced marches at Fribourg on the 30th of April. St. Cyr, who had reached Fribourg, pursued, meanwhile, that course of march which was necessary to form the junction of the whole army between Schwetlingen and Schaffhausen.

General Moreau, with the division under his immediate command, crossed the Rhine at Basle, and proceeded to the point where the various divisions were to meet. General Lecourbe with his division crossed the Rhine between Schaffhausen and Stein, and after some fighting, and making a good number of prisoners, the whole army, with

the exception of St. Susanne's division, were assembled at, and in the environs of, Schaffhausen.

The admirable masterly manœuvres of General Moreau had completely deceived General Kray, commanding the Austrians, and the consequences were immediate.

In order to oppose the progress of the French, the latter was obliged precipitately to decamp from Donaweschingen, into which St. Susanne entered on the 3rd of May, and pressed upon the rear of the Austrians, stretching out his flanks at the same time to the main body of General Moreau's army, he endeavoured to establish himself in the lines of Stockach, in order to oppose the lines of the enemy. On the same day, the post of Stockach was attacked and taken. On the following, General Moreau attacked that of Engen, where General Kray commanded in person—the post was well maintained, and the French suffered some loss. In the course of this conflict, the Archduke Ferdinand, with a body of Austrians under his command, in his retreat from Donaweschingen was attacked by St. Susanne, and nearly cut off, but by great exertions and presence of mind he was enabled to join the main army.

General Kray kept his post during the night, but at day-break commenced a retreat. General Moreau immediately pursued; and on the same day, the 5th, attacked the Austrians at Mosskirk, 15 miles distant from Engen. The Austrians defended themselves in the most intrepid manner, and the loss on both sides was nearly equal. General Moreau had four horses killed under him, and received an exhausted ball on his breast. On the 9th, the Austrians were again attacked at Biberach, and on the 11th near Memmingen; in both of which, success attended the French arms, and the Austrians suffered severely.

General Kray, leaving a considerable body of troops under General Mereveldt, to keep up a communication with General Reuss in the Voralberg, now retreated to Ulm, for the protection of his magazines there, and where he was joined by General Sztarray, with the troops under his command, and six thousand Bavarian and Wirtemburg auxiliares. The French were also concentrated on the territory of the city of Ulm, near Rheineck. General Kray was desirous of avoiding a battle until some promised reinforcements arrived, and as no inviting circumstance for an attack presented itself, both Generals contented themselves with mutual observation. This state of inaction was of great service to the French. They levied contribu-

tions and exacted supplies of corn and provisions throughout Franconia and Suabia.

The plan of co-operation which had been concerted between General Moreau and Buonaparte began to be developed. The former, while he still made a shew of directing his main force to the countries on the left bank of the Rhine, detached part of his troops towards the lake of Constance, whither he afterwards withdrew the main body, with an intention to remain on the defensive, and favor the operations of the campaign in Italy as much as possible, while St. Susanne with his division remained on the left bank of the Danube, in the neighbourhood of Geisligen.

General Moreau for two months had sought nothing farther than to amuse General Kray by marches and counter-marches, and prevent him from paying any attention to the affairs of Italy. After the battle of Marengo, however, as the convention concluded in Italy did not extend to Germany, he determined to penetrate into the hereditary states. He immediately levied a contribution of six millions of livres on the circle of Franconia, to enable him to provide for the necessities of his troops, and then put his army in motion, on purpose to oblige General Kray either to withdraw or fight a decisive battle.

General Kray, however, maintained possession of his camp at Ulm, although Lecourbe, who had been detached for that purpose, had rendered himself master of Augsbourg, and menaced the capital of Bavaria. On this, General Moreau crossed the Danube with the main body of his army, and attacked the troops under General Sztarray, posted at Blenheim, and on the very spot where Marshal Tallard was defeated by the Duke of Marlborough, General Moreau was successful, and after a short but obstinate action, he obliged the Austrians to abandon Ulm, and retire into Franconia.

General Moreau immediately marched in pursuit of the retreating enemy, and having come up with him at Neubourg, a new action ensued, in which Moreau was equally successful. Immediately after the last success, General Moreau entered Bavaria, established his head quarters at Munich, and whilst preparing for further victories, the armistice was extended to Germany.

THE refusal of the Austrian Emperor to ratify the preliminaries of peace signed by his Plenipotentiary, Count St. Julian, at Paris, on the 28th of July, put an end to the armistice, which ceased to have effect on the 7th of September, at one in the afternoon.

In the mean time, grand military preparations were made by both parties. The French army of the Rhine, seconded on its left by an army under Augereau, and on its right by that of the Grisons, formed, on the Mayne, as far as the entry into the Tyrol, a line ready to advance on the first signal.

The French army was composed of twelve divisions, comprising at least a hundred thousand men, and was divided into four corps. One under Lecourbe occupied Upper Suabia, Upper Bavaria, and the entry of the Tyrol. Another under the immediate orders of the Commander in Chief, General Moreau, occupied the two banks of the Iller, as far as Landshut. The 3rd, under Grenier, held all the left banks of the Danube, nearly to Passau, and the right bank of the river, as far as the mouth of it, at Altmuck. The 4th, under St.

Susanne, occupied the country between the Mayne and the Danube, from Bamberg as far as Aix la Chapelle.

The Austrian armies occupied a chain of posts in front of the French, bending their main force to strengthen their line, from the frontiers of Austria to the gulph of Venice. In Bohemia, they had an army of thirty thousand, under the Archduke Charles. They occupied the right banks of the Mayne in great force; and an army under General Klenau, in the Upper Palatinate, was opposed to St. Susanne, whose head quarters were at Mayence.

On the 24th November, Augereau drove the Austrians from Aschaffenburg, and marched through Franconia towards Bohemia, to communicate with the left of the division under General Moreau. On the 29th, General Moreau recommenced hostilities near the Inn, and carried the works at Wassenberg. In a battle at Haag, on the 1st December, he was less successful, and forced to retreat.

On the 3rd, the Archduke John, who commanded on the 1st, encouraged by his success, assaulted at the head of three columns the French post at Hohenlinden.

The Archduke had no sooner begun his march than a severe fall of snow took place by which his march was so much retarded, as to prevent that regularity in point of operation, which ought always to accompany a combined movement. Only the centre column arrived at the point of destination at the time when all the divisions ought to have been ready for action.

General Moreau directed General Richepanse to assail the centre column in flank, at the moment it commenced an attack, and this unexpected evolution produced great confusion: the left column being pierced nearly at the same time, while the right encountered unexpected obstacles. At 3 in the afternoon, the Imperialists were forced to retire, and were vigorously pursued by the active Commander in Chief, whose forces hung upon the rear of the Austrians, with such effect, that night alone saved the latter from intire destruction.

The French took 10 pieces of cannon, 200 caissons, 10,000 prisoners, and a great number of officers; among whom were three Generals. The loss of the French did not exceed one thousand in killed, wounded, and missing.

The critical situation of the Austrian Monarchy after the battle of Hohenlinden, obliged the Empe-

for to detach himself from his Allies, to procure an armistice from the French, and finally to conclude the peace of Luneville.[1]

The termination of the Campaign of 1800-1801 found the Emperor Francis II. in a much worse situation, than at the treaty of Leoben. In his capacity of King of Hungary and Bohemia, he was under the necessity of acceding to the propositions of a separate peace, the conditions of which were excessively hard, and he was obliged to make immense sacrifices.

General Moreau, n according to the Emperor Francis an armistice of only forty-five days, had obliged him to consent that the Tyrol should be wholly evacuated, and the fortresses of the Brunau and Wurtzbourg delivered up to the French: and when afterwards a cessation of hostilities was obtained by the Emperor in Italy, it was only on the conditions of the surrender of Peschiera, Sermione, Verona, Legnano, Ferara, and Ancona. Moreover, in consequence of the preliminary articles signed at Luneville, Mantua was also delivered up; and the Austrian Netherlands were ceded in perpetuity to France, as well as the whole of the bank of the Rhine with the county of Fulkenstein and

the Frickthal, by a definitive treaty, afterwards ratified by the Empire on the 7th September, 1801.

At the latter period all the principal articles of the treaty of Campo Formio were confirmed, the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics were recognised, and the Dutchy of Tuscany, now converted into a kingdom, under the appellation of Etruria, was bestowed upon Louis I. the hereditary Prince of Parma.

Buonaparte notified the conclusion of the war to the Tribunate and the Conservative Senate. The war had lasted the same number of years as the siege of Troy ; and it proved a subject of great exultation to the French nation.

The First Consul, whilst he congratulated the nation on the one hand, confidently asserted on the other, that it was the ambition of England alone which still continued to disturb the tranquillity of mankind.

He observed, "The Continental peace has been signed at Luneville. It is such as the French people desired. Their first wish was the boundary of the Rhine. Reverses never shook their resolution : victory never added to their pretensions.

"After having re-established the ancient limits of Gaul, they had to give freedom to the people, who were united to them by one common origin, as well as by a community of interest and of manners.

"The liberty of the Cisalpines and of Liguria is secured.

"After this duty, there was another, which justice and generosity imposed.

"The King of Spain had been faithful to our cause, and suffered for it. Neither our reverses, nor the perfidious insinuations of our enemies, could detach him from our interests: he will have a just recompence—a Prince of his blood is to sit on the throne of Tuscany.

"He will remember what he owes to the fidelity of Spain, and to the friendship of France; his roadsteads and his ports will be shut against our enemies, and will become the asylum of our commerce and our ships.

"Austria, and it is this which is the pledge of peace, Austria, henceforth separated from the Republic by vast regions, will no longer feel that ri-

valry, those heart-burnings, which for so many ages have occasioned the ferment of these two powers, and the calamities of Europe.

"By this treaty every thing is settled with respect to France; it will no longer have to struggle against the forms and the intrigues of a congress.

"The government owes the expression of its satisfaction to the minister plenipotentiary, who has conducted the negociation to this happy termination. There remain neither interpretations to be feared, nor explanations to be demanded, nor those equivocal arrangements in which the diplomatic art deposits the seeds of a new war.

"Wherefore was not this treaty, the treaty of a general peace? This was the wish of France. This was the constant object of the efforts of the government.

"But its efforts are in vain. All Europe knows that the British minister has endeavoured to frustrate the negotiations at Luneville.

"In vain did an agent, authorised by the government, declare to him, on the 9th October, 1800, that France was ready to enter into a separate negociation. This declaration only pro-

duced a refusal, under the pretext that England could not abandon her ally. Since then, when this ally consents to treat without England, that government seeks other means to delay a peace so necessary to the world.

"It violates conventions which humanity had consecrated, and declares war against miserable fishermen.

"It raises pretensions contrary to the dignity and the rights of all nations. The whole commerce of Asia and of immense colonies does not satisfy its ambition. All the seas must submit to the exclusive sovereignty of England. It arms against Russia, Denmark, and Sweden; because Russia, Denmark, and Sweden have secured, by treaties of guaranty, their sovereignty, and the independence of their flags.

"The powers of the North, unjustly attacked, have a right to reckon upon France. The French government will avenge with them a common injury to all nations; without ever losing sight, however, that it ought only to fight for peace, and for the good of the world."

WHEN the Directory and the Councils of France determined to do honor to Buonaparte, by a splendid feast in the church of St. Sulpice, transformed into the temple of Victory, Buonaparte, anxious to prevent any sentiments of rivalry and opposition on the part of General Moreau, to the ambitious projects which he had in view, and desirous of gaining his confidence and favor, requested that General Moreau might also be invited, and conjoined with himself in every sentiment intended to be expressed by that entertainment, and which request was readily complied with.

The first time General Moreau met the present Ruler of France, was in the house of the President of the Directory, Gobier. "General," observed Buonaparte to the departed chieftain, "I had several of your Lieutenants in Egypt, and they are very distinguished officers." He also presented him with a magnificent pair of pistols, saying, "I could have wished to have had all your victories engraved upon them, but there would not have been room enough."

Although General Moreau at this time was

in the judgment of the principal military characters, superior to Buonaparte, yet in the public eye he was secondary. The dazzling splendor of Buonaparte's fame had captivated the French people, and indeed had gained him panegyrists[1] in all parts of Europe, by whom he was regarded as the brightest character that had ever shone; and Moreau, less ambitious than Buonaparte, was content to be among the first in the train of this favorite of fortune.

The 7th of November was fixed upon for the feast in honor of the two Generals, and the walls of the Temple of Victory were decorated with an immense number of standards, taken in the course of the war from the enemies of the French Republic; but this magnificent feast was characterized from beginning to end by silence. One of its objects was to lull the suspicion of an approaching political explosion, but the active jacobins, though members of the legislature, absenting themselves,

[1] In an English work of great celebrity is the following observation; "Buonaparte, to the advantage of military renown, added that of moderation, prudence, and a regard not only for civil rights, but also for religion. His letters, his speeches, his actions, all proclaimed a sublimity of courage, imagination, and design, beyond the limits of vulgar conception, &c."

it by no means succeeded: and on the contrary afforded stronger grounds for suspicion.

It is said that Buonaparte communicated his plans to General Moreau, who, whatever he might think, either of their stability, practicability, or extent, was certainly too wise to state his opinion upon these subjects. He, however, although he did not, and indeed he could not, oppose the elevation he foresaw, it is said, even in the outset, much regretted the event.

THE campaign of 1800, 1801, was the last, excepting that of 1813, in which the grand military talents of General Moreau were exercised, and in which, as well as in his preceding campaigns, he had no less distinguished himself by his consummate skill in the art of war, than by his hamanity in softening its rigors and distresses, when opportunities offered.

I am now arrived at an epocha in the life of this distinguished individual, which but for the character and views of his rival and antagonist, would be involved in darkness and mystery. General Moreau was a man who saw not passing events with the casual glance of a superficial observer: he penetrated into the schemes of politicians, he read their designs, and foresaw their effects.

In the month of February, 1804, before the designs of Buonaparte upon the monarchy of France had unfolded themselves to the world, a few distinguished individuals, who were well acquainted with his ambitious projects, jealous of the honor and freedom of their country, entered into a compact either to relieve it from the system of tyranny he had commenced, or prescribe boundaries to his ambition.

General Pichegru, Georges, Cadoudal, (formerly a chief of the insurgents in Brittany,) and Lajollais, a friend of General Pichegru, were implicated in this conspiracy, and it was believed from appearances at the time, that General Moreau had to a certain extent entered into the views of the conspirators; but a perusal of the trial of Pichegru, Georges, and their friends, must convince every individual that General Moreau, if acquainted with a part of the plan, certainly did not intend giving to it any support.

At the commencement of the campaign of 1798, the fortune of war had thrown into the hands of General Moreau the baggage of the Austrian General Klinglin, wherein were discovered papers in cypher which left no room to doubt that a plan was formed to effect a counter-revolution, and that communications for that purpose were carried on between General Pichegru, the Prince de Condé, and the British Minister, Mr. Wickham.

The friendship General Moreau entertained for General Pichegru, made him desirous of suppressing these papers: he was however obliged finally to make a confidential discovery to Barthelemy, but which action was not condemned even by General Pichegru.

The delinquency of General Pichegru, the bosom friend of General Moreau, and his preceptor in the art of war, as well as the reserve and mystery observed by General Moreau, in regard to the correspondence and papers in cypher, determined Buonaparte to involve, if possible, that upright character in ruin: and although the industry of his emissaries could not adduce one proof of his having embarked in the conspiracy, yet he was arrested and treated as an enemy to the state.

General Moreau[1] together with Lajollais, and

[1] Buonaparte was fully sensible of the many virtues of General Moreau; of the universal respect and esteem with which he was regarded throughout France; and that he might become at one time a powerful and successful adversary to his schemes of ambition. He was moreover acquainted with many satirical observations the General had publicly made on his conduct; they rankled in his heart and fixed his determination to attempt his ruin. One of the satirical observations of the General I shall here notice. Some time before General Pichegru's plot was discovered, General Moreau gave a grand dinner at his house at Grosbois, to the principal officers who had served under him. The dinner was much admired by every person present, and afterwards the *Maitre d'hôtel* having been sent for, he was informed, that as the dinner was highly approved, the company had directed he should be presented with a saucepan *d'honneur*. This satire was in derision of the *Fucès d'honneur*, *Baguette* (Drumsticks) *d'honneur*, &c. which Buonaparte at that time distributed to his

some other persons obnoxious to the first consul, were arrested on the 17th of February, 1804, and the following report of the Grand Judge, Minister of Justice to the Government, was read to the Tribunal.

"Citizen first Consul,

"New plots have been hatched by England. This was the case even amidst the peace which she swore to maintain, and when she violated the treaty of Amiens, she counted less on her strength, than on the success of her machinations. But government was vigilant; the steps of the agents of the enemy were followed by the eye of justice: the people of London were no doubt expecting to hear of the explosion of that mine, which had been dug under our feet. At any rate the most ominous reports were spread, and they were indulging the most criminal hopes; —on a sudden the agents of the conspiracy were arrested; proofs have accumulated, and they are so strong and so evident that they carry with them conviction to every mind.

"Georges and his band of assassins had remained in the pay of England; the agents were still tra-

army with a view of rendering himself popular. This satire was soon publicly known, and occasioned many others on the same subject throughout Paris.

versing La Vendée, Morbilian, the Côtes Du Nord, and were endeavouring, but in vain, to find partizans, of whom they were deprived by the moderation of government and of the laws.

"Pichegru, unmasked by the events which preceded the 18th *Fructidor*, year 5, (Sept. 5th, 1797) and convicted, in particular, by that correspondence which General Moreau had addressed to the Directory, had carried with him to England his hatred against his country. In the year eight, he and Villot were in the train of the armies of our enemy, in order to unite with the brigands of the South. In the year nine he conspired with the committee of Bareuth, and since the peace of Amiens, he has still been the hope and the counsellor of the enemies of France.

"The British perfidy associated Georges with Pichegru—the infamous Georges, with that Pichegru whom France has esteemed, whom she wished for a long time to consider as incapable of treachery. In the year eleven a criminal reconciliation united Pichegru and Moreau, two men between whom honor ought to place eternal hatred. The Police seized at Calais one of their agents, at the moment when he was returning a second time from England. This man had in his possession documents, which confirmed the reality of a reconcilia-

tion at that time inexplicable, had not the bonds which united them been formed by criminality.

"On the arrest of this agent, General Moreau appeared for a moment to be agitated. He took some private steps to ascertain whether government was informed of it; but it was passed over in silence, and he himself, when he recovered his tranquillity, concealed from government an event which could not but awaken its vigilance. He observed silence even when Pichegru was publicly admitted into the councils of the British ministry, when he united in a notorious manner with the enemies of France. Government was disposed to consider his silence as arising from the dread of a confession which would have humbled him, as it considered his retirement from public affairs, his suspicious connexions, and his imprudent language, as the effect of peevishness and discontent.

"General Moreau, who could not fail of being suspected, since he maintained a secret correspondence with the enemies of his country, and who in consequence of this suspicion, which was too well founded, would at any other period have been arrested, was suffered to enjoy in tranquillity his honors, an immense fortune, and the kindness of the Republic. Events, however, rapidly succeeded each other. Lajollais, the friend and confidant of

Pichegru, went privately from Paris to London, returned to Paris, carried to Pichegru the ideas of General Moreau—carried back to Moreau the ideas and designs of Pichegru and his associates; the Brigands of Georges were preparing, even in Paris, every thing that was necessary for the execution of their common designs.

"A place was assigned between Dieppe and Treport, at a distance from molestation or the eye of vigilance, where the brigands of England brought over in English ships, landed without being observed, and where they found corrupted men to receive them, men paid to conduct them during the night from fixed stations, previously agreed on, and thus to convey them to Paris.

"At Paris lurking places were procured for them, hired before hand, where they had confidants to protect them; they had some of these in different quarters and streets at Chaillot, in the rue de Bacq, in the Fauxbourg St. Marceau, in the Marrais. A first debarkation was effected, consisting of Georges himself, and eight of his brigands. Georges returned to the coast to assist at the landing of Coster St. Victor, condemned by a sentence passed in the affair of *Nivôse* three, and of ten other brigands.

"In the commencement of the present month a third landing was effected. It consisted of Pichegru, Lajollais, Arnaud, Gaillard, (brother of Raould,) John Marie, (one of the first confidants of Georges,) and some other brigands of the same stamp.

"Georges with Joyau, called Dassar, St. Vincent, and Picot, went to receive this third debarkation: the whole assembled at the farm de la potérie.

"A fourth landing was expected; the vessels were in sight, but contrary winds prevented them from approaching; a few days ago they were still making signals. Georges and Pichegru arrived at Paris, where they lodged in the same house, surrounded by about thirty brigands under the command of Georges: an interview took place between them and Moreau; the place, the day, and the hour, where the first conference was held, are known—a second was agreed upon, but did not take place—a third and a fourth took place, even in the house of General Moreau.

"The presence of Georges and Pichegru at Paris, those conferences with General Moreau, are confirmed by incontestible and numerous proofs. Georges and Pichegru have been traced

from house to house. Search has also been made for those who assisted at their landing; those who, under the cloud, conducted them from post to post; those who gave them an asylum at Paris; their confidants and accomplices. Lajollais, their principal agent, and General Moreau are arrested: the effects and papers of Pichegru have been seized, and the police is employing the greatest activity to find him.

"England wishes to overthrow our government, and by this overthrow to effect the ruin of France, to deliver it up to ages of civil war and confusion. But to overturn a government, maintained by the affection of thirty million of citizens, and surrounded by a brave, powerful, and faithful army, was a task, not only superior to the strength of England, but of all Europe.

"England, therefore, had no hopes of accomplishing her design, but by the assassination of the First Consul, and by covering this assassination under the shadow of a man, who was still protected by the remembrance of his services. I must add, that the citizens need be under no uneasiness. The greater part of the brigands have been arrested, the rest have fled, and are closely pursued by the police. No suspicion attaches to any class of citizens, or to any branch of administration.

"I shall not give any further details in this report; you have seen all the papers; you will, therefore, give orders for their being laid before the eyes of justice. Signed by the Grand Judge, Minister of Justice,

"REGNIER.

"Certified in due form, the Secretary of State,

"H. B. MARET."

The Brother of General Moreau, who was a Member of the Tribunate, immediately addressed that assembly, testifying the deepest concern to find that endeavours were making to traduce a man who had rendered such important services to the Republic. He made a solemn protestation of his brother's innocence, complained that he was deprived of the liberty to offer an exculpation of himself, and demanded that he should be brought to trial, when he pledged himself that the innocence of General Moreau should be made manifest.

The Tribunate replied, that the defence of General Moreau should have all the latitude, liberty, and publicity, of which so important a cause was susceptible.

Deputations from all the bodies, of which the government was composed, presented themselves

before the First Consul, deprecating in the strongest language the conduct of England in the conspiracy which had been revealed. The most remarkable passage in the addresses was used by the President of the Tribunate, Joubert, and was as follows:

"While we imagined, Citizen First Consul, that you had nothing to dread but the dangers of legitimate war, the perfidy of the English government surrounded you with new snares. What a humiliating avowal of its inability to combat with open arms the repairing genius of France!!!"

Buonaparte replied to these addresses, that, since he had attained the chief magistracy, many plots had been formed against his life. Educated in camps, he never regarded, as important, dangers which caused in him no fear. But he could not avoid experiencing a serious and painful feeling, when he reflected on the situation in which that great nation would have been involved, had this last conspiracy succeeded: for it was principally against the glory, the liberty, and the destiny of the French people that it was planned.

He had long since renounced the hope of enjoying the pleasures of private life. All his days were employed in fulfilling the duties, which his fate and

the will of the French People had imposed upon him. Heaven would watch over France, and defeat the stratagems of the wicked. The citizens might be free from alarm—his life would continue as long as it should be of utility to the nation. But he wished the French people to understand, that without their confidence and affection, existence would be to him without consolation, and to them without an object.

These measures were accompanied by communications to the same effect issued in general orders to the French armies, and were followed of course by corresponding addresses. General Pichegru, although still in Paris, had contrived to elude the vigilance of the police: notwithstanding a proclamation had been issued, offering a reward of a million of livres for his apprehension. He was however, at length betrayed by the person with whom he lodged, an exchange broker of the name of Blanc, and arrested on the 28th of February.[1]

[1] The following is the last letter written by General Pichegru to this country; which, together with the subjoined remarks, deserves attention.

Le 18 Janv. de 5 Lieues dans le rivage.

Je vous ai écrit de la Rade de Douvres le soir du Samedi 16. Le lendemain à 4. h. du matin nous remimes à la voile, et dans la nuit du 16 nous avons débarqué heureusement avec un pronostic extraordinaire, pour s'être déja renouvellé trois fois. J'en

Blanc, however, did not escape unpunished for

fus frappé d'abord, mais je l'ai été bien davantage, lorsque ceux qui nous ont dévancé ici m'ont dit que la même chose leur étoit arrivée. Voici ce que c'est : au moment où les chaloupes ont abordé le rivage, une étoile, ou feu aérien, d'un éclat extraordinaire, s'est venu tomber directement devant nous, comme pour nous indiquer le point de débarquement et suppléer aux personnes qui devoient nous y attendre, et qui ne s'y trouvoient pas, parceque ce n'étoit pas une place de rendezvous; A. et La Rive, qui arrivent à l'instant de Paris, qui comme vous savez ont débarqué séparément, nous ont dit avoir remarqué la même chose. Je me flatte que ce phénomène est d'un heureux présage, et je désire que tout ce que j'aurai vu d'ici à peu de jours me confirmera dans cette espérance. Nous partons d'ici ce soir, et La Rive me dit que nous ne pourrons être à Paris avant Dimanche ou Lundi. Je détache d'ici M. Frederic pour aller par la voie la plus prompte, je veux dire la poste, prévenir de notre arrivée, de manière que j'espère voir et savoir à quoi m'en tenir dans les premiers jours de la semaine prochaine. Je vous écrirai aussitôt. A. retourne avec nous et sera probablement porteur de ma prémière, surtout si elle a à vous annoncer ce que nous désirons.

Notre voyage n'aura j'espère d'autres désagrémens que ceux résultans des mauvais chemins, des mauvais temps, et des marches de nuit. Toutes les troupes sont concentrées des environs de Boulogne à Flessingues, de manière qu'il n'y en a presque point d'ici à Paris. De Coise y est retourné depuis environ 8 jours; on croit bien décidément qu'il tentera la descente et il vient de mettre (d'hier seulement) tous les batteaux de la côte en réquisition.

Adieu, mon cher Baron, j'espère vous donner prochainement de nos nouvelles. J'y mettrai plus de célérité si elles peuvent être aussi favorables que je le désire. Faites moi le plais ir de

his treachery. Murat, who had signed the pro-

communiquer ces deux mots à Eug. Couchery n'ayant pas le temps de lui écrire: Portez vous aussi bien que nous.—*All is well.* Bon. *of* Roll.

The following remarks on his tactics, manners, and person, are extracted and translated from a work entitled, "Histoire Chronologique des opérations de l'armée du nord, et de celle de Sambre et Meuse, par le citoyen David, Témoin de la plupart de leurs Exploits."

The tactics of General Pichegru are of a nature altogether new and original. His system consists wholly in pursuing the enemy without intermission; in courting opportunities of engagements; in keeping his whole force together, without dividing it for the purpose of carrying on sieges; to reduce only such as are necessary, in order to secure proper positions, without seeming to be at all concerned about the reduction of such strong places as he had left behind him. This system of military tactics, was the only one that was suitable to our situation; and further, it was the only system that suited the character of the French. It was not to be doubted, that our troops were full of courage and bravery; but that the greater part of them was newly levied, and not sufficiently trained in sieges, for the purpose of undertaking a siege of any difficulty. Farther still, the French soldier is too ardent and impatient to go through with a chain of operations that require perseverance. In the field, he darts forth like an eagle, and fights like a lion. But a long and arduous siege repels, and even oftentimes discourages him. In order to have a military body of men perfect and invincible, it would be necessary to carry on sieges with Swiss troops, and to have French armies of observation. But while a general has only Frenchmen under his command, he ought not to let them grow restive by remaining long in one

clamation, had him arrested and exiled from Paris.

On the 29th, a law was proposed and passed in a single sitting, to punish with death every person who should afford an asylum to Georges, or any of his accomplices.

Georges was taken on the 9th of March, accompanied by a person of the name of Leridan: he killed with a pistol shot one of the police officers, and wounded another.

It was not unknown in Paris that the jealousy of Buonaparte had long been excited against General

place, but to keep them always in breath, and always within view of the enemy. If Pichegru had obeyed the orders of the Committee of Public Safety, if he had not known the character of the French, and adopted an unusual system of tactics, he would have sacrificed fifty thousand men at least before our towns of Hainault. Perhaps he might have been beaten, and even in case of success and victory, he most assuredly would not have been able to push his conquests even to the Nortern Sea and the confines of Westphalia.

General Pichegru possessed a fine understanding, as well as great knowledge and skill in military affairs: but the most prominent feature in his character was a manly boldness; simplicity and strength of mind; which, scorning defiles, advanced as directly as possible to its object.

Moreau, on his account of his military reputation, his probity, his moderation, and disinterestedness. He was adored by a great proportion of the army, and possessed the esteem of all well disposed persons. He was also considered as the natural rival of Buonaparte, and looked up to as the only person who was able to deliver France from his sway.

It was not therefore unlikely that Buonaparte should be anxious to rid himself of this formidable barrier to supreme power: but nevertheless the state of parties in France, and the popularity of General Moreau, rendered it necessary for Buonaparte to exert all his capabilities for manœuvre and intrigue to mask his real plans against General Moreau.

Even after the arrest of General Moreau, Buonaparte perceived the necessity of proceeding against him with the most guarded caution. The trial lasted nearly three weeks, from nine in the morning until six in the evening. During its progress, General Moreau was received in the hall with enthusiastic applause, and throughout he displayed the greatest firmness.

The sentence of the Judges was, that General Moreau was not guilty of the charges alleged against him by the Tribunate, but that his con-

duct had been inconsiderate. And they therefore sentenced him to two years imprisonment.

A fear of raising the indignation of the army, induced the First Consul to remit the punishment decreed to that of banishment. A letter which General Moreau addressed to him, was made the plea for this lenity, and General Moreau immediately quitted Paris.[1] He went first to Spain, and

[1] In General Sarrazin's "Confessions of Buonaparte to the Abbé Maury," the following statement of these transactions is given. "At London I had an enemy in Pichegru, who though only of the second order, was dangerous for his talents and reputation. Georges had a great influence in the Western Provinces. Moreau caused me much uneasiness. His wife, and more particularly his mother-in-law, had exasperated him against me to such a degree, that he would not see me. He turned my campaigns, and my political institutions, into ridicule. This man, who, previous to my return from Egypt, had refused the offer of being placed in the first rank, now repented of his moderation. I saw that a grand sweep was necessary, and determined to join all these heads into a single hydra, that I might cut them off at a blow. The enterprise was not an easy one. I planned a conspiracy. Although Fouche was no longer Minister of Police, he continued to possess my full confidence. He alone could give the proper direction to every branch of my vast plan. Founding our measures on the precise intelligence which Andreossy had collected respecting the *coteries* of London, we set on foot the *assassination of the First Consul.* Moreau was indignant at my insulting haughtiness. Pichegru could not forgive me the

was at Cadiz during the malignant contagion which raged there in the beginning of 1805, and from

arbitrary prolongation of his unwarrantable exile. The known rashness of Georges gave grounds to believe in the possibility of his attempting my life. The devotion of the Duke D'Enghien to the honor of his illustrious family, determined him to come to the right bank of the Rhine. The minutest details were communicated to me with a degree of precision that thunderstruck even myself. Every proposition of my agents was accepted with an eagerness that can be accounted for only by the hatred of the conspirators, by their desire to restore the Bourbons, and by the dexterity of my spies. My confident, General Savary, took care to be on the coast, near Fécamp, with six *gens d'armes*, at the moment when Pichegru and his band were disembarking. They followed them every stage of their progress. They might have arrested them the very day of their arrival in France, but it was necessary to draw in Moreau by making him communicate with the conspirators. As soon as this important point was gained, the alarm was sounded; all Paris was on foot. The most distinguished functionaries, although very well known, were frequently arrested by the *gens d'armes*, and conducted before competent authorities, in order to be confronted with the descriptions of the principal conspirators. This farce lasted several days. Meanwhile Caulincourt and Ordener were on their way to arrest the Duke D'Enghien, who, instead of entering France in triumph, as he had been flattered, was led prisoner to the castle of Vincennes. It would have been very easy to have given it out that he had killed himself, but that would not have satisfied my ambition. I had him conducted before a council of war, the President of which, Hullin, had received his instructions from me. The forms prescribed by the law were observ-

thence to America. On his arrival in America, General Moreau made a tour along the banks of the Ohio and the Missisippi. He visited the astonishing falls of Niagara, and surveyed every other natural wonder with which that extraordinary country is ornamented. In this excursion, General Moreau had an opportunity of observing the manners of the Americans: their internal policy and national resources. He clearly comprehended the strength and ability of the states, and in all his views of the Americans as a rising people, he invariably spoke with judgment, and predicted with truth.

After his tour, General Moreau, having been joined by his wife and child, purchased a house called Morrisville, below the fall of the Delaware; and there, with the wreck of his once large fortune, had the happiness to find in the enjoyment of a few friends, whose taste and sentiments were congenial with his own, a portion of tranquillity, which banished in some degree the remembrance of what he had lost in Europe.

By the Code Napoleon, the expense of the trial falls on the person accused. And the goverm-

ed; he was condemned to death, although he was innocent, since he had been arrested on neutral ground, and was shot in the moat of the castle of Vincennes, where he was buried.

ment have the choice amongst all the individuals implicated in the same accusation. It fell of course on General Moreau; and Madame Hulot, his mother-in-law, who had undertaken to send him the produce of his property to America, was obliged to pay out of it the whole expense of the trial of Pichegru, Georges, and their friends.

It is observed in a work intitled "the[1] Secret History of the Cabinet of Buonaparte," that at the conclusion of each day's sitting on the trial of General Moreau, the prisoners were conducted to their prisons between two files of soldiers; and that as General Moreau passed, the soldiers grounded their arms, and some whispered in his ear, "*Mon General voulez vous de nous?*" General do you want us? "*Non*" was the answer, "*Je n'aime pas le sang.*" "No, I do not love blood." Had he but given the word, it was generally believed that Buonaparte would have been a prisoner in the temple in less than six hours.

Although retired from public scenes and public

[1] By Lewis Goldsmith, a person, who from a residence at Paris as conductor of an English newspaper called the Argus, had certainly opportunities of receiving information upon many of the secret acts of Buonaparte: but who from his warmth has perhaps injured more than benefited the cause in which he has since written.

men, General Moreau was not to be forgotten; and when the oppressed Continental States rose to throw off their chains of slavery and misery, to compel Buonaparte to confine himself to the ancient boundaries of France, and to restore to their rightful owners the territories he had possessed himself of: when the revolutionary springs[1] of France appeared to be worn out, the counsels and the military skill of General Moreau were regarded by the Sovereigns of Europe, as essentially necessary to the completion of their just and honorable designs.

[1] In conversation with his friends in America, General Moreau constantly not only denied any previous knowledge of the enterprise of Georges, &c. but even condemned the plan itself. He observed "that to effect any change in France, the people should wait till men and *revolutionary springs* were worn out." The following was also an observation of General Moreau: L'arbre de la liberté est fletrie, et il ne reste rien que l'écorse *(le Corse.)*

COLONEL Rappatel, the Aide de Camp of General Moreau, who had shared in many of his most brilliant victories, and who did not abandon his General in the hour of misfortune, passed through this country about a year since in his way to Russia, whither he had been tempted to go in consequence of overtures from the Court of St. Petersburg, by their minister at Philadelphia, Mr. Dashkoff, to General Moreau, offering him a command, and requesting his aid in the general deliverance of Europe. He was there received with those distinctions which were due to the friend and fellow soldier of Moreau, and was in a short time appointed to an important command in the Russian army.[1] From the representations made by that officer, General Moreau was induced about the end of May, 1813, to quit his retirement at Philadelphia, in order to reassume that situation he was so admirably qualified to fill. He accordingly retired from those scenes where he had passed some years, universally beloved, and

[1] The successful issue of this gentleman's endeavours to persuade General Moreau to embark in the contest, procured for him the warmest acknowledgements from the Emperor Alexander.

in the enjoyment of that respect, which is due to a life well spent, and embarked in the Hannibal for Europe, again to plunge into that tempestuous ocean, where all his brightest hopes had once been shipwrecked.

The Americans repeatedly offered General Moreau the command of their armies, and the agents of Buonaparte were continally employed to induce him to the adoption of some step that might deprive him of his well earned popularity ; and they even flattered themselves with inducing him to become ruler of North America : but those, and every other attempt, were foiled by the nobleness which constantly animated General Moreau, and which, throughout his tempestuous career, drew respect from such of his enemies as enjoyed any liberality of feeling.

WHEN the Russian Minister found that General Moreau acceded to the wishes of the Emperor Alexander, he applied to the British Admiral Cockburn, for a licence for an American ship to go to Europe with a passenger, and on the 21st of June, General Moreau embarked at Hell Gate, on board the Hannibal, 500 tons burthen, and sailed from America. He landed at Gottenburg the 26th July, and on the 4th August he again embarked at Ystadt in a Swedish Brig of War for Stralsund. The Crown Prince of Sweden, then at Berlin, set off to give his early friend a meeting, and to concert with him a plan of military operations for the ensuing campaign. It was determined to organize a separate corps d'armée, to be principally composed of French prisoners, and called Moreau's legion. This body was to be decorated with the white or national cockade, to bear the motto "*pro patria*," to fight for the deliverance of Europe, and in particular for the emancipation of Frenchmen. A part of the plan agreed upon was, that General Willot, who was expected in England from America, together with General Rewbel, (the Commander in Chief of the Westphalian army, at the time of the escape of the Duke of Brunswick, and

who was disgraced by Buonaparte on account of that event,) were to organize such of the French prisoners as they could raise in this country, and to have disembarked with them in the north of France.

After a passage of two days, General Moreau arrived at Stralsund: his reception there was proportionate to his rank as a General in Chief, to his misfortunes, and his renown. He pursued his journey, and on the 10th of August reached Berlin, accompanied by Colonel Rappatel, and Mr. Svinine, a gentleman in the civil department of the Russian government, and now in this country. General Moreau was greeted by the populace with the most rapturous welcome. They assembled in front of his apartments with joyful acclamations, and in the evening he was serenaded.

On the morning of the 11th General Moreau visited all the Princes and Generals then resident at Berlin: those distinguished personages immediately returned his visits; and in the evening of the same day he set out from Berlin, accompanied by the gentlemen above mentioned, to join the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, at their headquarters.

At eight o'clock in the evening of the 16th August, General Moreau arrived at Prague.

The Counsellor of Legation, Colonel Rappatel, was immediately sent to the Emperor and King, to acquaint them of the same. These personages, conceiving General Moreau to be extremely fatigued from his journey, deferred seeing him till the following morning: but before the General was dressed, the Emperor rushed into his apartment, and embraced him.[1]

The King of Prussia soon after arrived, and assured the General of his high satisfaction in finding that they should have his able assistance: the Emperor desired that he would draw on his trea-

[1] In a small phamphlet published by Mr. Svinine, whose name I have already had occasion to mention, it is observed, "that on quitting his Majesty, General Moreau came to him, Mr. Svinine, and said in a soft voice, 'Ah! my dear S— what a man is the Emperor! from this moment I have contracted the sweet and sacred obligation of sacrificing my life for him. There is no one who would not die to serve him. How much are all the flattering reports which I have heard relative to him, how much are all the prepossessions I had entertained in favor of him, beneath *that angel of goodness.*" I have given this note, as Mr. Svinine states the General to have made the observation; but I must at the same time observe, that it is very different from that bold, animated, and nervous language, in which General Moreau has delivered himself on every other occasion.

sury for every demand that he should require, but which noble offer the General with equal nobleness declined: representing that he brought with him sufficient funds for the present campaign, and which he hoped would be the last. Two days afterwards, the 18th August, the Emperor of Russia presented General Moreau to the Emperor of Austria, by whom he was received in a manner flattering to his feelings, and worthy of his character. [1]

[1] On joining the Allied Armies, General Moreau, is said to have issued the annexed proclamation, dated Groswitsch, Head-quarters, Aug. 17, 1813.

"The sanguinary struggle for our independence is resumed—all the efforts of our illustrious Ally, his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and our own, to obtain a desirable peace, without any further bloodshed, have proved fruitless. The design was that we should have groaned under the ignominious yoke for a long time to come.

"To arms, therefore, ye valiant Russians, Prussians, and Germans! Our power is formidable, as it possesses both internal energy and a large numerical force. His Imperial Highness the Archduke Charles is Commander in Chief of the Imperial Austrian Army, who have made common cause with ours. Courage in battle, united with perseverance, must infallibly prevail.

"In the name of his Majesty the King of Prussia, as General in Chief of the Allied Army, the Russian Major General, and Chief of the Etat Major,

(Signed) "MOREAU."

The eventful years that had passed since the departure of General Moreau from the land of his nativity, the success of his Imperial rival, and the changes effected in the politics of Europe, were alike unable to obliterate from the minds of men the services or the just renown of General Moreau. His reputation was permanent, because it was founded on the qualities of the heart; and his military character was unimpaired, because it was solid. His health was drank at Dresden by the Officers in the service of Napoleon; and but for the interference of General Berthier, they would have paid for their enthusiasm by their lives. Two Officers in the service of Buonaparte deserted to General Moreau from Dantzig; and had he been spared to his country, there is no doubt that he would have been joined by many valuable French Officers.[1]

Mr. Paul Svinine in his pamphlet denies the authenticity of this statement, on the ground that, at its date, General Moreau was at Prague, and "that he had caused the Emperor Alexander to agree that he should have no title near his person, seeing that having no other ambition than to restore repose to France, his sole wish, after arriving at the accomplishment of this grand end, was quietly to terminate his days there, in in the bosom of his family. His Majesty then said to him, 'Well, be then my friend, my counsel.'"

[1] It has been observed, that in addition to the intire confidence of all the legitimate sovereigns in Europe, which General Moreau enjoyed at the time of his fate, Louis XVIII.

The battle of Dresden, and the plan of the campaign were arranged and advised by General Moreau—they are no doubt some of the grandest ideas that he had ever projected. General Moreau, was in earnest conversation with the Emperor Alexander in the midst of the battle, and in the act of giving his opinion on some military movements, while passing with the Emperor behind a Prussian battery, to which two French batteries were answering, one in front, and the other in flank, and the British Minister, Lord Cathcart, and Major General Sir Robert Wilson were listening to him, when a ball struck his thigh, and almost carried his leg off, passed through his horse, and carried away the calf of his other leg.[1] He uttered a deep groan, but

had given him unlimited powers with respect to France, pledging his word that he would take no measures either of internal or external police, without consulting him. On hearing of his death, that Prince exclaimed, "I have lost my crown a second time—(J'ai perdu ma couronne une seconde fois.) At the suggestion of the Prince of Condé, he intended to give General Moreau the rank of Constable of France, the highest situation under the old monarchy, and the French blue ribband.

[1] The following are Lieut. General Sir Charles Stewart's, his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the King of Prussia, accounts of the operations at, and in the vicinity of Dresden, and the fall of General Moreau. As this work is intended to embrace every circumstance relating to General Moreau, the introduction of these documents I conceive necessary.

immediately after the first agony of pain was over,

"Head-quarters of His Majesty the King of Prussia.
Zehista, Aug. 27, 1813.

"My Lord,—My last dispatches will have acquainted your Lordship of the determination of the Allied Armies to debouche from Bohemia, by the several passes into Saxony, and enter on immediate offensive operations in flank and rear of the enemy, if he still maintained his forward positions in Lusatia, and remained on the right bank of the Elbe. While the main Russian army under General Barclay de Tolly, including the corps of Witgenstein and Miloradovitch, and the Prussian corps of General Kleist, together with the whole of the Austrian army, were to act offensively from Bohemia, under the chief command of Prince Schwartzenberg, General Blucher's corps d'armée, composed of a division of Prussians under Lieutenant General d'Yorck, and General Sachen's and General Langeron's Russian divisions, were to move from Silesia on Lusatia, and threaten the enemy in front. General Blucher was to avoid engaging in any general action, especially against superior numbers. In conformity with these intentions, General Blucher advanced in three columns on the 20th from Leignitz, Goldberg, and Jauer, on Buntzlau and Lowenberg; General Sachen's corps moved on the right on Buntzlau, and General d'Yorck's on the centre, and General Langeron's on the left. The enemy abandoned Buntzlau, destroyed their works, and blew up a magazine of powder there; and General Blucher's forces advanced to the Bober, where they were attacked on the 21st by the enemy, who moved in great force on Buntzlau, Lowenberg, and Laun, and a very serious affair took place. It is reported Buonaparte commanded in person, and that he presented one hundred and ten thousand men to General Blucher. The Allied troops contested the ground with great bravery; but as General Blucher had received orders to avoid a general

spoke with the utmost tranquillity, and perceiv-

engagement, he withdrew in the best order to Haynau, Pilgramsdorf, Hirshberg, and behind the Katzbach; where his troops were at the date of the last accounts. The loss of General Blucher in this affair is reported to be near two thousand men; he took, however, several prisoners. The enemy suffered considerably.

"The grand armies on the side of Bohemia commenced passing the frontiers on the 20th and 21st; Count Witgenstein's and General Kleist's columns, by the passes of Peterswalde; the Austrians by Komotaw. On the 22nd, Count Witgenstein's corps fell in with the enemy, and had a very considerable encounter with them near Berghishabel and Zehista.

"The enemy met the Allies on the frontiers, and have been beaten back from all their positions, towards Dresden, although they endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to defend every inch of ground.

"The different columns of the allied armies were to debouche from the mountains and passes, at such concerted periods as would probably have operated fatally upon the enemy, if the arrangement, as planned, had been completely carried into effect; but the eagerness of the troops to push on and engage, brought the right corps into action on the morning of the 22nd. The French were commanded by General Gouvion St. Cyr, (who is newly arrived, and come up with the army from Wurtzburg,) and their force consisted of upwards of 15,000 men; they were supported by their troops from Konigstein, and by those in the camp at Liebenstein, which amounted at least to 6,000 men, under General Bonnet. After a very sharp action, Count Witgenstein drove the enemy from all points, took three

ing the officers around him in the greatest distress,

or four hundred prisoners, besides a vast number of killed and wounded. The loss of the Allies was not severe.

"The enemy after this action retired into Konigstein, his entrenched camp at Liebenstein, and also into the various works he has thrown up round Dresden. The Allies have pressed forward on him on every side, and the Grand Armies are now encircling Dresden.

"On the 26th, the Hussar regiment of Grodno, of Count Witgenstein's corps, had a very brisk engagement, close to Dresden, in which they took four guns and one howitzer. The advanced guards of the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, encamped this night on the heights above Dresden, between Nauslitz and Ischernitz.

"On the 27th in the morning, the enemy abandoned the ground in advance of Dresden which they occupied, called the Grossen Garten, and withdrew into the suburbs and their different works.

"I have thus given your Lordship a general outline of operations up to this period; every hour is big with events. No official reports are made out, so I fear my details in many points may be imperfect. Perhaps the history of war does not afford a period where two great armies stand committed to such bold operations.

"I have much pleasure in reporting to your Lordship, that two Westphalian regiments of Hussars, commanded by Colonel Hammerstein, have come over from the enemy, and are

he observed, "*Soyez tranquilles, messieurs, c'est*

most eager to be ranged in battle against them, to take their revenge for the misery they have entailed upon this country.

I have the honor to be, &c.

CHARLES STEWART, Lieut. General."

"Head-quarters of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, Altenberg, Aug. 29th, 1813.

"My Lord,—The enemy having abandoned the ground surrounding Dresden, called Grossen Garten, and having withdrawn into their works, and into the suburbs of the town on the morning of the 27th, it was deemed expedient to make an attack with a large force upon the place, the possession of which became of considerable importance. Count Witgenstein's and General Kleist's light troops, on the right of the town, had sustained during the morning of the 27th, in the attack of the Gardens, some loss; and indeed the enemy had so much improved by art the defences around the town, that it was evidently an enterprise of considerable difficulty to carry it.

"The troops moved to the assault at four o'clock in the evening: Count Witgenstein's corps, in three columns on the right of Grossen Garten: General Kleist moved one column of attack through these Gardens, and two on the left. His left column was headed by Prince Augustus of Prussia: three divisions of Austrians on the left of the town, under the immediate direction of Count Colloredo, and Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein, joined the Prussians on their left; the Prussians forming the centre attack. A tremendous cannonade commenced the operation: the batteries being planted in a circular form around the town, the effect was magnificent: the fine buildings in Dresden were soon enveloped in smoke, and the

mon sort." and leaning on Colonel Rappatel, who

troops moved forward in the most perfect order to the assault. They approached on all sides close to the town. The Austrians took an advanced redoubt with eight guns, in the most undaunted and gallant manner; I never saw troops behave more conspicuously: the work was of the strongest kind, not above sixty yards from the main wall, and it was flanked by cross-fires of musketry from the various loop-holes that were made in every part from projecting buildings: but nothing could surpass the gallantry with which it was stormed; the enemy fled from it only to shelter themselves behind new defences, manning the thick walls of the town, in which it was impossible, without a long and continued fire of heavy artillery, to make breaches.

"The enemy, with the aid of those means which a strong town affords of resistance, held the troops in check who had so gallantly carried, and entered the out-works. The night was fast approaching, and the enemy now attempted to make a sortie with a considerable force of all his guards, at least amounting to thirty thousand, to separate the Allied troops, and to take one wing in flank and rear. This was immediately perceived, and as it appeared evident that it was not practicable to carry the place that night, orders were sent to draw off the troops, and they returned to their several encampments. Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein made an admirable disposition on the side where the enemy made their sortie, by which all disorder was avoided. This enterprise, in proportion to its being of moment, was one of great difficulty; no troops could signalize themselves more, and in my humble opinion if it had been physically possible to carry the place under the circumstances they would have accomplished it; but there were no

supported him in his arms, he observed, "though I

breaches for the troops to enter, and the artillery although brought up at the close of the evening to near one hundred paces of the wall, were not able to batter it, or make an impression.

"From the best calculation I can make, I should estimate the loss of the Allies at under 4000 men in this attack. The Austrians chiefly suffered.

"The sortie of the enemy was a prelude to a more general battle, which took place on the following morning, the 28th. Buonaparte had arrived in Dresden, from that part of his army in Lusatia, on the night of the 22d; and having a very large force in Dresden, at least 130,000 men, he appears to have determined on attacking the Allies, who occupied a very extended position on the heights surrounding it.

"The enemy had great advantages in their disposition for attack: Dresden, lined with guns, was in their rear; their communications were not intersected; if they made an impression, they could pursue it; if they failed, they could withdraw in security, and our troops could not follow them under the guns of the place. One of the worst days that ever was seen added materially to the difficulties of the Allies, who had arrived, by rapid marches, through bad roads and defiles, at their positions; and whose supplies of every kind, it was difficult, if not impossible, to get up. Availing himself of the disadvantages above stated, Buonaparte displayed an immense number of pieces of artillery; and heavy cannonading on both sides formed the chief feature of the battle. Charges in various points were made, with the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian cavalry, and they distinguished themselves highly:

am lost, to die in so good a cause, and in the presence of the Emperor Alexander, is sweet."

but the main bodies of the infantry, in both armies, did not come in contact. The weather being so hazy, and the rain so incessant, that the action was sustained, at all points, under the heaviest disadvantages.

"Towards the middle of the day a catastrophe occurred which awakened more than ordinary sensibility and regret throughout of the Allied army. *General Moreau, in earnest conversation with the Emperor of Russia on the operations, had both his legs carried off by a cannon shot, the ball going through his horse: an equal loss both to the good cause, and to the profession of arms. It is impossible not deeply to lament his fate. He is still alive.*

"The enemy continued his efforts on the position of the Allies, till finding he could make no impression, the action ceased.

"The battle may have cost us six or seven thousand men. The enemy must have suffered more. In one charge of Russian cavalry against infantry and a battery, a great number of prisoners were taken, though the guns were not brought off.

"I have already detailed to your Lordship the general difficulties in which the Allied army was placed by the large force opposed to them, and by the opinion that Buonaparte would pass a considerable body of troops across the Elbe at Konigstein and Pirna to possess himself of the passes in our rear. The orders for retiring, to the Allied Army, were issued on the

The horror and consternation that followed

evening of the 28th, and the army is now in march in different columns.

"It is impossible not to lament that so fine and so numerous an army, perfectly entire in all its parts, should be under the necessity, having once advanced, of making a retrograde step, as miscalculations may be made on the event, and the enemy may suppose he has gained an advantage. I can only pledge myself to your Lordship, that the army is as eager as ever to meet the enemy, and the same determined spirit exists, hough a partial change of operations may be deemed necessary.

"The enemy's force was not diminished on the side of Lusatia up to the 23rd, for his efforts on the Elbe: as he attacked General Blucher again in great force on that day, who retired upon Jauer. On the 24th, however, he advanced again, the enemy having fallen back, which would indicate his bringing more forces into Bohemia.

"The Austrian corps of General Neuberg has also advanced in the direction of Zittau.

I have the honor to be, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES STEWART, Lieut. Gen."

"Toplitz, Aug. 30, 1813.

"My Lord,—Since my dispatch of yesterday's date, I have to acquaint your Lordship, that a very brilliant action has taken place this day on the road from Toplitz, towards Peterswalde, about two German miles from the former place. It appears

this catastrophe are indescribable, but General

that the Russian column under Count Ostermann, which was to retire by the pass of Osterwalde, found the enemy, who had actually crossed the Elbe at Pirna and Konigstein, had possession of the pass in the mountains, and they were obliged most gallantly to force their way through with the bayonet. They then remained in action with the enemy till late in the evening; and having been reinforced by the reserves of the Russian guards, cavalry and infantry, the former under his Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Constantine, who were sent rapidly to their support, this body of troops, consisting of about 8000 men, held in check, during the day, two corps and one division of the French army, under Generals Vandamme and Bertrand, amounting at least to 30,000 men. I should do his Imperial Majesty's Guards injustice if I attempted to describe the admiration I felt at their valor and signal bravery. The light cavalry of the guard, consisting of the Polonese and dragoon regiments, charged columns of infantry in the highest style. General Diebzetsch, an officer of great merit, particularly distinguished himself; Prince Galitzin in like manner. He was wounded in the attack. Count Ostermann, towards the close of the day, had his arm carried off by a cannon shot; the General commanding the Cuirassiers of St. George was also wounded.

"The importance of the bravery displayed by these troops is highly augmented, when it is considered, that had they not held their ground, the columns of the army and artillery retiring by Altenberg, which were delayed by the bad roads, must have been greatly endangered.

"His Prussian Majesty was at Toplitz when the enemy made their rapid advance by Peterswalde, and made the most able

Moreau, after receiving his wound, never deviated

dispositions to reinforce Count Ostermann, and by his coolness and personal exertions, preserved order and regularity, which even the momentary idea of the enemy's getting in the rear is apt to endanger. The admirable conduct of this Sovereign on all occasions is the theme of universal praise. The corps of Count Ostermann lost three thousand men in this day's action *hors de combat.*

"The French loss may be averaged at double. General Vandamme's corps suffered immensely. The cavalry of the Russian guard took two standards, and three or four hundred prisoners.

"The enemy followed our rear-guard, during the day, on the Dippoldswald road, and they met with a considerable check from the rear-guard, commanded by the Austrian General Hardegg.

"I hope your Lordship will excuse the hurry with which this is written, and will make allowances, as the period and continued movements and operations prevent much accuracy.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES STEWART, Lieut. Gen."

"My Lord, Toplitz, August 31, 1813.

"The brilliant and well-contested action of the 30th ultimo, in which the Prussian guards covered themselves with glory, has been followed up by a very general and decisive victory over that part of the enemy's army, which had advanced from Konigstein and Pirna, on the great chaussée, leading from

from the calm and even temper, which so pecu-

Peterswalde to Toplitz. It became of the utmost importance to make this attack, not only to give time for those columns of the army to fall back, which were still retiring upon the Altenberg and Dippoldswalde road, but at the same time to extricate the corps under General Kleist, which had not disengaged itself from the mountains.

"The enemy had the advantage, in pushing rapidly forward upon our right flank, of a good line of road; whereas the columns of the Allied army, although retiring by shorter lines, were impeded, not only by the unfavorable state of the weather, but by almost impassible roads.

"A great proportion of the artillery train and baggage of the Allied army had not yet got clear of the mountains, when the enemy had arrived at Hollendorf and Kulm, about three German miles distant from Toplitz, the scene where the action took place.

"The attack being determined upon, the following disposition of the troops, destined for that purpose, was immediately made. Six thousand Russian grenadiers, two thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, under the immediate orders of General Miloradovitch, together with twelve thousand Austrians, under Count Coloredo and General Bianchi, commenced the action; the remainder of the troops collected for this enterprise being formed in columns of reserve upon the adjacent plain.

"The village of Kulm is situated at the bottom of a range of mountains, which forms an almost impregnable barrier between Saxony and Bohemia; from this point branch off two distinct ranges of mountain, east and west; between these ranges

liarly characterised him: and indeed throughout

the ground is generally flat, affording, however, in some places, good defensible positions. Upon this ground, immediately fronting the village of Kulm, the enemy collected a strong force of infantry, with a great portion of artillery; a galling fire was kept up incessantly from this point upon the Russians, under General Miloradovitch.

"Such was the strength of the adjacent heights of Kulm, and so ably had the enemy disposed of their force for its defence, that it was judged more expedient to make the principal attack by the right, in consequence of which the Austrian infantry were directed to move along the high ground upon the right, while the Russian guards and infantry were to commence their attack upon the left, so soon as the Austrians were sufficiently advanced. While these movements were executing, the corps of General Kleist, which had not been disengaged from the mountains, appeared in the enemy's rear, descending the road by which the enemy were to retire in case of need. On all sides the attack commenced in the most vigorous and decisive manner. The enemy's left were turned by the distinguished bravery and good conduct of the Austrians under Count Colloredo, the cavalry charging repeatedly; while upon the other flank General Miloradovitch, with the hussars of the guards and grenadiers, forced every point which the enemy in vain attempted to defend. Upon this point above forty pieces of artillery and sixty tumbrils, much baggage, and the whole equipage of General Vandamme, fell into the hands of the Russians. Completely beaten in front at all points, and intercepted in their rear by General Kleist, nothing was left for the enemy but a desperate and precipitate retreat.

the whole of his sufferings, he bore his fate with

"The rout now became general, the enemy throwing down their arms in every direction, and ceasing even to resist, abandoning guns and standards, to seek for shelter in the woods.

"The fruits of this victory are considerable. The General commanding, Vandamme, six other General Officers, of whom are Generals Giott, Hochtox, Himberg, and Prince Reuss; sixty pieces of artillery, and about ten thousand prisoners, with six standards.

"The whole of General Vandamme's staff, and many officers of rank, are also among the prisoners.

"The enemy continue their retreat, closely pursued by the Cossacks and Allied cavalry.

"Having received a severe contusion by the explosion of a shell shortly after the commencement of the action, I was under the necessity of quitting the field of battle, and am, therefore, indebted for the latter details which I have given your Lordship, to Colonel Cooke, Aide-de-Camp to his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, who upon this, as upon every other occasion, since he has been attached to me, has afforded me great assistance.

"I have now the pleasing task of calling your Lordship's attention to another most brilliant contest, which has terminated highly to the honor and advantage of the Allied army.

"It would appear that upon the 25th, Marshal Macdonald had occupied a very strong position in the neighbourhood of

heroism and grandeur of mind not to be surpassed, and appeared, to those with whom he conversed, from his extreme composure and calmness, to endure but little pain.

He was conveyed from the field on a litter made of Cossacks pikes, to a cottage at a short distance, which, however, was so much exposed to the fire, that they were obliged, after just binding up his

Jauer in Silesia, which he had strengthened with a numerous and formidable artillery. He was, however, attacked by General Blucher upon the morning of the 26th, and after a very sharp contest, driven from every part of his position, leaving upon the ground fifty pieces of artillery, thirty-nine tumbrils and ammunition wagons, with a number of prisoners, exceeding ten thousand men.

"The contest was renewed with fresh vigor, and with equal success on the part of General Blucher, the whole of the 27th and 28th, of which the result appears to be, that thirty pieces of cannon, and five thousand more prisoners, have been taken during the last two days.

"According to the latest intelligence, General Blucher continued the pursuit with the utmost celerity.

"General Prince Reuss, whom I named to your Lordship as among the prisoners taken in the very brilliant affair of yesterday, is dead of his wounds.

I have the honor to be, &c.

CHARLES STEWART, Lieut.-Gen."

wounds, to remove him to Noethlitz, where he suffered amputation below both his knees. When the first surgical operation was completed, and he understood it would be necessary to amputate the other limb, he declared had he been previously so informed, he would have preferred dying. He however underwent the whole without complaining, exhibiting a deportment and countenance firm and undismayed. He afterwards partook of some refreshment.

About seven o'clock in the evening of the amputation, he was placed in a litter formed of the body of a coach, and carried by Russian soldiers to Passendorff. He complained of extreme pain; he rested at the country house of Mr. Tritschen, Grand Master of forests, and there again partook of refreshment. On the 28th, at four in the morning, he was removed in the same manner from Passendorff to Dippoldswalden, and there rested in the house of a baker named Wutz, where he took some further refreshment. An hour after he was removed to the frontiers of Bohemia, being borne the whole of his painful journey by Russian soldiers.

In the course of this melancholy route, the unfortunate General Moreau was drenched with rain, which fell in torrents—with no other covering except

what a few blankets afforded, which were insufficient to defend him from the inclemency of the weather, this truly great character sustained himself with unshaken fortitude, and never in all his bodily anguish forgot the beloved country in whose sacred cause he had spilled his vital blood.

On the 3rd day after his wound General Moreau addressed the following letter[1] to Madame Moreau.

"MA CHERE AMIE---A la Bataille de Dresde, il y a trois jours, j'ai eu les deux jambes emportées d'un boulet de canon—Ce coquin de BUONAPARTE est toujours heureux.

"On m'a fait l'amputation aussi bien que possible. Quoique l'armée ait fait un mouvement rétrograde, ce n'est nullement par revers mais par décousu, et se rapprocher du Général BLUCHER.

"Excusez mon griffonnage. Je t'aime et t'embrasse de tout mon coeur.

"Je charge RAPPATEL de finir. V. M."

[1] A most correct fac simile of this highly interesting letter accompanies this work.

"Madame,—Le Général me permets de vous écrire sur la même feuille où il vous a tracé quelques lignes. Jugez de mon chagrin et de ma douleur par ce qu'il vient de vous dire.

"Depuis le moment où il a été blessé je ne l'ai pas quitté, et ne le quitterai pas jusqu'à sa parfaite guérison. Nous avons la plus grande espérance: et moi qui le connois, je puis dire que nous le sauverons. Il a supporté l'amputation avec un courage héroique, sans perdre connoissance: le premier appareil a été levé, et les plaies sont fort belles. Il n'a eu qu'un léger accès de fièvre lorsque la suppuration s'est établie, et elle a diminué considérablement.

"Vous devez me pardonner tous ces détails; ils sont aussi douloureux pour moi à tracer qu'ils le seront pour vous à lire: j'ai eu bésoin de courage depuis quatre jours, et en aurai bésoin encore. Comptez sur mes soins, sur mon amitié, et tous les sentimens que vous m'avez inspirés l'un l'autre pour le servir: ne vous allarmez pas; je ne puis vous dire d'être courageuse; je connois votre coeur.

"Je ne laisserai pas une occasion sans vous donner de ses nouvelles. Le Médecin vient de m'assurer

que si cela continue d'aller ainsi, dans cinq semaines il pourra aller en voiture.

" Adieu, Madame, et respectable amie; je suis bien malheureux. J'embrasse la pauvre Isabelle. Le plus dévoué de vos serviteurs,

RAPPATEL.

Lann, 30 Aoust, 1813.

1er Septembre—Il va bien, et est tranquille."

(TRANSLATION.)

" My dear love,—At the battle of Dresden three days ago, I had both legs carried off by a cannon ball.

" That scoundrel Buonaparte is always fortunate.

" The amputation was performed as well as possible.

" Though the army has made a retrograde movement, it is not at all the consequence of defeat, but from a want of *ensemble*, and in order to get nearer General Blucher.

" Excuse my hasty writing. I love and embrace thee with my whole heart.

" I charge Rappatel to finish. V. M."

Every word in this interesting letter is indicative of the firm spirit which was fleeting from its earthly

"Madam.—The General permits me to write to you on the same sheet on which he has sent you a few lines. Judge of my grief and regret by what he has just told you.

"From the moment he was wounded, I have not left him, nor will I leave him till he is perfectly cured. We have the greatest hopes; and I, who know him, am certain we shall save him. He supported the amputation with heroic courage without fainting. The first dressing has been taken off, and the wounds have a good appearance. He had only a slight access of fever when the suppuration took place, and it has considerably diminished.

"Forgive these details; they are as painful for me to give, as they will be for you to receive—I have stood in need of all my fortitude for the last four days, and shall still stand in need of of it. Rely upon my care, my friendship, and upon all the sentiments with which both of you have inspired me—Don't alarm yourself, I need not tell you to exert your courage. I know your heart.

"I will neglect no opportunity to write to you—The Surgeon has just assured me, that if he continues to go on as well, he will be able in five weeks to go out in a carriage.

"Madam, and respectable friend, farewell—I am miserable. Kiss poor Isabelle for me.

Your most devoted servant,

Lann, Aug. 30, 1813. RAPPATEL.

Sept. 1.—He is going on well, and is easy."

mansion. Writing as he must have been under the influence of extreme pain, nothing personal was allowed to escape him—he seems forgetful of his bodily sufferings, while his soul is full of the cause which had led him to his death: and must remain a monument of his spirit to the admiration of posterity. It appears by the brevity of this celebrated letter, that his physical strength had been unequal to the task of proceeding, for it is not to be supposed that the moral powers of General Moreau could be subdued or even weakened.

The situation of General Moreau becoming every hour more hopeless, his surgeons at length apprised him of the approach of that event which no human skill could avert. Without giving way to despondency, he commenced dictating the following letter to the Emperor Alexander, abounding with the most fervent expressions of gratitude and respect.

"To His Imperial Majesty the Emperor Alexander.

"*Sire,—I go down to the grave with those sentiments of admiration, respect, and devotedness, which your Imperial Majesty inspired me with from the first moment of our interview.*"

General Moreau had written thus much of what he regarded his last duty to man, when his brave

spirit, at five minutes before seven in the morning of the 2nd of September, 1813, was released from all earthly suffering.

A conference, which took place at Lann between him and some of the Generals on the affairs of the Allied Armies, and by which he was completely exhausted, accelerated his dissolution. He observed to the officers when he felt his strength fail him, and he could no longer continue the conference, that he hoped to see them on the following morning, when they could go into the points not discussed.

It is certainly true that the sacred cause in which General Moreau had embarked, occupied his thoughts in the most awful and momentous periods which immediately preceded his death. The effect of this event upon the combined armies is described by the British Ministers and Generals in affecting and appropriate language, and the Emperor Alexander, with all the benignity and nobleness of his nature, addressed the following letter to the disconsolate widow of General Moreau.

"MADAME,—When the dreadful misfortune which befel General Moreau, close at my side, deprived me of the talents and experience of that great man, I indulged the hope, that, by care, we might still

be able to preserve him to his family and to my friendship. Providence has ordered it otherwise. He died as he lived, in the full vigor of a strong and steady mind. There is but one remedy for the great miseries of life—that of seeing them participated. In Russia, Madam, you will find these sentiments every where: and if it suit you to fix your residence there, I will do all in my power to embellish the existence of a personage of whom I make it my sacred duty to be the consoler and the support.

"I intreat you, Madam, to rely upon it irrevocably, never to let me be in ignorance of any circumstance in which I can be of any use to you, and to write directly to me always. To anticipate your wishes will be a pleasure to me. The friendship I vowed to your husband exists beyond the grave, and I have no other means of showing it, at least in part, towards him, than by doing every thing in my power to insure the welfare of his family.

"In these sad and cruel circumstances, accept, Madam, these marks of friendship, and the assurance of all my sentiments."

"Alexander."

"Toplitz, 6th September, 1813."

His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, also issued the following orders relative to General Moreau. "That the body should be conveyed to Prague to be embalmed, and that from thence Colonel Rappatel should convey it to St. Petersburg, and to have it buried with the same funeral honors as were observed to Prince Kutusoff Smolenzk, in the Catholic church of that city."

It now only remains to rescue from the aspersions of Buonaparte the brave and virtuous character, whose career has been traced, who by his military operations, and more especially by his admirable and scientific retreat out of Germany, during the most disastrous period of the French Republic, has universally acquired more real reputation, than any of his cotemporaries, or perhaps any commander of ancient celebrity.

Branded by the French government with the foul epithets of traitor and hypocrite, hireling and apostate, it is the duty of every well wisher to the cause in which he fell, to place his character in its true light.

In early life General Moreau's conduct displayed the feelings of a pure and upright patriot; and his enemies will not deny his shining talents

as a soldier. Trained by, and under the able instructions of, General Pichegru, General Moreau adopted the ancient mode of warfare. His character, as a military man, was the reverse of that of the other French Generals: there was less boldness and fire in his operations, but they betrayed more talent, method, and science; and his morality, as well as his political character, has added a bright and lasting lustre to his military achievements, and acquired him the title, even among his enemies, of the Gallic Fabius.

An anecdote of this celebrated character, commencing his military career, should not here pass unnoticed. When his battalion of National Guards was first reviewed, the Inspecting General Count de Thiars de Bissy, notwithstanding the jealousy which the troops of the line then entertained of the National Guards, could not help observing "that few colonels of the line with their old corps, could have afforded him the gratification of seeing so much regularity, discipline, and precision, as in the evolutions of Moreau's battalion of National Guards." "The Count de Thiars has done me much honor," said Moreau returning from the review, "but I hope he will live long enough to see me command not only National Guards, but the army of the line."

Attached to his country, and beloved by his countrymen, he became obnoxious to Buonaparte; and for the crime of patriotism, he was tried, imprisoned and exiled. As a banished man, he owed no allegiance to his country, even had its government been legitimate.

A sentiment not to be defined, but one which is perhaps as strong as any in the whole catalogue of human feelings, prevented him from sooner taking an active part in the grand affairs of Europe. He could not draw his sword against his countrymen, whilst they successfully supported Buonaparte, but when the crisis was at hand, and the allied powers of Europe called for his presence and his talents, he quitted his retreat; not because the voice of praise and adulation had penetrated to his seclusion; not to court and receive a share of that popularity which rests upon the smiles of fortune, and may evaporate in the breath of a moment; but to lend his services, and, if necessary, yield his life, for the deliverance of his country.

The high sense of honor and nobleness of General Moreau cannot be more fully evidenced than in the following anecdotes.

Mr. D'Orsay, an emigrant, had forfeited all his property to the state, but had been allowed to return to Paris, and was, consequently, compelled to live

in the most penurious way, on the trifle he had saved, when he was one morning surprised by a visit from General Moreau, who, after expressing his compliments, observed, "I have bought an estate, Sir, which before the revolution was yours; you know such property sells very low; I have had it valued; and must beg your permission to leave with you, as your just right, the difference between the price and the estimate:" and he laid down a sum of money sufficient to make the poor emigrant comfortable.

When the Archduke Charles was on his way from Bohemia to take the command of his army, as he drew near the scene of action, he met a number of wounded abandoned by their comrades on the road, for want of horses to draw the carriages in their retreat. The prince immediately ordered the horses to be taken from several pieces of cannon that were already retreating, saying that these brave men were better worth saving than a few cannon. When General Moreau heard of this benevolent trait, he ordered the cannon to be restored, observing, that he would take no cannon that were abandoned from such humane motives.

In 1796, a few days before hostilities were resumed on the banks of the Rhine, an Austrian officer was sent to have a parley with General Moreau,

who did not conceal from him, that he was informed 30,000 men would be immediately sent from the Austrian army of Germany to that of Italy. The officer carried this intelligence to General Wurmser's head-quarters, where the order for the departure of the 30,000 men did not arrive till three days after. This fact is a proof that the French are as well served by their spies who are near the cabinets of Europe, as by those who are near the armies of their enemies.

At the close of the year 1800, General Moreau had taken advantage of the temporary suspension of military operations to return to France, and mingle the hymeneal roses with his well earned laurels. The amiable woman he selected, and who has since proved herself so worthy of the heart and hand she possessed, was a native of the Isle of France, of the name of Hulot. Her family is respectable and opulent, but she has derived no advantage from the latter circumstance, on account of the difficulties attending a process at law, in which their estates were involved.

In the year 1802, when the ancient religion was established in France, a seat in the cathedral was not allotted to Madame Moreau; while the most distant relatives of Buonaparte were seated in the most conspicuous place, above all the constituted

authorities of France. Urged by curiosity to behold a spectacle so splendid and gratifying to the Christian world, Madame Moreau endeavoured to obtain entrance into the cathedral, in the midst of undistinguished numbers. Whilst pressing forward in the crowd, she received from the musket of a soldier a blow, which nearly deprived her of life.

This savage atrocity, perpetrated on the person of a female, who was the wife of a general equal in renown to the reigning idol, and infinitely his superior in point of moral worth, created a deep sensation at Paris; nor indeed could it fail to make an impression on every feeling or reflecting mind: but the pageantry of the day effaced all minor events from the recollection of that versatile people: and the wretch, execrable as the monster who struck to the earth Agrippina, the grand-daughter of Augustus, and the widow of Germanicus, remained unpunished.

During the imprisonment and trial of her husband, Madame Moreau was suffered to be at large, and she had the intrepidity to address letters[1] of

[1] Madame Moreau having lost all her papers in a fire which took place and burnt down her house of Morrisville in America, the author is prevented from presenting correct copies of those interesting documents to the public.

remonstrance to Buonaparte, which show an amiable woman in the brightest point of view, as the courageous and affectionate defender of her husband.

Two years since, Madame Moreau, on the death of her mother, Mrs. Hulot, proceeded, accompanied by her daughter, from America to Bourdeaux, with an intention of going to Paris, to attempt a settlement with her brothers about the inheritance; but it was not until after repeated applications that she was allowed to land, and to remain on shore till her health, which was greatly impaired by the distresses of her mind, should be sufficiently re-established to permit her to prosecute her intended journey to this country, and on perceiving, from the state of the continent, that the time was arrived when General Moreau would not withhold his valuable military services and counsels from the cause of Europe, she immediately embarked for this country, and placed herself and child under the protection of the British nation.

Explanations to the accompanying Map of the Course of the Rhine, in the Environs of Strasbourg, showing the passage of the Rhine, effected by the Army of the Rhine and Moselle, and the Operations at the Siege of Kehl.

PASSAGE OF THE RHINE.

a. Troops ready to embark.
b. Point of embarkation on the arm of the Mabile.
c. Points of debarkation of the different divisions.
d. Battery of three pieces of cannon attacked by the third division.
e. Small bridge upon the arm of the Ehrlenrhin.
f. Austrian battery of two pieces of cannon.
g. Position of an Austrian battery of eight pieces of artillery.
h. Bridge of boats constructed on the day of the passage, and which existed to the termination of the siege of Kehl.
i. Flying Bridge.
k. Ferry upon the navigable canal at the sortie of the citadel.

1. Horn work of the Lower Rhine.
2. Lunette of the Kintzig.
3. Redoubt étoilée.
4. Horn work of the Upper Rhine.
5. Half Moon before the Horn work.
6. Redoubt of the Cimetière.
7. Left part of the entrenched camp.
8. Redoubt of trous de loups.
9. Right part of the entrenched camp.
10. Têtes de Pont of Ehrlenrhin.
11. Redoubt bonnet de prêtre.
12. Horn work of Ehrlenrhin.
13. Reduct for covering the flying bridge.
14. Ile des Escargots, and its entrenchments.
15. Ile de l'Estacade.
16. Ile Touffue.
17. Estacade.
18. Entrenchments of the Islands of the Kintzig.
19. Batteries of the left bank.
20. Manor of the Anabaptists.
21. Camp of the two demi-brigades of the reserve.
22. Ancient bridge of piles.
23. Ruins of the church of Kehl, and the post house.
24. Austrian battery of four pieces of heavy calibre.
25. Austrian redans, of from ten to twelve pieces.
26. Lines of contravallation.
27. Austrian camps.

APPENDIX.

(A.)

DOCUMENT ALLUDED TO IN PAGE 52.

General Dedon's Details of the Operations at the passage of the Rhine on the 24th of June, 1796, and of those immediately subsequent, which are elucidated by an accompanying Map.

LE 5, après midi, on s'occupa dans la ville de Strasbourg, après en avoir fait fermer les portes, des derniers préparantifs que la nécessité du secret avoit fait différer jusques-là. On commenca par expédier les embarcations destinées aux fausses attaques, et à les diriger sur les points où elles devoient se rendre, pour n'avoir plus ensuite à s'occuper que de ce qui étoit relatif à celle de Kehl.

On doit se rappeler que, suivant le projet arrêté, le passage devoit se tenter par cinq attaques, dont deux vraies et trois fausses, mais que celle sur Kehl étoit la principale. La réussite de celle de Gambsheim, dont le but étoit de transporter à la rive droite un corps de dix mille hommes avec quelques chevaux et quelques canons, eût singulièrement favorisé les troupes débarquées à Kehl, en prenant à dos toutce qui auroit voulu nous disputer le passage de la Kintzig,[1] et en interceptant les secours les plus considérables que l'ennemi pût espérer, et qui ne pouvoient lui arriver que par la route de Rastadt, dont nous nous serions emparés ; mais la hauteur extraordinaire des eaux et des obstacles naturels qu'on n'avoit pas pu prévoir, la firent échouer.

L'attaque de Missenheim et celles de Béclair et de la redoute d'Isaac, qui n'avoient d'autre objet

[1] La Kintzig, désignée dans les anciens ouvrages militaires sous le nom de *Quinche* ou *Kinche*, descend des montagnes Noires ; elle a plusieurs sources qui se réunissent vers Schiltach, de-là elle passe à Gengenbach, à Offembourg et à Kehl, et se jette dans le Rhin une lieue au-dessous de ce fort au village d'Auenheim. La vallée qu'elle traverse, quoique très resserrée, est une des principales communications pour traverser la chaîne des montagnes Noires, et pénétrer en Souabe.

que de détourner l'attention de l'ennemi, ont parfaitement atteint leur but. Ainsi, ayant fait connoître les emplacemens de ces quatre attaques secondaires, et tracé le tableau des forces qu'on y avoit destinées, nous ne rentrerons plus dans le détail de ce qui s'y est passé : le récit en seroit d'un intérêt médiocre, et détourneroit l'attention qui doit se fixer principalement sur la véritable attaque, celle de Kehl.

Nous eûmes lieu de craindre que l'ennemi n'eût conçu quelque jalousie sur ce point, puisque, vers le 1^er^ Messidor, il établit entre Korck et Wilstett un camp de six mille hommes, formé du contingent de Souabe, aux ordres du général Stein. Ce camp, qui n'étoit qu'à deux petites heures du point de passage, devenoit un nouvel obstacle à notre entreprise ; il devoit la rendre et plus difficile et plus meurtrière. Néanmoins, prenant une juste confiance dans la bravoure de notre infanterie, et loin d'y renoncer et de désespérer du succès,[1] nous nous crûmes assez forts pour vaincre, sans rien changer au premier projet, et sans augmenter d'un seul

[1] Ce ne fut nullement par une audace irréfléchie, mais par suite d'un calcul raisonné, qu'on se détermina à ne pas changer le point d'attaque, quoique nous eussions eu connoissance de l'établissement du camp de Wilstett.

homme le nombre déjà déterminé des troupes de débarquement.

Le 5 Messidor, à l'entrée de la nuit, les corps destinés au passage, se trouvèrent rassemblés sur les deux points principaux, ainsi qu'il suit; savoir :

Au poligone et sur les glacis de la citadelle de Strasbourg, sous les ordres du général Férino, et des adjudans-généraux Abattucci, Montrichard et Decaen.

2ᵉ bataillon de la 3ᵉ demi-brigade d'infanterie légère	970	
1ᵉʳ bataillon de la 16ᵉ *idem*	930	
31ᵉ demi-brigade de ligne	3054	
89ᵉ *idem*, ...	2315	15095
56ᵉ *idem*, ...	2769	
106ᵉ *idem*, ...	3299	
2 bataillons de la 84ᵉ	1758	
9ᵉ régiment de cavalerie	249	
18ᵉ *idem*, ...	176	
2 escadrons du 4ᵉ régiment de dragons	205	679
1ʳᵉ et 6ᵉ compagnies 2ᵉ régiment d'artillerie légère	49	
		15774

Près de Gambsheim, sous les ordres du général Beaupuy et des adjudans-généraux Bellavêne et le Vasseur.

10e demi-brigade d'infanterie légère	2640	10811
62e de ligne	2617	
103e *idem*	2746	
109e *idem*	2808	
6e régiment de dragons	452	889
2 escadrons du 8e régiment de chasseurs	226	
2 escadrons du 7e de hussards	152	
1re compag. du 2e régiment d'artillerie légère	59	
		11700

Le tout étoit aux ordres du général Dessaix.

On avoit partagé en quatre colonnes ou divisions les troupes destinées à former le premier débarquement pour l'attaque de Kehl, ainsi que les embarcations qui devoient les transporter, et chacune de ces divisions devoit aborder à un endroit désigné.

La première, formée de sept bateaux d Ill et de six grands bateaux, ayant en tête quatre nacelles, et conduite par l'adjudant-général Abatucci, devoit débarquer sur les îles boisées, formées par le vieux Rhin de Kehl, immédiatelment au-dessous de l'embouchure du bras nommé Ehrlenrhin.

La seconde division ne consistoit qu'en deux nacelles ; son objet étoit de jeter sur les îles qu'on a depuis appelées *des Escargots et de l'Estacade*, et cotées 14 et 15, une cinquantaine d'hommes, suffisans pour chasser de ces îles les postes ennemis qui auroient pu nous inquiéter.

La troisième division devoit venir ensuite; elle n'étoit composée que de quatre nacelles et de deux bateaux d'Ill, le tout monté de deux cens hommes ; mais elle étoit chargée de la tâche la plus difficile. Elle devoit chercher l'embouchure du bras d'Ehrlenrhin, et remonter ce bras l'espace d'environ cinquante toises, pour aborder sous les embrasures d'une batterie de canon, cotée *d*, et dont il étoit nécessaire de s'emparer d'abord, attendu que cette batterie eût foudroyé les troupes de la quatrième division débarquées dans l'île d'Ehrlenrhin, et qu'elle eût contrarié l'établissement du pont volant, qui devoit être notre seule communication, jusqu'à ce que le pont de bateaux fût fini. Le commandement de cette division fut confié à l'adjudant-général Decaen.

La quatrième division, formée de deux nacelles, six bateaux d'Ill et six grands bateaux, sous les ordres de l'adjudant-général Montrichard, étoit chargée d'aborder l'île d'Ehrlenrhin, et les troupes, après y être débarquées, devoient se diviser en deux

parties. Une moitié devoit marcher vers la partie supérieure de l'île, afin de découvrir des barages qu'on espéroit y trouver, et qui eussent servi de communication à la terre ferme. Le reste devoit se porter vers le petit pont *e*, dont on connoissoit à-peu-près la position, afin de s'en emparer avant que l'ennemi pût le rompre, pour que ce pont pût servir à communiquer avec les troupes de la première ou de la troisième division, suivant que ce petit pont se fût trouvé au-dessus ou audessous de l'entrée du vieux Rhin de Kehl.

Le 5, à neuf heures du soir, toutes les embarcations avoient filé hors de la ville par le canal de navigation, dans l'ordre indiqué ci-dessus, et à dix heures elles étoient toutes arrivées à l'écluse du péage, cotée *k*. Là on embarqua quatre pièces de quatre démontées, dans quatre bateaux différens, dont deux pour la première et deux pour la quatrième division ; ensuite on se mit en marche en remontant le bras Mabile jusqu'au point *b*, désigné pour l'embarquement des troupes, qui étoient en bataille au lieu marqué *a*. Il étoit plus de minuit lorsque l'on commenca à entrer dans les nacelles. Le temps étoit très serein et très calme, le clair de lune, qui nous étoit défavorable, exigeoit qu'on prît beaucoup de précautions et qu'on observât le plus grand silence. L'ennemi avoit sur les bords du Rhin des postes qui n'étoient pas à 400 mètres

(200 toisses) de nous, et, de nuit, à une si petite distance, le moindre bruit étoit capable de nous trahir. Le second battaillon de la 3e demi-brigade d'infanterie légère, et le premier de la 16e furent embarqués les premiers. L'ordre admirable avec lequel se fit cet embarquement, la bonne volonté des soldats, et l'ardeur des chefs, étoient du meiller augure. Cependant, avant qu'il fût assez avancé pour faire partir les premières nacelles, le canon des fausses attaques supérieures et inférieurs se fit entendre, et nous craignîmes que cette circonstance ne donnât l'éveil aux postes de la rive qui nous étoit opposée, et n'augmentât le danger des premiers abordages : mais nous eûmes bientôt lieu de voir par l'effroi des gardes que nous surprîmes, qu'elles ne s'étoient pas préparées à notre visite.

Enfin, à une heure et demie après minuit, les bateaux légers des quatre divisions étant chargés, le Général donna le signal du départ ; les bateaux remontèrent le long de la rive gauche, jusques vers la batterie dite de Custine, pendant qu'on continuoit à remplir les gros bateaux qui devoient les suivre et les soutenir, et qui partirent à mesure qu'ils furent chargés. Toutes ces barques traversèrent le Rhin, et abordèrent à la rive droite, aux points respectifs qui leur avoient été désignés, avec autant de bonheur que d'adresse ; car il n'y eut

pas un seul bateau qui se perdit, pas un seul qui n'abordât à-peu-près à l'endroit qui lui avoit été désigné.

Les troupes débarquèrent avec beaucoup d'audace, sans tirer un seul coup de fusil, et emportèrent à la baïonnette tous les postes ennemis, qui n'eurent que le temps de faire leur première décharge et de s'enfuir. La surprise et l'effroi dont ils furent saisis ne leur permirent même pas de songer à couper les petits ponts de communication,[1] qui se trouvoient sur les bras du Rhin, qui nous séparoient encore de la terre ferme.

La troisième colonne, chargée de remonter le bras d'Ehrlenrhin, et d'aborder la batterie *d*, essuya, en y arrivant, un coup á mitraille de chacune des trois pièces qui s'y trouvoient. Ce feu, qui ne l'ébranla nullement, ne lui causa pas une grande perte, et elle s'empara brusquement de

[1] Tous ces ponts, composés seulement de deux sapins flottans à fleur d'eau, étoient si frèles, qu'ils furent entièrement usés au bout de quelques heures, avant que la totalité de notre avant-garde y eût passé. Le pont *e* avoit été reconnu, seulement il nous avoit été impossible de bien juger de sa position, et nous ignorions s'il étoit inférieur ou supérieur à la batterie *d*, et à l'entrée du vieux Rhin de Kehl.

cette batterie[1]. Celle cotée *f* fut abandonnée après avoir tiré quelques coups, et l'ennemi fut réduit à se défendre dans les deux redoubtes 6 et 8[2].

La partie de la quatrième division, qui avoit filé sur sa droite dans le haut des îles d'Ehrlenrhin, pour y chercher des barages ou des moyens de communication au continent, avoit eu le bonheur d'y réussir. L'autre partie étoit aussi parvenue heureusement à s'emparer du pont *e*, avant qu'on eût pu le rompre, et un pareil pont avoit servi aux troupes de la première division à franchir le vieux Rhin de Kehl, aux environs de la batterie *f*, en sorte que toutes les troupes débarquées, composant les trois principales divisions, se trou-

[1] C'est à la prise de cette batterie, et non pas à l'attaque de la redoute des Trous de loups, comme je l'avois dit par erreur dans le *Mémoire militaire sur Kehl*, que nos soldats ayant sauté dans les fossés, et ne pouvant plus de là se servir avantageusement de leur feu, ramassèrent des pierres, les jetèrent par-dessus l'épaulement, et en accablèrent tellement ceux qui le défendoient, qu'ils les forcèrent, par cette nouvelle manière de combattre, d'abandonner la batterie.

[2] Ces deux redoutes, dont l'une prendra le nom de *Redoubte du Cimetière*, et l'autre celui de *Redoute des Trous de loups*, joueront un rôle important dans l'histoire du siége de Kehl.

vèrent réunies dans la plaine entre les deux digues sur le terrain voisin de la batterie *d*.

Le nombre d'hommes jeté sur la rive droite par cette première opération, pouvoit être de deux mille cinq cens environ. Ils avoient á enlever les deux redoutes 6 et 8, et à soutenir le choc des troupes que l'on devoit présumer que l'ennemi détacheroit du camp de Wilstett pour les culbuter : ils avoient conséquemment besoin de recevoir promptement des renforts.

A la suite des bateaux de débarquement, on avoit fait remonter dans le bras Mabile deux grands bateaux chargés des agrès nécessaires pour l'établissement d'un pont volant, et derrière ceux-ci venoit l'équipage de pont de soixante bateaux d'artillerie dont il a déjà été fait mention. Dès que l'éveil avoit été donné, on avoit commencé à travailler dans le bras Mabile à la construction de ce pont volant. Il étoit prés d'être achevé á la pointe du jour : mais, comme il falloit encore près de deux heures pour lui faire doubler la pointe des Epis, le conduire à sa place et en jeter les ancres ; que la grande hauteur des eaux et l'extrême rapidité du Rhin exigeoient que l'on mît beaucoup de circonspection à ces opérations, le Général, pour accélérer le passage des renforts à la rive droite, ordonna que les bateaux qui avoient servi au pre-

mier débarquement, seroient ramenés à la rive gauche pour en opérer un second. Cette manœuvre s'exécuta pendant l'établissement du pont volant, et l'on se procura ainsi, en attendant qu'on pût en faire usage, le moyen de doubler nos forces sur la rive ennemie, par les convois successifs de ces bateaux de transport.

Ce fut une opération très judicieuse, et qui doit être imitée dans toutes les circonstances semblables, que d'avoir enlevé aux premières troupes débarquées tout moyen de retraite, dans l'intention de leur procurer des secours plus prompts ; et nous avons eu lieu de nous féliciter d'avoir pris ce parti, puisque, dès que les Généraux qui commandoient le camp de Wilstett eurent avis du passage, ils s'avancèrent avec deux mille hommes d'infanterie, de la cavalerie et de l'artillerie pour nous renverser ; mais leur choc fut soutenu par notre infanterie formée dans la plaine, sous la protection de deux de nos pièces de quatre et de deux canons pris à l'ennemi.

Le pont volant fut entièrement établi vers six heures du matin, et on s'en servit pour passer quelques chevaux qui défilèrent un à un et avec bien de la peine sur le pont *e* ; mais on ne put en profiter pour passer de l'artillerie, attendu que les îles d'Ehrlenrhin étoient impracticables pour du

canon. Le reste de la matinée fut employé à faire passer de l'infanterie, et par le pont volant, et tout-à-la-fois par les bateaux qui alloint et venoient continuellement, mais dont le service étoit néanmoins rallenti par la force de la dérive occasionnée par la grande rapidité du fleuve.

L'intention du Général, pour ne pas compromettre l'équipage de pont, étoit de n'en faire commencer la construction que lorsque nous serions entièrement maîtres de Kehl, de facon que sans artillerie, presque sans cavalerie, mais avec une infanterie excellente, il falloit emporter les redoutes 3, 6, et 8, la ville et le village de Kehl, et résister aux efforts de la réserve camdée à Wilstett.

Notre avant-garde, alors composée des deux bataillons d'infanterie lègére dont il a déjà é'é fait mention, et d'une partie des 31^{e}, 56^{e} et 89^{e} d'infanterie de ligne, se divisa pour attaquer à-lo-fois les redoutes; une partie suivit la digue et marcha à celle du Cimetière, et l'autre se dirigea vers celle des Trous de loups.

La redoute du Cimetière et la batterie *g* avoient inquiété par quelques coups de canon l'établissement du pont volant, mais sans succès. Elles étoient elles-mêmes battues, de la rive gauche, par notre grande batterie de la culée du pont, et nos

canonniers tiroient avec tant de justesse, que plusieurs de ceux de la redoute eurent les têtes emportées ; aussi ne fit-elle pas une longue résistance.

L'attaque de la redoute 8 (des Trous de loups) fut plus sérieuse. Elle débuta par une fusillade terrible et bien soutenue de part et d'autre. Elle étoit défendue par trois cens hommes d'infanterie et cinq bouches à feu. Elle fi pendant quelque temps une défense très vigoureuse ; mais, tournée par la gorge, et assaillie de toute part, elle céda à la fin à l'audace de nos troupes.[1]

Après la prise de cette redoute, l'ennemi ne se défendit que foiblement. Cependant la cavalerie des émigrés chargea avec assez de bravoure une compagnie de grenadiers de la 31^e^ ; mais elle fut repoussée avec perte. Nos tirailleurs chasèrent l'ennemi du fort[2] de la ville et du village de Kehl

[1] C'est là que l'on fit prisonnier le fils du prince de Furstemberg.

[2] On ne doit pas croire que le fort de Kehl fût à cette époque en état de défense ; il avoit été rasè après avoir été cédé à l'Empire par le traité de Bâde, et depuis il n'avoit pas été rétabli : il n'en existoit que les fondemens, les reliefs en étoient effacés, et les fossés comblés. On avoit construit, depuis cette guerre, pour la défense de ce point, les trois redoutes de la plaine, es les batteries indiquées sur la carte ci-jointe ; et ces redoutes une fois prises, Kehl n'offroit guére

et de la redoute étoilée 3. Il ne nous disputa même pas le passage de la Kintzig, comme on auroit pu s'y attendre; et vers les dix heures du matin, nous étions déjà maîtres de tous ces postes, et nous poursuivions l'ennemi sur la route d'Offembourg.

Le reste du jour, il ne se passa plus rien de bien intéressant à le rive drote. Le pont volant et les bateaux de transport étoient employés sans relâche á passer de l'infanterie :[1] on se tirailla de part et d'autre jusqu'à la nuit, et nous fimes encore quelques prisonniers dans la soirée.

Nous prîmes en tout dans cette journée quatre à cinq cens hommes, deux mille fusils, treize pièces de canon, un obusier et plusieurs caissons ; l'enemi eut six cens hommes tués ou blessés, et nous n'en perdîmes pas le quart.[2]

plus de moyens de résistance qu'un village ordinaire, et par conséquent il n'étoit nullement à l'abri d'un coup de main.

[1] Les troupes destinées à l'attaque de Gambsheim n'y ayant pas réussi, étoient venues renforcer celle de Kehl.

[2] Jamais victoire aussi complette et aussi importante n'a coûté aussi peu de monde; nous n'avons pas perdu deux cens hommes tant tués que blessés. Le citoyen Girard, capitaine du second régiment d'artillerie à pied, y fut tuè;

A deux ou trois heures après midi, on commença à s'occuper de la construction du pont. On étoit d'abord convenu de l'établir un peu au-dessous du pont volant aboutissant à l'île d'Ehrlenrhin ; mais comme les communications étoient impracticables dans cette île, et qu'on se trouvoit maître de Kehl, et dans une position à pouvoir sans danger l'établir bien plus avantageusement à la gorge du fort, on résolut de le placer environ à 200 mètres (150 tois.) en dessous du vieux pont, dans un endroit coté *h*, où le Rhin se trouve partagé en deux bras par une île basse et sablonneuse. On fit descendre de la pointe des Epis l'équipage de bateaux qui y étoit rassemblé, et dès qu'il fut arrivé au-dessous de l'emplacement désigné, on travailla à jeter le pont. Ce travail fut commencé à six heures du soir, continué toute la nuit, et entièrement terminé sur les deux bras le 7 Messidor entre dix et onze heures du matin.[1]

le citoyen Bec-de-lièvre, chef de bataillon de la 3 demi-brigade d'infanterie légère, y fut blessé.

[1] Ce pont fut composé de quarante-sept bateaux, dont trente-sept sur le grand courant, et dix sur le bras de Kehl. Pour faciliter la communication du pont volant avec la rive droite, on avoit construit simultanément sur le bras d'Ehrlenrhin, à la place du petit pont *e*, un pont de bateaux qui a subsisté jusqu'à la fin du siège de Kehl.

Ce ne fut qu'à cet instant que la communication des deux rives fut solidement établie, et que notre position fut bien assurée sur la droite. Alors seulement on put se féliciter de la réussite de cette grande entreprise déjà tentée infructueusement en 1793,[1] et dont le succès devoit procurer à la France l'avantage inappréciable de voir le théâtre de la guerre s'éloigner de ses frontières, et de faire vivre ses armées aux dépens de l'ennemi.

1 Le passage du Rhin, tenté le 17 Septembre 1793, à Huningue, à Niffren, à Kehl et à Fort-Vauban tout-à-la-fois, n'a échoué que parce qu'il avoit été très-mal concerté ; on avoit alors abondance de moyens en tout genre ; et si on avoit dirigé cette opération avec la prudence et l'intelligence nécessaires, elle auroit infailliblement réussi. On voulut en rejeter la faute sur le corps des pontonniers ; mais la conduite de ce corps, dans les derniès campagnes, prouve évidemment qu'on n'a dû attribuer ce revers qu'à l'ignorance et à l'étourderie de ceux qui dirigeoient l'opération : et tous les militaires instruits qui ont été à portée d'en juger, sont d'accord là-dessus. C'est avec une extrême surprise que j'ai lu, dans le second volume des *Campagnes des Français*, page 287, que nous passâmes le Rhin à cette époque, dans deux endroits différens ; qu'un de ces passages nous valut la prise de Kehl, et qu'on s'empressa d'en rétablir les fortifications, et de jeter un pont sur ce fleuve, etc. La vérité est, au contraire, que le passage d'alors ne réussit nulle part, et que ceux qui sacrifièrent béaucoup de braves gens à une tentative ridiculement combinée, ne voulant pas perdre en entier la gloire qu'ils s'en étoient promise, firent bombarder, sans aucun but utile, les habitations de

Les Autrichiens et leurs partisans ayant affecté dans le temps de présenter le passage du Rhin comme l'effet d'une témérité aveugle, dont l'heureuse issue, selon eux, ne doit être attribuée qu'à la poltronnerie et à la mauvaise conduite des troupes des cercles à qui la garde du Rhin étoit confiée, et à quelques hasards heureux qui secondèrent notre audace, je m'étois efforcé de démentir ces absurdes allégations, et de prouver que le succès de cette tentative avoit été le résultat naturel de l'habileté de nos dispositions et de l'intrépide valeur de nos troupes.

Mais depuis, la réussite d'un second passage du Rhin, plus audacieusement entrepris, et bien plus opiniâtrement défendu que le premier, et d'autres exploits non moins étonnans, ont dû convaincre

Kehl et celles du vieux Brisach qui furent réduites en cendre. Nous invitons le citoyen Liger à mieux choisir les sources où il puise les matériaux dont il compose son immense histoire, et à se defier des gazettes du temps. Ce n'est pas la seule erreur qui lui soit échappée dans ce qu'il a dit des armées du Rhin. Les difficultiés que j'ai éprouvées pour tracer seulement l'esquisse de la campagne d'une armée, me donnent la plus haute idée des talents d'un Ecrivain qui entreprend l'histoire militaire de toute la révolution; et si j'ose lui donner ce conseil, c'est pour la perfection d'un ouvrage aussi intéressant, et d'un plan aussi étendu que le sien.

les plus incrédules que rien n'est impossible à la valeur française, lorsqu'elle est guidée par le génie et l'expérience. Cette vérité effrayante pour ceux qui voudroient encore se montrer nos ennemis, a dû leur être démontrée par ces nouveaux succès d'une manière plus convaincante que par tous nos raisonnemens. Néanmoins, comme je crois qu'il peut être utile de mettre le lecteur à portée d'apprécier le pour et le contre, et de juger par lui-même du degré de probabilité que nous pouvions avoir de réussir au passage du Rhin, je vais suspendre un instant le récit des opérations de la campagne, pour essayer de lui présenter, d'un côté les obstacles que l'ennemi pouvoit opposer à nos progrès sur la rive droite, en supposant qu'il ne négligeât aucune de ses ressources, et lui montrer de l'autre quels moyens nous avions pour surmonter ces obstacles.

Je ne ferai pas entrer en ligne de compte toutes les entraves que notre situation, le manque de chevaux, la pénurie d'argent et les besoins de toute espèce, ont apportées à nos préparatifs. Je ne parlerai pas non plus des obstacles qui résultoient de l'état du fleuve extrêmement gonflé par la fonte des neiges, qui a lieu dans les Alpes à cette époque, ni du clair de lune qui pouvoit trahir le secret de l'embarquement, ni de toutes les contrariétés qu'on éprouve nécessairement dans les acces-

soires d'une opération aussi compliquée, et qui entraîne autant de détails. Quoique la moindre de ces contrariétés suffise quelquefois pour faire tout échouer, comme à force d'efforts et de persévérance nous pouvions maîtriser les événemens sur notre rive, je ne mettrai dans la balance que les obstacles que l'ennemi pouvoit nous opposer, à compter de notre abord sur celle qu'il devoit défendre.

Admettons à la rigueur que les postes répandus dans les îles où nous sommes descendus, et dans la batterie *d*, aient fait leur service avec assez de surveillance pour ne pas se laisser surprendre, et pour que leurs sentinelles aient aperçu les premières barques à leur débouché du bras Mabile; supposons même que tous ces postes se soient mis sous les armes pour s'opposer à l'abordage des bateaux, est-il présumable que de simples gardes eussent pu empêcher le débarquement d'une flotille entière, dont le Rhin fut couvert en un instant, et qui portoit plus de deux mille hommes bien déterminés? Et n'étoit-il pas au contraire très vraisemblable, qu'en voyant les premières barques suivies d'un nombre considérable de grands bateaux pour les soutenir, ces gardes s'enfuiroient, et qu'elles iroient porter l'effroi dans les corps dont elles faisoient partie, en exagérant encore, comme de coutume, le nombre des assaillans?

De la pointe des Epis, il ne faut que quelques minutes et quelques coups de rames pour traverser le Rhin : ainsi, nous ne devions pas beaucoup redouter l'effet de l'artillerie ennemie. On sait qu'à cette heure les canonniers sont endormis ; qu'avant qu'ils aient tout préparé, et qu'ls puissent tirer le premier coup de canon, il s'écoule bien quelques minutes ; sans compter qu'une pareille alerte répand toujours beaucoup de confusion dans leur service. En effet, chaque pièce quî eût pu contrarier le débarquement, ne tira qu'un coup ; et comme la batterie *d*, reconnue pour la plus fortement armée et la plus dangereuse par sa position, fut abordée par une colonne qui débarqua immédiatement sous ses embrasures, et qu'elle fut enlevée à la baïonnette et à coups de pierres, la première défense de l'ennemi se trouva paralysée avant qu'il eût pu en tirer quelque parti : on devoit s'y attendre d'après les mesures que nous avions prises, et la connoissance parfaite que nous nous étions procurée de la disposition de ses postes et de ses batteries. Aussi n'étoit-ce pas le succès de ce premier pas qui pouvoit paroître incertain ; et pour oser le franchir, il n'étoit pas nécessaire de compter sur la lâcheté des corps chargés de s'y opposer ;[1] car il est tou-

[1] Ce premier succès est dû certainement en partie à la justesse des dispositions qu'on avoit faites, et aux combinaisons d'après lesquelles on avoit déterminé les points d'abor-

jours très probable que des troupes, quelqu' excellentes qu'on les suppose, qui seront disséminées en petits postes pour la garde d'une ligne quelconque, ne la défendront avec un peu de vigueur que lorsqu'elles se seront attendues à être attaques, qu'elles se seront préparées à la défense, et qu'elles auront en même-temps l'espoir d être promptement secourues par des réserves; et l'on ne devoit pas s'attendre á une résistance opiniâtre de la part de gens surpris et déconcertés par la multiplicité et la vivacité des attaques.

Parvenus à débarquer, nous avions encore bien des obstacles à surmonter; mais c'étoit déjà un grand point d'avoir un pied en terre ferme et des troupes à l'autre bord d'Ehrlenrhin, pour tendre la

dages des différentes divisions. Effectivement on peut se convaincre aisement, et par les details que nous avons donnés, et par l'examen de notre carte, que la troisième division en remontant le bras d'Ehrlenrhin, et en s'emparant de la batterie *d*, nous procura la double avantage de nous donner pied en terre ferme, et d'éteindre le feu de la batterie la plus dangereuse. La tâche de cette division étoit difficile ; d'abord il étoit possible que les bataliers manquassent l'embouchure de ce bras, qui est assez étroite; ensuite il falloit beaucoup d'audace pour le remonter à force de rames, dans un espace de plus de cinquante toises: aussi elle fut confiée aux bateliers les plus hardis, et l'adjudant-général Decaen, depuis général de brigade, officier aussi intelligent qu'intrépide, fut chargé de la commander.

main à celles à qui ce bras restoit encore à passer. En coupant ses petits ponts de communication, et entr'autres le pont *e*, l'ennemi auroit infailliblement retardé notre passage. Néanmoins, au moyen des bateaux de transport de la troisième division, et de quelque agrès de pont préparés à cet effet à la pointe des Epis, on seroit bientôt parvenu à faire un pont plus solide et plus commode que le pont *e*, sur lequel on étoit obligé de défiler un à un; il auroit été terminé avant que l'ennemi eût eu le temps de rassembler assez d'infanterie pour marcher à nous. Quant à la cavalerie, elle n'eût pas été redoutable dans un terrain marécageux, couvert de broussailles et coupé de digues et de flaques d'eau, tel que celui qui s'étend du bras d'Ehrlenrhin à Kehl. Il étoit naturel d'ailleurs d'imaginer que dans le premier moment de sa surprise, l'ennemi n'auroit ni le temps ni la présence d'esprit nécessaires pour couper ces ponts; nous avions bien compté là-dessus, et l'événement a prouvé que notre calcul étoit bien fondé.

S'il eût garni d'infanterie les digues de la plaine, notre victoire nous auroit été plus disputée, et nous auroit peut-être coûté plus cher; mais il est douteux qu'il eût pu d'abord rassembler assez de monde pour profiter de cette ressource, et ces digues nous eussent bien foiblement arrêtés, si elles eussent été mal garnies.

Quant à la batterie *g* de la tête de pont, elle étoit trop éloignée du point d'attaque, et trop inquiétée par nos batteries de la rive gauche, pour que son feu fût bien dangereux. Les redoutes 6 et 8 du Cimetière et des Trous de loups ont fait tout ce qu'elles pouvoient faire. La première, mal défilée, étoit écrasée par la batterie de gros calibre que nous avions à la culée du grand pont sur la rive gauche; il n'étoit pas tenable: la seconde a fait une belle défense, et telle q'on eût pu l'exiger des troupes les plus aguerries.

On voit sur la carte ci-jointe quelle étoit notre position après avoir enlevé ces deux redoutes. L'ennemi restoit maître de la ville et du village de Kehl; il pouvoit nous les disputer ainsi que la redoute étoilée 3, et défendre le passage de la Kintzig. Nos tirailleurs ont suffi pour le chasser de tous ces postes, et non-seulement il ne nous a pas disputé le passage de cette rivière, mais il n'a pas même pris la précaution d'en couper le pont, de façon que nous nous sommes trouvés maîtres de la grande route, qui au-delà de ce pont se divise en deux, celle de Rastadt, et celle d'Offembourg.

On pourroit se persuader au premier coup-d'œil, que si l'ennemi eût mis plus d'opiniâtreté à se maintenir à Kehl, et dans la redoute étoilée; si, en abandonnant ces postes, il eût rompu le pont de la

Kintzig, et s'il nous eût vivement disputé le passage de cette rivière, on pourroit, dis-je, se persuader qu'ayant ainsi donné le temps à la totalité des troupes du camp de Wilstett d'arriver à son secours, il nous eût infailliblement culbutés dans le Rhin : mais si l'on considère qu'au moment oú nous sommes entrés dans Kehl, nous devions avoir au moins cinq mille hommes d'excellente infanterie à la rive droite, sur un terrain coupé très favorable à cette arme ; que le pont volant, qui étoit en active, et les bateaux de transport donnoient passage à cinq cens hommes et plus à chaque quart-d'heure ; que l'ennemi, qui ne devoit guère avoir d'abord plus de mille hommes à Kehl, en avoit déjà perdu cinq cens ; que le grand feu des fausses attaques sur toute l'étendue du Rhin devoit rendre les Chefs très irrésolus et retenir chacun à son poste, et que les Généraux ennemis, mal informés de nos véritables forces, devoient naturellement se les exagérer, on cessera d'être surpris des fautes que'ils commirent dans cette circonstance, et l'on conviendra que ces fautes présumables devoient entrer pour beaucoup dans le calcul des probabilités que nous avions de réussir. On sentira aussi l'inutilité des efforts qu'eussent pu faire les débris de la garnison de Kehl, pour défendre la Kintzig, avant l'arrivée de quelques renforts plus considérables que ceux qui'ls avoient pu recevoir jusqu'alors, contre des forces plus que doubles, et dans des circons-

tances où l'influence si puissante du moral du soldat est aussi favorable à celui qui attaque que contraire à celui qui se défend. D'ailleurs, l'ardeur que nos troupes mirent à la poursuite de l'ennemi, ne lui eût pas laissé le temps de couper le pont de cette rivière assez complétement, pour qu'il ne pût être promptement, répare et practicable au moins pour l'infanterie, et cette rivière étant guéable alors en beaucoup d'endroits, cette précaution de sa part ne nous eût que foiblement arrêtés.

On avoit prévu que l'ennemi défendroit cette position, et le passage de Gambsheim avoit principalement pour objet de l'obliger à la quitter. Ainsi, si d'un côté la fortune nous a été favorable à quelques égards, de l'autre elle nous a mal secondés, en faisant manquer cette attaque secondaire par quelques incidens auxquels on n'avoit pas dû s'attendre. D'ailleurs, si l'ennemi nous eût forcés par plus d'opiniâtreté à nous disputer le passage de la Kintzig, nous aurions déployé contre lui de nouveaux moyens qui l'eussent certainement étonné, et nous avions préparé d'avance une opération qui n'a pas eu lieu, parce qu'elle est devenue inutile, et à laquelle il n'eût pu rien opposer : mais par prudence, je dois en supprimer les détails.

Il est donc incontestable que le pont volante une fois établi, et il l'étoit à six heures du matin, il

étoit impossible à l'ennemi de rassembler dans le jour assez de forces pour que nous n'eussions pas toujours sur lui l'avantage du nombre.[1] Nous

[1] Calculons les forces de l'ennemi dans les environs de Kehl, et combinons si d'après le temps présumé nécessaire pour les rassembler et marcher contre nous, il lui étoit possible d'avoir l'avantage du nombre avant l'établissement du pont. Le camp de Wilstett étoit fort de dix-huit cents chevaux et de quatre mille hommes à pied environ. De ce camp étoient probablement détachés les cantonnemens des villages voissins de Korck, Neumühl, Sundheim, etc.; il y avoit mille hommes à Kehl, qui gardoient depuis Marlen jusqu'à Auenheim. Supposons deux mille hommes répandus dans les villages de Missenheim, d'Altenheim, Goldschir et Marlen; deux mille dans ceux d'Auenheim, Litzenheim, Diersheim et jusques vis-à-vis Gambsheim. A deux heures du matin, nous ne pouvions avoir contre nous que les gardes ordinaires des bords du Rhin et des redoutes de Kehl. Il devoit bien être quatre heures avant que le premier moment de la surprise eût permis aux chefs qui commandoient à Kehl de rassembler tout leur monde, et de faire des dispositions défensives qui le missent tout en action. Voilà donc mille hommes contre nous, et nous en avions deux mille cinq cens débarqués. Le général Stein qui commandoit, dut recevoir à la fois des avis venant des differens points d'attaque, ce qui dut augmenter son étonnement et son incertitude, et différer l'expédition de ses ordres; et ce n'est pas exagérer de dire que ce lui qu'il envoya au camp de Wilstett pour marcher contre nous, ne put guère y arriver avant six heures. En supposant qu'on eût pu l'exécuter sur-le-champ, et que toutes les troupes qui le composoient eussent pu se mettre en mouvement, elles ne seroient pas arrivées à Kehl avant neuf heures. A

manquions à la vérité d'artillerie et de troupes à cheval ; mais une grande supériorité en infanterie, et en infanterie excellente, nous eût mis à même de résister aux plus grands efforts dont il eût été capable.

Mais à la nuit, le pont étant à peine commencé, et l'ennemi ne pouvant plus prendre le change sur le vrai point d'attaque, on pouvoit crainde qu'il

cette heure il y avoit donc possibilité que nous eussions contre nous six mille hommes, dont quinze cens de cavalerie. Ajoutons aux deux mille cinq cens hommes du premier débarquement, quatre mille cinq cens hommes passés en trois heures sur le pont volant, et trois mille au moins fournis par le passage successif des bateaux de transport, et l'on verra que dans cette supposition, nous avions encore à opposer à l'enemi trois mille cinq cens hommes de plus qu'il ne lui eût été possible d'en rassembler ; cette supériorité eût été plus qne suffisante pour compenser le manque d'artillerie et de cavalerie, sans même avoir aucun égard à la bravoure et au moral des troupes, les redoutes de la plaine sur-tout étant déjà en notre pouvoir. Pendant le reste de la journée, l'ennemi, inquiété par les fausses attaques n'eût pas osé se dégarnir au-dessus ni au-dessous de Kehl, et le nombre calculé ci-dessus ne pouviot s'accroître. Notre supériorité relative augmentoit donc de douze à quinze cens hommes toutes les heures ; il étoit donc pue probable qu'il vînt nous attaquer avant qu'il eût reçu de loin des renforts considérables, qui lui donnassent l'avantage du nombre : ce qui ne pouvoit avoir lieu avant l'établissement du pont.

ne joignit aux six mille hommes campés à Wilstett, les troupes qui formoient le cordon sur le Rhin à quelques lieues de distance, et qu'il ne rassemblât ainsi un corps assez considérable pour attaquer avec avantage, avant que l'établissement du pont nous eût misà même de faire soutenir notre infanterie par de l'artillerie et de la cavalerie : on pouvoit même s'attendre à un choc d'autant plus violent, qu'il ne lui restoit plus que cette ressource, et qu'il devoit bien savoir que le pont fini, il ne seroit plus temps de rien entrependre contre nous, avec quelqu'espèce de succès. Aussi, notre position sur la rive droite, avec un pont volant pour toute communication, sans cavalerie, presque sans canon, n'ayant de secours à attendre que de notre courage, nous parut, à l'entrée de la nuit, un peu plus critique que dans le jour. Cependant on voit en réfléchissant, que même en relevant tous ses postes sur le Rhin, l'ennemi n'eût pu rassembler assez de troupes pour avoir sur nous la supériorité du nombre, puisque le 9, il n'avoit encore pu réunir dans le camp de Bihel, plus de quinze mille hommes environ, et qu'au moyen des renforts qui passoient sur le pont volant, nous devions avoir sur la rive droite, avant la nuit, un nombre d'hommes au moins égal à celui-ci, et que conséquemment nous étions bien en mesure de soutenir ses attaques. Malgré ces considérations, et malgré la grande probabilité qu'il y eût été repoussé, rien ne l'excuse de n'avoir tenté aucun effort pen-

dant toute la nuit. Nous avons sans doute été redevables de la tranquillité dont il nous a laissé jouir, à l'irrésolution de ses Généraux, ainsi qu'à la terreur et à la confusion qui se répandent ordinairement parmi des troupes qui se sont laissé surprendre.

Je crois qu'il est maintenant bien démontré, que tout ce que l'ennemi eût pu faire pour mettre obstacle à notre passage, n'en eût pas empêché la réussite. Il eût pu, sans doute, en profitant de tous ses avantages, le rendre plus difficile et plus meurtrier ; mais le plan de cette opération étoit si bien combiné, et tout y étoit si bien prévu, qu'il eût fallu un malheur bien obstiné pour ne pas y réussir. Ainsi, quoique l'on doive toujours regarder comme une action très hasardeuse celle de passer un fleuve, comme le Rhin, à la vue de l'ennemi, lorsque celui qui l'entreprend a parfaitement calculé ses mouvemens, qu'il est parvenu, par d'habiles manœuvres, à donner le change, et qu'il peut compter sur le courage des roupes, il ne peut être accusé d'une aveugle témérité. Il me semble, au contraire, qu'à la guerre on doit donner quelque chose au hasard, et qu'en pareil cas, on doit compter au nombre de ses avantages, la surprise et l'effroi qu'on inspire toujours à son ennemi par une tentative audacieuse : et l'on conviendra que si la fortune nous a été favorable, nous avons bien su

la maîtriser par la sagesse de nos dispositions, et que l'ntelligence et le zèle des chefs, la bravoure et le dévouement du soldat dans cette circonstance méritoient bien d'être couronnés du plus heureux succès.

APPENDIX

(B.)

DOCUMENT ALLUDED TO IN PAGE 123.

Etat des troupes employées à la défense de Kehl.
1796-7.

Les Généraux Dessaix et St. Cyr, commandant la défense, et se relevant tous les cinq jours.

Le Général de Division Eblé, ayant sous ses ordres le Chef de Brigade Lobréau, commandant l'Artillerie.

Le Général de Brigade Boisgérard, commandant le Génie.

Le Chef de Battaillon Dédon, chargé en chef des équipages de ponts.

Généraux de Division.	Généraux de Brigade.	Demi-Brigades.	Nombre des Bataill.
		3e de ligne.	3
	Davoust.	10 *idem* . . .	3
Ambert.		31 *idem* . . .	3
	Decaen.	44 *idem* . . .	3
		62 *idem* . . .	3
	Eckmayer.	68 *idem* . . .	3
Duhesme.		76 *idem* . . .	3
	Lecourbe.	84 *idem* . . .	3
		93 *idem* . . .	1
	Montrichard	97 *idem* . . .	3
St. Suzanne.		100 *idem* . . .	3
	Tarreau.	103 *idem* . . .	3
		106 *idem* . . .	3
		109 *idem* . . .	3
			40

Nota De ces quarante bataillons, quinze étoient journellement de service a la rive droite: savoir, six dans le fort de Kehl, trois dans le camp retranché, trois dans les iles d'Ehrleurhin, et trois dans l'ile de la Kintzig. Une réserve de six bataillons campoit a la rive gauche dans l'ile du Rhin. Le Général Saint-Cyr ne vint relever Dessaix que vers la fin de Frimaire.

Tableau de l'armée Autrichienne employés au siége de Kehl.

Le Général Latour, Général d'Artillerie, commandant le siége: son quartier-général étoit à Korch;
Le Field-Maréchal-Lieutenant Kollowrath, commandant l'Artillerie;
Le Colonel Szeredai, Directeur du Génie.

INFANTERIE.

Staeder, Lieutenant-Général.
Le Prince Frédéric d'Orange, Zopf, Généraux-Majors.

	Bataillons.	
Grün-Laudon, corps franc	2	
Szeckler	1	
Bannat	1	
Esclavons	2	12
Starray	3	
Bengorsky	2	
Nadasty	1	
		12

	Bataillons.	
De l'autre part	12	
Burger, Terney, Généraux-Majors.		
Archiduc Antoine	1	
Olivier Wallis	2	
Kaunitz	2	
Alton	3	
Joseph Colloredo	1	15
Gemmingen	1	
Kaiser	1	
Grenadiers de Retz, Reisinger, Dietrich et Pitsch	4	
Petrasch, Lieutenant-Général.		
Kerpen, Foulon, Généraux-Majors.		
Corps franc de Gyulay . . .	2	
Archiduc Charles	3	
François Kinsky	2	
Charles Schoeder	2	
Grand Duc de Toscane . . .	2	14
Michel Wallis	1	
Wenceslas Colloredo	1	
De Ligne	1	
Riese, Lieutenant-Général.		
Baillet-Latour, Sebottendorff, Hegel, Généraux-Majors.		
Corps franc de Servie	2	
Wartensleben	3	
Esclavons	1	
Hohenlohe	2	14
Wenckheim	1	
Gemmingen	1	
Grenadiers de Candiani, Szenassi, Absaltern et Büdeskuty	4	
Total	55	

CAVALERIE.

Mels-Colloredo, Kospoth, Lieutenans-Généraux.
Merfeld, O'Reilly, Nauendorf, Génér.-Majors.

	Escadrons.
Hussards des frontières	10
Levener, chevaux-légers . . .	6
Karackray, *idem*	6
Prince de Lorraine, cuirassiers . . .	6
Kaiser, chevaux-légers	6
Kaiser, carabiniers	2
Archiduc Jean, dragons	4
Hoenzollern, cuirassiers	6
Total	46

Nota. L'emigré Klingin de Strasbourg, général-major au service de l'Empereur, s'y rendit utile à l'ennemi par les connoissances qu'il avoit des localités; plusiers ingénieurs français émigrés servoient à ce siége. Les troupes employées à la garde du Rhin ne sont pas comprises dans ce tableau.

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Vendemaire	begins	Sept. 22.
Brumaire		Oct. 23.
Frimaire		Nov. 22.
Nivôse		Dec. 22.
Pluvôse		Jan. 21.
Ventôse		Feb. 20.
Germinal		March 22.
Floreal		April 21.
Prairial		May 21.
Messidor		June 20.
Thermidor		July 20.
Fructidor		Aug. 19.

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